Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor StatesCambridge University Press, 2010 M08 23 This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership structure they choose to manage their mineral wealth and second, that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states. Each represents a significant departure from the conventional resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their respective developmental trajectories since independence demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across countries that share the same institutional legacy but also that this variation helps to explain the divergence in their subsequent fiscal regimes. |
Contents
1 | |
11 | |
Taxation and Expenditure in MineralRich | 31 |
State Ownership with Control versus Private Domestic | 45 |
State Ownership with Control | 77 |
Domestic Private | 121 |
State Ownership without Control versus Private Foreign | 181 |
State Ownership without | 219 |
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Common terms and phrases
actors adopted Almaty Atyrau Authors Azerbaijan Baku benefits budget budgetary company’s country’s direct claimants DPOs EBRD effects energy example expenditures export Finance FOCs foreign investors form of ownership funds Gazprom governing elites government’s host governments ibid implicit incentive income increase industry institutions interview investment Kazakhstan Lukoil managers mineral rents mineral sector mineral wealth mineral-rich model contract moreover name withheld oil and gas oil companies oil prices oil sector OPEC ownership structure percent of GDP petroleum sector political population proceeds from mineral production PSAs regions resource curse ROCs role Rosneft Russia S2 and P2 Saudi Arabia share SOCAR social spending SOFAZ Soviet Union stability state’s Statoil strategy strong fiscal regimes subsidies tax burden Tax Code tax reform tax regime taxation tion transparency Turkmenistan Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Uzbekneftegaz weak fiscal regimes World Bank