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our officers below the rank of general are draft motivated. He pointed out that this attitude had also invaded the Military and Naval Academies. He then asked, “What kind of leaders will we have when hundreds of boys at the Academies are there, not because they want to be officers but because they don't want to be enlisted men?”

This officer attitude communicates itself to the men. But there is also resentment on the part of the enlisted men who volunteer in order to avoid being drafted. The Secretary of the Navy in May 1958, stated “over a long period the increasing disciplinary problems in the Naval Establishment, especially a.w.o.l. rates and the brig population, have been a matter of grave concern to me. The a.w.o.l. rate rose 30 percent in 1957 over 1956 and courts-martial continue at the rate of 1,000 a week. The human and financial losses * * * cannot be afforded."

(5) The alternative to conscription is a voluntary Military Establishment.In Great Britain a Government committee has been appointed “to examine the factors bearing on the willingness of men and women to serve in the Armed Forces and to make recommendations." The U.S. Government, on the other hand, has been so ordered toward compulsion that there have been since 1915 a number of Presidential or congressional commissions to consider the value of universal military training and none to promote a voluntary estiblishment.

The British committee has already suggested better housing, married quarters, a shorter working day with more intensive employment, the ending of mounting formal guard on camp gates, kit inspections, and pay parades. It has deplored some indications of the caste idea which the Manchester Guardian describes as "expressions of a basic attitude, carried over from an age in which the officer was a country gentleman, intent on cultivating certain social virtues in himself and his fellow officers. That attitude will change as the officers structure of the army is changed, and as technical efficiency comes to be regarded as the prime requirement. The most valuable recruits for the Armed Forces will be men and women who would do well in comparable employment in civilian life and who will therefore expect comparable standards of efficiency and treatment." (Manchester Guardian Weekly, Nov. 6, 1958.)

In the United States three important suggestions have been made that would result in an adequate volunteer establishment. The first is the proposal that a living wage, on a par with that of other Government workers, be paid to first-term enlisted men and that adequate increases be provided to solve the reenlistment problem.

The second is that Congress provide for decent housing and other decent community standards in places where military personnel must live.

The third is to change the Army idea that every cook, bookkeeper, and warehouse employee must be physically qualified for and given combat training. No more than 20 percent of an army are combat troops. The rest are supply or support personnel. Representative Thomas B. Curtis, in a speech before the Sea bee Veterans Convention in St. Louis in 1954, said:

“When we examine * * * the work performed by men in uniform for the Military Establishment, we will find that at least 80 percent (and some even estimate higher) is not fighting nor will it ever be fighting. It has to do with supplies, transportation, warehousing, maintenance, overhaul, bookkeeping, housing, feeding, overhead. Nor am I referring to the borderline cases, such as field or frontline maintenance, or frontline feedings, etc. Obviously, any work on the front lines will involve the need for military discipline.

“Now if 80 percent of the men in uniform are never going to be engaged in fighting * * * what in Heaven's name are we talking about training 100 percent to fight. If indeed an analysis of the job requirements of these 80 percent reveals, as it does, that the skills required are essentially civilian skills as were the skills needed in the Seabees, then we had best follow the Seabees formula in our personnel practices as it relates to the 80 percent."

The Seabee formula was to take men of all ages and physical conditions from civilian life and use their civilian skills without putting them through basic military training or into uniform or under the miltary code.

Representatve Curtis added: "The men in the Seabees were put into jobs they already knew. The guiding light of the personnel system was to utilize civilian skills. The military knows full well that they need civilian skills. What they have not yet learned is that the civilian enterprise is better equipped to train men in these skills than the military and incidentally at one-tenth the cost, because we don't have to provide room, board, and wages for our civilian trainees." Respectfully submitted.

John M. SWOMLEY, Jr.


Washington, D.C., January 26, 1959. Hon. CARL VINSON, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed is a copy of the resolution passed at our 63d annual national convention held in Los Angeles, Calif., August 3-10, 1958, dealing with the extension of the Selective Service System. Since it is not possible for me to appear before your committee in person, a privilege and honor, I shall appreciate your inclusion of this resolution in the record of your hearings as an expression of our stand on the legislation which you are considering. With all good wishes. Cordially,

BERNARD WEITZER, National Legislative Director.

SELECTIVE SERVICE Whereas the existence of full induction authority under the Universal Military Training Service Act enables the Selective Service System (1) to insure that the required strength of the Activ Armed Forces be maintained both directly by inductions and indirectly by stimulating enlistments, (2) to assist in maintaining the required strength of the Reserve forces by deferring inductions of members who serve satisfactorily, (3) by classifications deferring induction, to channel men possessing critical skills or the requisite ability to acquire them into essential activities and occupations including engineering, scientific, and technical pursuits and teaching, and the study and preparation for such fields, (4) the Selective Service System, based on the accepted principle of the universal obligation and privilege of all citizens to defend this Nation, has fairly and effectively chosen the men to meet this universal obligation and privilege; and

Whereas the Selective Service System maintains through registration an inventory of all men of military age including the only inventory of veterans no longer in the Armed Forces who in an emergency might be needed quickly for augmentation of those forces, and keeps current the availability for order to active duty in time of emergency of over a million members of the Standby Reserve; and

Whereas Selective Service has become an integral part of the Nation's defense and the Selective Service System, by its decentralized system of operation through orer 4,000 local and appeal boards in every community made up of local citizens, has earned and enjoys the confidence of the overwhelming majority of the American people; and

Whereas section 17(c) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act (62 Stat. 625), as amended, provides that no person shall be inducted into the Armed Forces under that act after July 1, 1959, with the exception of persons whose deferments under section 6 of such act have ceased to exist; and

Whereas the impending termination of induction authority under the aforesaid act will leave our Nation without an effective obligation for every young man to serve his country in a military capacity; and

Whereas the continuance of authority to induct all persons liable therefor under the aforesaid act is essential to insure the maintenance of the required strength of the Armed Forces since voluntary enlistments in such forces and their Reserve components are greatly stimulated and influenced by the mere existence of that induction authority; and

Whereas the local boards of the Selective Service System in every community of this Nation would render invaluable service in the event of an all-out emergency because of their ability to furnish manpower at local levels to any agency authorized to requisition men for specific duties; and

Whereas some 40,000 of the 46,000 full and part-time officers and employees of the Selective Service System have volunteered their services to the Govern. ment and receive no compensation; and

Whereas the annual cost of operating the Selective Service System is only about 16 cents for every man, woman, and child in this Nation: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America in 630 Annual National Convention assembled in Los Angeles, Calif., August 3-10, 1958, That section 17(c) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act (62 Stat. 625), as amended, be further amended so that all the authority to induct persons into the Armed Forces now provided by that act will be extended until July 1, 1963 ; and be it further

Resolved, That we use every effort that this be made known to the Members of the Congress and to the President.


January 26, 1959. Re Extension of Setective Service authorization. Hon. CARL VINSON, Chairman, House Armed Service Committee, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN Vinson: At the last annual meeting of the American Farm Bureau Federation the voting delegates of the member State farm bureaus unanimously approved the following statement of policy relative to military training and Selective Service:

“Under present conditions an effective Military Establishment must be composed primarily of skilled and highly trained technical personnel who remain in the armed services for extended periods.

“This necessitates a vigorous voluntary recruitment program and the maintenance of adequate incentives to encourage skilled and trained personnel to remain in the services.

"It is imperative that the use of manpower by the military forces be subject to continuous scrutiny to avoid waste and inefficiency.

“Such additional manpower as is recruited by selective service should be obtained primarily from the younger age group, preferably from those under 23 years who have not acquired family or business responsibilities."

We continue to be very much concerned with respect to the number of young men, 23 years of age and older, who are inducted-even though this may be a smaller problem numerically than was the case a few years ago. We do not believe it is in the national interest to countenance the wastes involved in disruption of the careers of young men of this age—but rather that it would be in the national interest if practically all inductees were in the age brackets of 19-22 years.

We do not necessarily propose any amendment of the law in this respect.

Presumably much the same purpose could be accomplished by the inclusion of a recommendation to such effect in the report of the Armed Services Committee.

It will be appreciated if you will incorporate this letter in the record of the hearings. Very sincerely,

Matt TRIGGS, Assistant Legislative Director.


I am Miss Elizabeth A. Smart. My address is 144 Constitution Avenue NE., and I am representing the National Woman's Christian Temperance Union.

The National Woman's Christian Temperance Union opposes this bill. The practices of the armed services in making alcoholic beverages freely available on Government premises and thereby putting the Government's stamp of approval on the use of them is not, in our judgment, conducive to the announced objective of having fighting forces capable of defending our country, and the free world, against aggression. Particularly is this so as our weapons of defense become more and more complicated and require greater skill and greater physical and mental ability to adjust to their requirements. The use of alcoholic beverages is directly opposed to acquiring these skills and this endurance.

What we have said with regard to the Armed Forces generally, applies with still greater force to the teenagers in the services who are acquiring wrong ideas at an age when they are ill equipped to defend themselves against such pressures. We deplore the drafting of anyone under 21 and particularly of those from 1812 up, or the pressuring of them to come into the services where such unfortunate conditions obtain.

We note that our present defense policies are based on the use of fewer and fewer men and more and more reliance on extremely expensive weapons. We submit that this is an excellent time for Congress to revise its policies in respect to the drafting of our citizens, especially of our future citizens under the age of 21.


ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON H.R. 2260, JANUARY 26, 1959 The Chamber of Commerce of the United States recommends the enactment of legislation to continue for not more than 2 years the authority to induct, for 2 years of active military service, men not previously deferred.

Before this is done, however, Congress should explore the alternative methods of reducing the excessively high age of the average inductee and then should

(a) Amend the law to make young men liable for induction for only 2 or 3 years after attainment of age 1812, instead of remaining eligible until age 26, or until 35 if deferred for any reason; or

(6) Instruct those responsible for administration of the Universal Military Training and Service Act to modify the order in which qualified young

men are called into service. Congress also should review the entire draft law to amend its obsolete provisions and permit the expiration of those provisions that no longer are necessary or which Congress has no intention of implementing.

The chamber's position on this important issue is based upon policy declarations unanimously approved by its members and upon a comprehensive study of the draft law by a joint subcommittee on manpower drawn from the membership of the chamber's national defense and education committees. This study was completed last week following a series of conferences with manpower officials of the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and with the assistance of statistical studies recently completed by Selective Service and Bureau of Labor Statistics officials.


In spite of (1) sharply reduced military manpower requirements; (2) an abundance of draft age, physically fit nonfathers; and (3) enactment of nearly a dozen major laws that have substantially increased the attractiveness of military service as a career, there is no conclusive evidence that currently projected military manpower goals for the Active and Reserve Forces can be achieved and maintained without the draft.

The input requirement from civilian life to maintain an active force of approximately 2.5 million is 525,000 for the current fiscal year. About 20 percent (115,000) of this number will be inductees and there is considerable evidence that a large percentage of the long-term voluntary enlistees are draft inspired or stimulated.

If the Active Forces remain at or about the June 30, 1959, target strength of 2,520,000, defense officials conservatively estimate they will need an average of 90,000 inductees annually through fiscal 1963.

The draft is also vital in connection with active duty requirements for junior officers, doctors, and dentists, and in supplying the necessary flow of young manpower into the various civilian components.

The principal source of junior officers is ROTC graduates, most of whom enter the ROTC program in preference to being inducted as enlisted men. For the past several years, draft-inspired volunteers also have been the principal source of doctors and dentists. By June 30, 1959, defense officials predict that 50 percent of all military doctors and 60 percent of all dentists will be noncareer officers who accepted Reserve commissions-plus a 2-year active duty obligation-in lieu of being inducted.

The value of the draft as a source of manpower for the Reserve Forces stems from the fact that most inductees, upon completion of their 2 years of active duty, are required to spend 3 years in the Ready Reserve and 1 year in the Standby Reserve. In addition, many young men enter directly into one of the many Reserve programs in lieu of being inducted for 2 years.


In response to direct inquiries regarding the reasons for requesting a 4-year extension of the draft law, defense officials have offered only three arguments :

1. Convenience.

2. That's the way it was done the last two times. 3. We think we'll need it that long.

The chamber recommends that any extension of the draft law be limited to not more than 2 years for the following reasons :

1. In an era of rapid technological advancement and rapidly changing military manpower requirements, Congress should reexamine our basic military manpower statute at least every 2 years.

2. A 2-year extension would be just as satisfactory as a 4-year extension in showing our allies that the United States regards its military commitments seriously and fully intends to live up to them.

3. Real progress is being made toward the development of a quality active force of men with at least 4 years of service. The Army's percentage of such persons jumped from 34 percent in 19.30 to 41 percent in 1958. The comparable Air Force percentages are 40 and 49. If this rate of improvement continues, the draft may not be needed for more than 2 years.

4. While 12 of the 16 Cordiner Committee recommendations affecting military personnel have been fully implemented, defense officials concede it is too early to measure the impact of these proposals—particularly the $576 million pay raise-upon new enlistment and reenlistment rates. Even before the pay raise was approved, the reenlistment rate for first-term regulars (the most critical retention group) rose from 15.7 percent in 1955 to 27 percent in 1958.

5. The Defense Department estimate of draft needs assumes no further reductions in the size of the active forces, but Defense Secretary McElroy has made it clear that further reductions are likely.


INDUCTEES ARE TOO OLD The major problem in connection with the draft law is the average age of inductees. Those who enlist voluntarily average 1814 years of age just about what the services prefer. But inductees average nearly 23 years of age, the average is still rising, and there is no expectation that it will decline, under existing laws and regulations.

With all due respect to the young men who are being inducted, the fact remains that they are merely helping meet strength goals; they are contributing little, if anything, to the development of a quality career force or to our overall defense posture. Most inductees enter the Armed Forces reluctantly, for very understandable

Most of them have either entered the business world or married or both. Many have purchased homes. For these and other reasons, less than 5 percent of all inductees reenlist. Career incentive legislation would influence few of them. This perpetuates the turnover problem which is costly in terms of both dollars and efficiency. Furthermore, most inductees cannot be utilized effectively in the jobs where men are in short supply because they are ready for discharge by the time they receive the necessary in-service training.

In summary, the Defense Department, while working hard on the one hand to improve the attractiveness of military service, is reconciling itself to accepting 100,000 men a year that it knows it cannot utilize effectively or retain on a career basis.

The Army-the only service now using the draft-is living with this problem, and the situation has improved slightly since mental standards were raised several months ago, in accordance with a draft-law amendment approved during the 85th Congress. But the problem is an unnecessary one that must not be allowed to continue.

It is in both the national interest and the public interest that inductees be younger. Younger men make more efficient and more enthusiastic soldiers and are much more likely to remain in the service on a career basis. And taking young men into the service at an earlier age would make it easier for them to decide between a military or civilian career. No matter which they choose, their comparative youth will be in their favor.

As previously indicated, there are two ways to deal with the problem. Perhaps the simplest method is to amend the draft law to make young men liable for induction for only 2 or 3 years after attainment of age 1842. This, of course, could necessitate wiping out some of the special Selective Service deferment categories. But the continuing need for certain types of student, technical, and professional deferments should be recognized. The potential impact of any such amendment on draft-inspired long-term enlistments also would have to be considered carefully.

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