ing. The reason for the curtailment is due to lack of sufficient appropriations. We sincerely believe that if the money was furnished that we could fill all Reserve units to full strength under the provisions of the present law.

We sincerely believe that this provision of law should be retained on the statute books and strongly recommend that section 262 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended, (50 U.S.C. 1013) be further amended by deleting the date August 1, 1959, in the first section of 262, and insert August 1, 1963.

Mr. MORRIS. I assume that all of these gentlemen are for the bill. I can see no reason why anybody wouldn't be, but I think we should inquire as to whether or not there is anyone who has a different view. Mr. RIVERS. I guess you could find somebody to oppose it.

Mr. MORRIS. I mean any of the witnesses who have been listed.
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Slatinshek.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. No, sir; we have none.

Mr. PHILBIN. May I make a suggestion in line with Mr. Morris' suggestion, which I think is a correct one: Is there anyone present in this room-could you ascertain whether there is anyone present in this room who desires to oppose the bill or whether in the files of the committee anyone has written in requesting an opportunity to be heard against the bill?

Mr. RIVERS. I just asked him.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Everyone who had written in to be heard has been heard.

Mr. PHILBIN. In other words, you have no requests pending in the files of the committee from persons who have expressed a desire to appear against the bill?

Mr. SLATINSHEK. That is correct.

Mr. PHILBIN. There is no opposition to the bill, so far as you know?

Mr. SLATINSHEK. That is correct.

Mr. RIVERS. Is there anybody here opposing this bill?
Speak now or forever hold your peace hereafter.

Mr. SWITZER. I haven't had an opportunity to appear before this committee, but I did when the bill was originally passed, and I think one of the most useful things that this committee has ever produced is this bill. I have had many occasions to discuss this thing with Mr. Milton, and our organization, the Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, are very happy with the results of the thing so far, and I think it would be a calamity if this law were not extended along the lines of the bill that you have before you.

Mr. RIVERS. Thank you very much.

General STICKNEY. I have made an analytical study of this bill insofar as it affects the Marine Corps, since before the passage and what has happened since. I would like very much to present it. I believe it will answer a lot of questions.

Mr. RIVERS. We will be glad to have it for the record.

(The prepared statement of Brig. Gen. William W. Stickney, USMCR, follows:)

It is my considered opinion that the individual Reserve in our Reserve components, particularly the Marine Corps, are in better shape today than ever before in history.

This I say even though numerically we are far from reaching our mobilization requirement in our organized units. I say particularly the Marine Corps Reserve, only because this had been my direct concern and I am more knowledgeable of its status.

I am sure that those who are in charge of the various components share the same general opinion in regard to their particular service.

I am completely aware that not all of the services are as enthused about the 6 months training program as are the Army and the Marine Corps, and it would appear, the Coast Guard.

I believe, as far as these components are concerned the 6 months training program has done more to increase their military efficiency, reduce their personnel turnover, and increase their stability than any other provision of the Armed Forces Reserve Act.

Now, upon what do I base this opinion? As to the other Reserve components I base this opinion upon my personal observations throughout the country and the remarks of their representatives at meetings of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, and other Reserve component committees.

As to the Marine Corps Reserve, I base my opinions on much detailed study. observation, and statistical reports.

If the 6-month training program is not extended, the only source for procurement of reservists will be the pool of prior service personnel.

In order to maintain our drill pay strength we will certainly have to seek DOD approval to return to the practice of recruiting nonprior service personnel whose only required training would be that received from scheduled drills and annual field training.

This system has long since proved inadequate. For example, in fiscal year 1956, before the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 became effective, the Marine Corps Reserve enlisted into our drill pay training units well over 29,000 Marine reservists. We ended the year with a net gain of 394.

This, in and of itself, involved great expense with very little, if any efficient military training due to the short time that any individual member was subject to such training.

At the time we recruited our first group of 6-month trainees back in late 1955, only 30 percent of our enlisted drill-pay reservists were considered trained to the extent that they could be mobilized and assigned immediately to a combat unit in the event of emergency.

By April 1, 1957, the date after which we ceased to accept nonprior service personnel for enlistment (except for 6-month trainees), the percentage of trained men in our units had climbed to 65 percent.

Today, applying the same standard to determine readiness for combat, 73 percent of our enlisted drill-pay reservists are trained and ready.

The reason for this dramatic increase in preparedness for combat is that our 6-month trainees must complete their active duty training relatively soon after enlistment.

If the active duty obligation did not exist, these same reservists could spend 5 or more years in Reserve unit training programs and still not reach an equivalent level of combat proficiency.

I have devoted much time in an attempt to evaluate our procedures before and after the effective date of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.

To assume the effective date of the 1955 act as a point of departure would not be a fair evaluation as the knowledge and understanding of its provisions did not take effect until sometime in the fiscal year 1957.

On the other hand, the obligated service provisions of the 1955 act were not generally understood, by the public, before late 1956 or early 1957. For this reason I have made a study of overlapping years which I believe shows definite trends that are compatible with public understanding.

The first group covers those nonprior service accessions into our drill-pay reserve between the years 1955 and 1957. The second group those nonprior service accessions between the years 1956 and 1958. By this overlapping procedure studies I believe we can obtain very definite trends of evaluation as to the effectiveness of the 1952 act vis-a-vis the 1955 act.

Group I is composed of 6- and 8-year obligors enlisted under the provisions of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. Group II is composed of 6-month trainees enlisted under the provisions of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.

The types of losses are the same for each group. It will be noted that based upon a 3-year experience in each group, group I requires over three times as many enlistments to arrive at a given strength as group II.

To analyze the problem from yet another angle, I have compared the percent of loss as related to the average strength of our drill-pay units. The gross loss which occurred each year required a replacement from some source. In each year shown a net gain was realized, therefore, the percentage presented represents a percent of turnover in the drill-pay reserve.

Further, it should be noted that in fiscal year 1958, numerous administrative transfers were required not because of normal loss, but because of directed reductions in strength at DOD level, which in turn required deactivation of a number of units so that the gross loss shown for this period is actually much higher than would be normally expected had planned growth been permitted. Even with this forced reduction in strength, the statistics show an improvement in turnover of plus 24.4 percent.

To view this situation from still another angle I have made a study of the higher caliber of accessions in the program as evidenced by the GCT's of those entering the Reserve, through the 6-month program only.

This area, by the way, has been of great interest to the Regular Establishment as a probable source of officer procurement in view of the higher educational level of the members entering the Marine Corps through this program.

The result of this study shows the following percentage comparison of enlistments by mental groups during the fiscal years 1957 and 1958.

Upon analysis of these statistics we find that during the year 1957 the Reserve program produced the following results by mental groups:

In other words the overall Reserve program for 1957 produced the following results:

In the 6-month program 4.8 percent more in mental groups I and II and a like decrease in mental groups III and IV. And the Reserves on extended active duty gave to the Marine Corps 1.7 percent more in mental groups I and II, and 1.7 percent less in mental groups III and IV.

In an analysis of these same statistics for the year 1958 we find the Reserve program produced the following results by mental groups.

In other words, the overall Reserve program for 1958 produced the following results:

In the 6-month program, 11.5 percent more in mental groups I and II with a corresponding decrease in mental groups III and IV, and the Reserves on extended active duty gave to the Marine Corps 10.3 percent more in mental groups I and II and an equal percent less in mental groups III and IV in 1958.

In comparing the improvement of the Reserve program in this area between the years 1957 and 1958, we find the following within the various areas:

In other words the 6-month program showed an improvement of 6.7 percent more in mental groups I and II and a decrease of 6.7 percent in mental groups III and IV during fiscal year 1958.

In comparing the improvement of the Reserves reporting for extended active duty between the years 1957 and 1958, we find the following reports:

In other words the Reserves reporting for active duty during 1958 showed an improvement of 8.6 percent in mental groups I and II and a decrease of 8.6 percent in mental groups III and IV.

In view of the foregoing it becomes patent that the 6-months program not only benefits and improves the military efficiency of those within the training program itself but has had the effect of overall improvement of the entire Reserve structure as manifested by the improvement of those leaving the Reserve for extended active duty with the Regular Establishment.

There have been many comments as to the fiscal requirements of the 6-months program vis-a-vis other types of Reserve training now in use.

For this reason, I have made a study of the relative costs of these various enlistment programs. The pay and allowance costs of these programs are based on normal enlisted promotion patterns.

The results of this study are as follows:

(a) Cost of initial active duty training for a 6-month trainee :
Personnel cost (includes pay and allowances, travel, subsistence
and clothing) --.

Enlistment cost-.

18 months Reserve training including 15 days active duty-.

$928 None

347

1,275

(b) Cost of 2x6 enlistment personnel cost for 2 years.. Recruiting cost_--

Difference between 6 months and 2x6----

Cost per month of useful service (18 months).

(c) Cost of 4-year enlistment in USMC: Personnel cost for 4 years--Recruiting cost

Cost per month of useful service (42 months)--.

3, 326 290

3, 616 2, 341 201

7,765 290

8, 055

192

1. The raw cost figures provided above do not consider many factors which cannot be accurately expressed in dollar costs. Some of these are:

(a) The data above shows a cost of $201 per month of useful service for a 2x6 enlistee, as compared to $192 for a 4-year enlistee. This comparison does not take into consideration the increased value of the 4-year man in that during his second 2 years we receive the benefit of his experience.

(b) Presently 98-99 percent of the recruits for the Regular Establishment are enlisted for a 4-year period. This makes possible such programs as the unit rotation system. If the 2x6 program were to be emphasized, the stability of the regular forces would be seriously weakened.

(c) If 2x6 enlistments were emphasized, the recruiting workload and training overhead of the Regular Marine Corps would increase, so that within a given Regular strength, the size of the operating forces would necessarily be decreased.

(d) If the primary emphasis on Reserve input shifted to the 2x6 program, the stability of the Organized Reserve should decrease, since the 2x6 man would presumably have a shorter period of mandatory participation. However, this disadvantage would appear to be balanced by the higher state of training of the 2x6 compared to the 6-month trainee.

2. The chief disadvantage of the 2x6 program lies in its effect on the Regular Marine Corps. A 2x6 enlistee costs more per useful month of service than a 4-year enlistee, and emphasis on 2x6 enlistment would tend to convert the Regular forces into a glorified casual company.

In conclusion, I believe that it is in the best interests of the Reserve and Regular components that the 6-month training program as now permitted in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 be continued as therein provided.

It is believed that the foregoing facts plus the experiences of the various Reserve components have proven beyond any reasonable doubt that the 6-month training program has established the following: