Mr. WAMPLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

In different localities where you have all three working under the procedures we have now, how do you find the procurement of personnel in the Army and the Air Force and the Navy, how does that affect the procurement as far as the services are concerned?

Mr. BROWNLOW. Well, of course, Congressman, the Navy has been much more stable than the other two branches. I would say that the general standard over a period of years of mechanics in the Navy yard and Navy facility, is superior probably to those in the other two.

Mr. WAMPLER. Would you classify that as a morale factor?

Mr. BROWNLOW. I think so, yes. I think the average toolmaker, patternmaker, would much prefer working for the Navy than they would the Army or Air Force, other than probably in the ordnance plants, themselves.

Mr. RIVERS. We have here one of my constituents from the Charleston Navy Yard.

Tom, stand up. I am going to ask you to put your statement in the record, Mr. Evans.

Mr. Tom EVANS. I can make it right here. We wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Brownlow's position. We oppose H.R. 3367.

Mr. RIVERS. What about the author?

Mr. EVANS. We are for him.

Mr. RIVERS. And I will ask the rest of you gentlemen who have statements to put them in the record.

Mr. GRITTA. We are opposed to this bill.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Mr. Chairman, I move we table the bill.
Mr. RIVERS. As many as favor tabling the bill, say aye.
Opposed, no.

I have two proxies here from Mr. Fisher and Mr. Morris, and without objection the motion to reconsider is laid on the table, and that does kill it.

Mr. BROWNLOW. Thank you very much, gentlemen of the committee.

Mr. RIVERS. Admiral, you bring up a unification for the Air Force and the Army, and I think we will consider that.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the chairman.)

O

FULL COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4413, H.R. 3412, H.R. 3413, H.R. 3323, H.R. 3290, H.R. 3291, H.R. 3292, H.R. 3293, H.R. 3368, AND H.R. 3365; APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE TO CONSIDER H.R. 3387; AND REPORT OF REAL ESTATE AND CONSTRUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C., Tuesday, February 24, 1959. The committee met at 10:10 a.m., Hon. Carl Vinson, chairman, presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order.

A quorum is present.

The purpose of the meeting this morning is to consider reports from the subcommittees.

The first subcommittee I will recognize is the chairman of the subcommittee No. 1, Mr. Kilday. Mr. Kilday, has your subcommittee a report to submit?

Mr. KILDAY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we have several bills.

I will first report on H.R. 4413, entitled, "A bill to provide improved opportunity for promotion for certain officers in the naval service, and for other purposes."

Mr. Chairman, this is a very technical and rather complicated bill. I will read a statement with reference to it, and then if there are questions, I will attempt to answer them. I would like to complete the statement first because I believe it will probably answer a number of questions that would occur to members as we go along.

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide equitable opportunity for promotion to officers of the Navy and the Marine Corps who are in or behind the so-called hump.

In order to fully understand this very complex problem, it first necessary for me to describe just what the hump is and how it was created.

The hump is the disproportionate number of Regular officers of the Navy and the Marine Corps who were originally commissioned during World War II. These officers are practically all contemporaries from the standpoint of age, years of service, and experience and they represent one-third of all of the Regular officers of the Navy and the Marine Corps.

In other words, one-third of the Regular officers of the Navy and the Marine Corps are contained in 4-year time spread, while the remaining two-thirds are spread over the remaining 26 years of a 30year career pattern.

These officers are serving in the grades of major and lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps, and lieutenant commander and commander in the Navy.

The problem that these officers face can be summarized as follows: Eight thousand Regular "hump" officers in the Navy now serving in the grade of commander and lieutenant commander must be fitted

into 2,000 expected vacancies in the grade of captain over the next 10 years.

In the Marine Corps the problem is to fit 1,940 Regular "hump" majors into 435 lieutenant colonel vacancies during the next 5 years. Ultimately 3,000 Regular "hump" lieutenant colonels and majors of the Marine Corps must be fitted into 580 colonels' billets.

It is perfectly obvious from these figures that unless corrective action is taken, the attrition rate, that is the number of people who will fail of selection for promotion will be fantastically high over the next 10 years.

Now let me give you exactly what this attrition rate will be unless we pass this legislation:

In the Navy the attrition rate for selection of Regulars from commander to captain without legislation will be 74 percent. In other words, 3 out of 4 Regular commanders considered for promotion to captain will fail of selection because there will be insufficient vacancies to permit any additional promotions.

Even worse, on promotion from lieutenant commander to commander, the attrition rate for Regulars will eventually reach 85 percent. In other words, 85 out of 100 being considered for promotion from lieutenant commander to commander will fail of selection.

With the proposed legislation, the attrition rate from commander to captain will be reduced to about 54 percent, and the attrition rate from lieutenant commander to commander will be reduced to about 45 percent.

In the Marine Corps the attrition rate, that is the rate of Regular officers who will not be selected for promotion from major to lieutenant colonel, will be 75 percent, unless corrective action is taken.

If the proposed legislation is enacted, the attrition rate from major to lieutenant colonel will be reduced to aproximately 30 percent and the attrition rate from lieutenant colonel to colonel will be approximately 40 percent.

This is the magnitude of the problem. It is due to the fact that a large number of officers were commissioned at approximately the same time in approximately the same grade during World War II.

In 1947, when the Officer Personnel Act was passed, it was anticipated that attrition would be approximately 20 percent in promotion from lieutenant to lieutenant commander, 20 percent from lieutenant commander to commander, and 25 percent from commander to captain. These attrition rates were not applied in the Navy, to the Regular officers, because of a number of circumstances which arose after the Officer Personnel Act was enacted.

First it should be noted that the anticipated normal promotion points could not have been attained for at least 10 years after enactment of the Officer Personnel Act in 1947. Second, many officers were serving in higher grades, in advance of their normal promotion points. This was to be expected because the size of the Navy and Marine Corps, at the end of World War II, was considerably in excess of the size of these two services prior to World War II. Thus the billet justification existed, which included accelerated promotions, when the Officer Personnel Act was written.

Then came the Korean war. It didn't make sense to the Navy to fail an officer of selection to the next higher grade and then order an

inactive Reserve officer to active duty to fill that billet, particularly a Reserve officer who hadn't been on active duty for about 5 years. At any rate, the attrition rates were not assessed during the Korean war. Thereafter the continuation of the cold war necessitated the maintenance of a Navy and Marine Corps in excess of that originally contemplated when the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was written.

Now we may criticize the Navy and Marine Corps, if we wish, for not taking more vigorous corrective action when the hump problem became obvious, but that will do nothing to solve the present problem. Corrective action by the Congress has now become absolutely

necessary.

Now, just what does the proposed legislation contemplate?

In order to understand what the proposed legislation contemplates, it is first necessary to explain what the Officer Personnel Act provides with regard to forced retirement points.

Unrestricted line captains who are selected to the grade of captain under the Officer Personnel Act are not required to be retired under the law until they have completed 30 years of service and have twice failed of selection. This same principle applies to Marine Corps colonels. Navy commanders are not required to retire until they complete 26 years of service and until they have twice failed of selection to the grade of captain. The same principle applies to the grade of lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps.

The Navy does not bring their captains into legal promotion zones for promotion to admiral until the 29th and 30th year of service. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, put colonels in legal promotion zones to brigadier general in their 23d and 24th year.

Both the Navy and Marine Corps have promoted majors and lieutenant commanders to the next higher grade, that is commander and lieutenant colonel, in their 16th and 17th year of service, and in some instances prior to the completion of those years of service. Officers now are being considered for promotion to captain in the Navy in their 18th and 19th years, and have been considered for promotion to colonel in the Marine Corps in their 18th and 19th year and during the Korean conflict prior to the completion of this period of service. This was accelerated promotion, but it was necessitated by the billet requirements that existed at the time of Korea and thereafter. Now the officers who have already failed of selection to the grade of captain in the Navy or those who will thereafter fail of selection to captain in the Navy may do so in their 18th or 19th year depending upon the year group and when the promotion boards meet. But bear in mind that these officers having twice failed of selection to the grade of captain in the Navy, or colonel in the Marine Corps, are not required to retire under existing law until they complete 26 years of service.

As a result, there are 666 commanders now serving on active duty in the Navy who have once or twice failed of selection to the grade of captain, and there are 168 lieutenant colonels now serving on active duty in the Marine Corps who have once or twice failed of selection to the grade of colonel.

Since under existing law these officers are not required to retire until they complete 26 years of service, it becomes readily apparent that without legislation these officers occupy commanders' billets