For reasons that are not necessary to go into at this time, we were not able to get a bill with the full backing of the military departments up until too late in the session.

Mr. RIVERS. Right.

Secretary JACKSON. And this committee did vote out a similar bill which was passed by the House. Subsequently, at the very latest part of the session, we did get this particular bill up.

Mr. RIVERS. That is right.

Secretary JACKSON. And this bill was also introduced as H.R.

13472.

Mr. RIVERS. Yes, sir.

Secretary JACKSON. And my observations about hearings, sir, was that on this particular bill as it was introduced, there was not time for the committee to afford it hearings.

Mr. BRAY. That is correct. I wanted the record to show that this committee did take action on this matter last year. Secretary JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. Now, let's go on.

I think that sets the record straight.

Go ahead, Mr. Jackson, and let's see now.

Secretary JACKSON. While this bill is necessarily complex, as a matter of drafting, simply stated it has two main objectives:

First, to raise the critically low rate of retention of Reserve officers beyond their obligated tours of duty.

A military establishment must be viewed in total perspective. The effectiveness of our national security program is measured not only by numbers of men, ships, planes, tanks, and missiles available. The quality of its leadership the officer corps-is vitally important. These leaders, including junior officers, must provide the direction, the decisiveness, the inspiration which gives maximum effect to the men operating the complex equipment and weapons of a modern military force.

The situation which we face today, however, with respect to an officer corps of desired competence and stability, is not a healthy one. Our basic problem stems directly from inadequate retention of junior officers. The magnitude of this problem is shown by the fact that our junior officer turnover (input plus losses) approximates 90,000 annually. This will be presented in more detail in the visual graphic presentation which follows.

Mr. RIVERS. And you are going to give the reason for that mortality rate?

Secretary JACKSON. The reason for it, yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. You say you will give the reasons for it.

Secretary JACKSON. We will indicate the reasons for it there. In fact, I go into it a little in my main presentation, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. I see.

Secretary JACKSON. Each year, large numbers of newly commissioned officers enter the services. The majority do so because of obligations under compulsory military service laws or a variety of Government-subsidized educational programs. While many are of exceptional quality, the majority are not thinking in terms of extended military service and remain on duty only the minimum time required by law.

The resulting large turnover of junior officers means that the operating forces must constantly perform their tasks with an excessive percentage of officers undergoing initial duty. Operational efficiency inevitably suffers. Accidents and mistakes are increased; maintenance and repairs are more costly.

I wish to emphasize that adequate retention in terms of numbers of officers will not provide a solution. We need adequate retention in terms of high quality officers in the proper age brackets and with the required specialized training.

We try to meet our large requirement for junior officers in two ways. First, for our Regular officers, we select the best candidates from all officer procurement sources in such numbers as required for the regular forces.

Secondly, we supplement these Regular officers by employing Reserve officers who are generally needed for a period short of what could be called a career; that is, for about 10 to 14 years.

The active-duty agreement plan before you is designed, therefore, as an inducement to attract well-qualified and capable junior Reserve officers needed to supplement the regular corps in the lower ranks.

The second objective of the bill is to provide more equitable treatment of those Reserve officers who supplement the Regular corps but who will not be continued on active duty long enough to be entitled to retirement, either because they are not needed or in the event that a reduction in force is required.

Mr. RIVERS. You are still talking about the 10-to-14 year group?
Secretary JACKSON. Yes, sir.

The equitable treatment of these and other Reserve officers provided for in this bill is two-fold. In the first place, the bill requires that every Reserve officer called to active duty will be offered a contract up to 6 years.

I might say this is not in effect in time of war or national emergency. Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

Secretary JACKSON. He knows that at the end of these 6 years he may not be offered another contract unless there is further need for his services, in which event he may be given additional contracts if his services are required.

Therefore, upon entering on extended active duty, he knows just where he stands and he can accept or reject the contract.

In the event that he is not permitted to complete a contract because of a reduction in force, the bill provides that he will receive 2 months' pay for every year he has served under contract and 1 month's pay and allowances for every year in which he was not permitted to serve out the term of his contract.

If he fulfills the term of his contract and does not continue further on extended active duty, he will receive 2 months' pay of the grade in which he finished his contract for every year that he served.

And, here I would like to point out an unusual feature of the bill. Even though the officer is offered another contract and declines, he will still receive the 2 months' pay for every year that he has satisfactorily performed under the prior contract or contracts.

If he serves under contract up through 14 years, he will then be released from active duty with 24 months' pay; or if the services have a place for him in the regular corps for which he is qualified, he may be augmented with a regular commission; or if he is continued not as a Regular officer, he must be given a contract for 6 years, which, if he performs, will entitle him to retirement.

This bill does not guarantee a career through to retirement for any reservist. It does, however, assure the Reserve officer going on extended active duty a clear-cut knowledge of what he is to expect by way of tenure. And, in addition, it provides a very liberal payment in the event that he is not afforded the opportunity to serve the periods set forth in the contracts.

It is the first time, to my knowledge, that an officer will be paid an additional payment over and above the pay and allowances which he has received, even though he refuses to accept another contract and to continue on active duty.

It should be pointed out, however, that under no circumstances are such payments made until the member goes off active duty finally. These are the highlights of the bill. There are detailed refinements, such as the fact that these payments for satisfactory performance under a contract do not include the first 2 years of his service, and the further fact that he must have a total of 5 years of active duty to qualify for such payments.

These and other details will be brought out in the presentation which I would like to submit at this time, with your permission. Mr. RIVERS. Go ahead, sir.

Secretary JACKSON. The problem this bill is designed to remedy or greatly alleviate for the services is the problem of inadequate retention of Reserve officers beyond obligated service, resulting in reduced combat effectiveness and increased training costs; for the Reserve. The bill would correct constant vulnerability to release with insufficient compensation to warrant delay in beginning civilian life.

Now, this chart gives you a visual demonstration of the officer structure as of the end of fiscal 1958, indicating that approximately 60 percent of the officer structure was comprised of Reserve officers, and approximately 40 percent of Regulars, covering all of the services.