Now, from the standpoint of our first problem, this is really the core of the situation as presented on this chart.

You will note that this black line indicates the desirable or ideal officer posture in terms of relative strength and in terms of years of service along the career pattern.

You will notice the disproportionate numbers here in the 2- and 3year men, and here in the World War II hump.

Now, this red section (3 to 14 years of service) does not mean there are no officers there, but what it does mean is that in order to fill that up to the required level, we have to draw on these 2- and 3-year officers to fill up the numbers, and in some instances to draw back from officers whose grade would require a higher or more advanced type of performance to fill in this area.

Now, we regard this as extremely important because this group here (3 to 14 years of service) are the officers who will lead the combat troops, generally speaking, and therefore at the moment we have in this group men with 2 or 3 years' experience or men who in some instances perhaps have reached an age beyond which they would normally be expected to undergo the rigors of combat.

Now, without belaboring this further, in 5 years if nothing is done, this situation would become more acute because of the World War II hump moving forward and retiring with the passage of time.

Mr. RIVERS. In that connection, if you will suffer

Secretary JACKSON. You want the chart back, sir?

Mr. RIVERS. No. That hump we are talking about-when Mr. Kilday gets his hump bill through, will that relieve that group there, assuming that it goes through substantially the way you have suggested?

Secretary JACKSON. That would not affect the situation that we have with regard to the Reserve officers who are not in the Regular corps. Mr. RIVERS. I am talking about that World War II group.

Secretary JACKSON. I am, too, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

Secretary JACKSON. The so-called Navy hump bill will relieve the backup for promotions of the Regular officers.

Mr. RIVERS. I see.

Secretary JACKSON. But would not materially affect the Reserve pocket I am discussing here.

Mr. RIVERS. I see.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Mr. Jackson, does the 3- to 14-year valley reflect Reserve officers only? I think you ought to make that clear to the committee.

Mr. RIVERS. What did you say?

Mr. SLATINSHEK. That chart that Mr. Jackson showed

Secretary JACKSON. This represents the whole officer structure, comprised of Regular and reservists. Many of these are Regulars, of

course.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. I see.

Secretary JACKSON. But implementing the Regular corps, with its valleys here, we have to call on these very junior Reserve officers to fill up this pocket. These are Regulars undoubtedly or long-term reservists. We haven't broken it down. But this is the whole officer posture. But these are the people who are reservists who are brought

in here to fill up, and they turn over every 2 years to a very large degree.

The next chart will show, I think, rather dramatically what is involved in this.

Now normally each year for the last year or so 400,000-I am sorry, about 40,000 young officers have completed their obligated term of service. The majority of these are ROTC students who are completing their 2- or 3-year period.

Our requirement from this group has been 15,000, that we want to get from this pool who are finishing their obligated service and can go home if they wish, unless we induce them to stay.

We needed 15,000. We have been able to get only 10,000 to apply. And out of this 10,000, the year before last we actually took 9,600. And I think the most recent count permitted even less selectivity. Commander GRANT. About 300 only.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt there?

Mr. RIVERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. WINSTEAD. You have only had 10,000 to apply. Now what period of time?

Secretary JACKSON. A year.

Mr. WINSTEAD. You are talking about the annual experience? Secretary JACKSON. Yes. This year the latest figures permitted us selectivity in something less than 300.

Mr. RIVERS. But when you talk with these boys, at the end of 2 or 3 years that is all the service they have had.

Secretary JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. You say "Now we want you 9,600 boys. We have looked at you. You have a great prospect. Now we will offer you a 6-year contract."

Secretary JACKSON. Under the new plan.

Mr. RIVERS. But you haven't had this plan before.

Secretary JACKSON. That is right.

Mr. RIVERS. But under this new plan you will say, "Now we will give you a 6-year contract."

Secretary JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. With all these things you have outlined here.

Secretary JACKSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. This will give you the best talking point you have ever had.

Secretary JACKSON. Exactly.

Mr. RIVERS. Under the present law, you can't

Secretary JACKSON. Under the present law we have no inducement to offer these men except the advantages of going on for a period, and they don't know what will happen or how long they wil be kept on active duty.

Mr. WINSTEAD. And it is strong in your mind what did happen in the last few years?

Secretary JACKSON. That is right.

Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

Secretary JACKSON. The important thing that we want to bring out here by this chart and Commander Grant shows me that the latest figures here show that we had only 10,400 apply and we took 10,100. Now the significance of that is we had to take virtually everybody who applied. We had no selectivity, no ability to go up and attract some of these far more competent people, and therefore, get quality of force, because everybody that came in we practically had to take. Mr. RIVERS. Right.

Secretary JACKSON. Now this is the last chart, I believe, on the services' problem of retention and quality, but I think it illustrates what we have mentioned briefly in the main presentation.