and Admiral Russell. Mainly in the procurement field and the train-ing field. It entails much more work and complicates your plans to a terrific extent because you are never quite sure that this is going to come about, so you have to build in your plan things that are undesirable to have there in case you do not get your manpower and resources you expect to have.

Mr. KOWALSKI. General LeMay, may I summarize it in this way, that you object to it for administrative reasons essentially? General LEMAY. That is one of the main reasons, yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson.

(Statements requested off the record.)

Mr. WILSON. I would like to ask a question of the counsel. Does the act of August 3, 1950, actually set numerical limitations on the various forces?

Mr. BLANDFORD. It does, Mr. Wilson.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't catch the question, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Does the act of August 3, 1950, actually set numerical limitations?

I am about to give you the most complicated answer possible under the circumstances. [Laughter.]

Because the act of August 3, 1950, did establish numerical limitations. Unfortunately, since then the strengths of the armed services have been codified in certain instances. However, the act of August 3, 1950, established a fixed ceiling of 2,005,000 people that may serve on active duty and it had after that a strength figure, a limitation for each of the services.

Now, the only two services that are actually now confronted with an absolute reduction are the Army and the Air Force because the Army suspension, or the Army limitation has been codified and, therefore, that suspension, that is the suspension which is now in effect, permits the Army to exceed 837,000. The limitation on the size of the Air Force has been codified at 502,000 and if we did not suspend this limitation, the Air Force would suffer a tremendous reduction.

The Navy strength, on the other hand, has not been affected since it has been codified, except to the extent of 4,000 regular enlisted personnel, because the limitation on the total number of personnel was removed when it was codified.

The Marine Corps is not affected because they were authorized a strength of 400,000, which removes them from the limitation that was contained in the act of August 3, 1950.

I am sorry I had to go through it. [Applause.]

Mr. COHELAN. Please repeat that.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Doesn't this point up the fact that Congress ought to take another long look at the limitations on the various forces and try to establish them in law, rather than have to depend on amendments on amendments?

The CHAIRMAN. No. I think this is the right way to proceed on it. I think Congress was wise when it put its limitations, as it did. As time rolls on, we may have to suspend it. Let's deal with it on that

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basis instead of trying to deal with it by statute in trying to say what the strength of the services will be.

Mr. WILSON. Do you think it is realistic for General LeMay to come up here and testify that the Air Force is 40 percent over the authorized strength, except for a little amendment that we continue to extend?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we gave him permission to do that. We gave him permission to go over that strength. Mr. Gavin.

Mr. GAVIN. General, you say here in your statement:

As you gentlemen know, the Air Force does not use the draft as a direct means of procuring its military personnel. Therefore, it is not possible to determine the quantitative degree to which the draft assists in obtaining Air Force enlistments.

You know, we get a little tired of that. And that goes for the Navy and it goes for the Marine Corps, too. You are always telling us, "Well, we get voluntary enlistments and, therefore"-you kind of intimate that we could get along pretty well without them. But I am glad to see there is a little change as far as the Navy is concerned, because the admiral said in his statement:

Any sudden increase in demand for personnel such as that occasioned by the recent crisis in the Near East and the Far East, which can't be met by recall of volunteer Reserves, must necessarily be met by an increase in the Regular strength. I feel that under existing conditions the Navy should have maximum flexibility to meet the emergencies.

Now while all these other services besides the Department of the Army may be able to secure voluntary enlistments, the question I am asking you is this: If we were suddenly precipitated into an emergency, do you think that you, the Air Force, and the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps, would get such voluntary enlistments to meet the demands that may be made upon us any time, anywhere in a critical world?

General LEMAY. Mr. Gavin, I believe that in case we get into a general war at the present time, you are going to win it or lose it with the people you have in uniform at the time, and any draft provisions for a long-scale training of forces after the war starts is impossible.

So I think that the main benefit that we obtain from the draft in the Air Force is the voluntary enlistments of people who would not ordinarily enlist if we did not have the draft.

Mr. GAVIN. But certainly if we got into an emergency, you would have to supplement your Regular forces no matter how efficient they may be, with additional forces, and the question I am asking you: Don't you think it is imperative that this draft law be extended, so that in the event an emergency does arise, we will have that flexibility to be able to meet the demands for all branches of the service?

General LEMAY. From the Air Force standpoint, we do not think a draftee will be able to be trained and make any substantial contribution in the war.

Mr. GAVIN. Well, do you think that this law should be enacted?
General LEMAY. I do. I so testified.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, following your philosophy then, the safe course to pursue is to have a very large standing force, larger than you have today?

General LEMAY. I think you should have a force that is large enough to deter the enemy first, and if you do not deter him, to win,

because we believe in the Air Force that modern war can't last too long, at least the decisive phase of it can't last too long, and you will not have time to do as we have done in the past, and that is to induct and train large military forces to fight a war.

The CHAIRMAN. It naturally follows therefore, then, you should by all means have a force sufficient, in being, all the time?

General LEMAY. That is our belief; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think your strength is sufficient to meet your requirements now?

General LEMAY. I think, taking everything into consideration, with a certain element of risk that is always going to be present; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you don't think there is any justification for Congress to increase the personnel strength of the Air Force any larger than it is today?

General LEMAY. I am in the same position as everyone else has always been in here. No Chief of Staff has ever been satisfied with the percentage of the resources that have been allocated to him. However, he has always had the opportunity to present his case in the Department of Defense and he must, of course, accept the decision on the proportionate resources that he is going to obtain.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your strength authorized by the Budget now?

General LEMAY. We are now at 850,000.

The CHAIRMAN. 850,000?

General LEMAY. And next year we will get to 845,000.

The CHAIRMAN. You think you will meet your military requirements with 850,000 men?

General LEMAY. Within those elements of risk I mentioned; yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. GAVIN. Another question, Mr. Chairman. What was your strength, General, back in 1953?

General LEMAY. In 1953, 970,000.

Mr. GAVIN. 970,000. I merely want to call to your attention the demands that are made upon the Department of the Army.

The Army strength back in June 1953 was 1,503,850. And now, in June of 1959 projected, they are cut back to 870,000.

Now what percentage of the cutback from 1953 to 1959 did the Air Force take, General?

General MERRELL. Sir, my name is General Merrell, Deputy Director of Personnel Planning of the Air Force.

Mr. GAVIN. Yes.

General MERRELL. Of course, from 970,000 to 850,000, which is a little more than 10 percent, sir.

Mr. GAVIN. Yes. I merely wanted to call your attention-a 10 percent cut in the Army-from 1,533,000 down to 870,000, and still they haven't the general said they must have troops qualified to meet the emergency as it rises up today, and even with the Department of the Army being cut back almost 50 percent they are still not given sufficient appropriations to modernize their equipment to meet the demands that are made upon them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Gavin.
Mr. Winstead?

Mr. WINSTEAD. I understood you would have an 845,000 strength for the Air Force at what date?

General LEMAY. At the end of the next fiscal year.

Mr. WINSTEAD. What number did you request?

General LEMAY. That is the number we requested.

Mr. WINSTEAD. You have the total number that you requested.
General LEMAY. [Nods.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY. I would just like to button up, if I might, in a little more precise terms, this discussion that we had a moment ago about the adequacy of our present forces.

General, is it your professional judgment that we have in being military forces which, without augmentation, can win, if we are attacked?

General LEMAY. I think so at the present time, with a certain element of risk.

Mr. HARDY. Well, if you put an element of risk in there, then that raises a question as to whether we do have in being adequate forces. General LEMAY. I think you are always going to have a certain element of risk, Mr. Hardy, regardless of the size of the forces you have. It is a question of how much risk you want to accept. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Just one question.

General, as we all so well know, the Constitution puts the burden. upon us in Congress to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a navy. Now, can you tell us what authority or authorities in the service particularly in the air branch-is the best, or are the best to tell us just how many we ought to have in the Air Force, in the Army, in the Navy, and in the Marine Corps?

Now who should we go to to find out just how many we ought to have?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I wouldn't propound that question of the general. That is embarrassing to him, because he doesn't want to say that.

He and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-they are the proper ones to guide and give us full information as to the security of the country, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. MORRIS. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have all those up here before us.

Mr. MORRIS. Then may I follow with this question

General LEMAY. I have no objection to answering that question,. Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General LEMAY. At all.

The CHAIRMAN. You agree with me, do you not? [Laughter.] General LEMAY. I think the Department of Defense

[Further laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. It is on that ground that we let you answer.. [Further laughter.]

Mr. WILSON. No fair coaching the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait one minute. Let there be order now.
Mr. MORRIS. All right.

General LEMAY. I think the Department of Defense should give that answer. I don't think that any of the service chiefs in this day and age can, in a vacuum, give their requirements without considering the requirements of the other services, because we must work as a team, and the Department of Defense must button them all up through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to come up with the answer. They must all fit together.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the Defense Department is really the one that ought to answer those questions in your judgment, is that correct?

General LEMAY. That is correct.

Mr. MORRIS. And I am not going to ask you to answer this, but you don't think it should be the Bureau of the Budget?

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Morris.
Any further questions for the general? If not-
Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. One minute. Everybody will get an opportunity. Mr. DOYLE. General LeMay, I understood you to state that in your judgment any war in the near future would be won or lost within that period of time, or before that period of time had expired which it would take to call into the service a substantial number of men-in other words, substantial increase in our enlisted personnel.

Was that correct?

General LEMAY. That is correct, particularly in the Air Force. Mr. DOYLE. All right.

General LEMAY. We can't

Mr. DOYLE. Now I take it, therefore, that you have come to some conclusion as to the approximate time it would take to call into the service particularly the Air Force, that being your particular responsibility to call into the Air Force the required number of men to help win the war, rather than lose. How do you come to that conclusion?

What I am getting at is how long do you allow to the problem of winning or losing a war, if it should come soon-general war?

General LEMAY. Well, it takes varying lengths of time to train people, depending upon the skills that you are training the men in, of

course.

Mr. DOYLE. Of course.

General LEMAY. In our technical skills like jet airplane mechanics, radar specialists and people of that sort, we enlist them for 4 years. It takes about 3 years of schooling before they are pulling their weight and doing a day's work.

So, from that standpoint it takes about 3 years to train a man. you take jet bomber pilots, the period is about 7 years. So you can see that you are not going to draft

anyone, train them, put them into the armed services, and get any use out of them in an atomic war, where your atomic exchange is going to take place very quickly.

In the first place, the facilities for doing this in all probability will not survive the attack.

Mr. DOYLE. Then, may I close this question by saying can you give us any indication, then, if you have one, as to your conclusion as to the