the Army has concurred in the 6-month trainee program, and that program is being financed. That is as much as I can answer in detail.

Mr. HARDY. Well, the question that I think is involved hereand one that I wanted to assure myself on-is whether or not we can be assured that the 6-month trainee program will be carried out to the extent that funds were appropriated for it if that is necessary to keep the National Guard to a strength of 400,000?

Secretary McELROY. Well, I don't think I want to answer that question because it is a little bit too technical for me.

Mr. HARDY. Well, in other words, Mr. Secretary, if you are not willing to answer that question, is it a correct interpretation, then, of your feeling that you shouldn't answer it that the Department of Defense would be willing to go below the 400,000, unless somebody decides to release these funds?

Mr. WINSTEAD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARDY. One second, please, because I want to be sure that I get this thing cleared. Then I will let you come in.

Secretary MCELROY. Mr. Gale tells me that there is a lot more in this subject than I can give you. You will either have to let me file it for the record or Mr. Finucane will be up here to give you the complete facts on it.

Mr. HARDY. Well, Mr. Secretary, here is the thing I want to try to establish in my own mind. Now presumably these funds are frozen by the Bureau of the Budget and they declined to release it.

The thing I want to know is: Is the Department of Defense going to acquiesce in a freeze by the Bureau of the Budget of these funds if the release of them is necessary to maintain the National Guard at the prescribed figure of 400,000?

Secretary MCELROY. We have a real problem on this National Guard because of the fact that the figure was put in on an average of 400,000. We didn't have-we hadn't had 400,000 when the year started. So that in order to have an verage of 400,000, we were going to have to go to 410,000 or 415,000 for part of the year and then drop back, in case 400,000 was still the right figure in the ensuing fiscal year, to a lesser figure starting July 1 of 1960.

This is the kind of thing I am saying to you as being a part of the problem we are talking about.

If we had started out with 400,000, which we did not do--I am talking starting out the fiscal year-it might have been a little bit more simple to handle.

But the numbers of 6-month trainees has been accepted as a right number by the Army in relationship to this overall problem of maintaining the mandatory figure that was included in the legislation. Now, then, I would strongly suggest that either we give you the complete story in written form or else that you have before you somebody that can give you greater detail in this than I am able to do. Mr. HARDY. Well, it may be that we will need to do that, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. HARDY. I certainly will be glad that you will submit in written form the story in full.

But the policy question was the question that I was trying to establish here, as to whether it was going to be the policy of the De

partment of Defense to permit the strength of the National Guard to go below that figure which the Congress said, if the Bureau of the Budget insisted in holding up these funds.

Secretary MCELROY. What has happened both in the case of the Army National Guard, Mr. Hardy, and also in the Army Reserves, where mandatory requirements were placed on us, is that this bill was signed by the President. He accepted this mandatory requirement and directed us to conduct the affairs of those two units of our forces in accordance with that directive.

Mr. HARDY. So, then, it is your intent to carry it out?
Secretary MCELROY. Absolutely.

Mr. HARDY. That clears up that aspect.

Secretary MCELROY. Oh, yes. There has never been any ambiguity about that.

Now, then, I think the thing we will have to say to you is that we don't know whether this committee in order for us to get the average figure that we need, is going to want us to go up to 425,000 on the 30th of June of 1959, if that is required, and then lop it off in the next month or two to 400,000. Because that is the problem of the "average" business. You see, we have always established figures in the past on the basis of end strength, so that we could either gradually move up or gradually move down depending on which way we were going. Mr. HARDY. That is one I would think you could work out. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hardy?

Mr. HARDY. Could I ask him to just

Secretary McELROY. The average is a very difficult thing for us, because of the fact-you see, a few months had already gone in the fiscal year before the figure was actually sent.

Mr. HARDY. I can appreciate that.

Now there was one other question that I had wanted to ask you, and I will have to forego it, but I would like to ask that it be included in the information that you give. As I understand it, the funds which the Congress appropriated for National Guard construction have not been released either, and I would like to know what the status of that is?

Secretary MCELROY. All right.

Mr. HARDY. And what the intent is?

Secretary MCELROY. All right.

The President's budget, for Army National Guard construction for fiscal year 1959 indicated an obligation of $15 million. Approximately $16.5 million has been apportioned to attain this level of obligations; $5.25 million has not been apportioned pending the acceptance by the various States of the Army's new troop plan for the guard. The new plan proposes to organize the guard to conform to the pentomic division structure of the Active Army and would make some changes in deployment of units.

When the new troop plan is accepted by a State and a deployment of units approved, additional funds will be recommended for apportionment to meet the construction requirements of the various units. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hardy. Now, members of the committee, there are 14 or 18 members that have not had the privilege of examining the Secretary. So, Mr. Secretary, I will have to respectfully request that you return tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock,

so the other members on the committee can have the same privilege that we senior members have enjoyed up to this time.

So you will have to come back, Mr. Secretary. I trust it won't inconvenience you, but it is nothing but fair that you do so.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, February 5, 1959.)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C., Thursday, February 5, 1959.

The committee met at 10 a.m., Hon. Carl Vinson, chairman, presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Now let the committee come to order.

Now when the committee recessed yesterday we had reached Mr. Becker on the committee. Now, Mr. Becker, have you any questions to propound to the Secretary? If so, you may do so.

I am hoping, members of the committee, we can finish the inquiry today. We will have to be on the floor at 12 o'clock to present the draft bill.

Now, you may proceed, Mr. Becker.

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Secretary, I won't deny my very close association with-not as a member, but association for many years with the National Guard, and my interest in the Reserve training program of the National Guard.

Now I took it upon myself to try to get some figures of what has happened to cause young men in my area to start screaming about getting in the 6-month program.

Of course, I find that you cut in this past year, 1959, the number of Reserve trainees to go into National Guard, from 55,000, appropriated funds, to some 44,000 in 1959.

Now I don't expect you to have these figures on hand, but why?
Secretary MCELROY. You say why from 55 to 44?
Mr. BECKER. That is right.

Secretary MCELROY. Well, I can't give you a specific answer except in the general terms, that in the opinion of the Department of Defense, where this is in the personnel area, it was agreed in working with the Army that the best combination of qualified members of the National Guard would be the combination of the figure that you give, if that is it and I wouldn't know specifically-and the other sources we have for members of the National Guard.

There needs to be some sort of a balance and this is the kind of thing that has been worked out among men as the best way in which to accomplish what has been set as the objective by the committee. Now if you want any more specifications, Mr. Becker, it will have to come from Mr. Finucane.

Mr. BECKER. That is fine.

Secretary McELROY. Or else I will file it for the record.
Mr. BECKER. I wish you would do it.

The thing I have in mind, Mr. Secretary, is this fact. I only voted for the 6-month training program because I believe it has always been my concept-that if there was an opportunity given to young

men to go into the military forces right after high school and get their training in, it is much better than interrupting college and getting married, or in jobs and everything else. I recognize the fact, that in supporting the extension of the draft, that the disruption that takes place in the mind of youth coming from the schools in recent years of not knowing when the ax is going to fall on them-is bad. Their plans can't jell and I think consequently they can't get their minds set. I thought we could fill this program with the 55,000, because we have 11,000 spaces in the National Guard Reserve training program and I would dare say we could fill them overnight if given the opportunity.

Secretary MCELROY. Well, this, of course, does put certain problems on the training establishment of the Army. It also is true that you would not want all of your National Guard to be made up of 6-month trainees of this young age.

Mr. BECKER. Oh, no.

Secretary MCELROY. The working out of the combination has been a matter which has been given careful consideration by the Army and the number that is in the program is regarded as the best number of these for the overall total.

Mr. BECKER. But you probably will be able to get better and more precise information from Mr. Finucane when he comes before the committee.

Secretary MCELROY. Not only from him, but I will get a specific answer to this question of yours.

Mr. BECKER. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, we have heard a great deal about the current symphony-the broken record, "We are behind, we are behind, we are behind, we are behind." We seem to read that in the front page of the newspapers and all the television and radio commentators and current magazines and everything else.

Now, there was a statement made just the other day that hasn't been answered here nor has it been asked a statement made the other day to the effect that we do not have a single plane on air alert today, and secondly, that the reason for that fact is that there is a shortage of money.

Now, certainly that has created concern in the minds of a great many people, that we don't have a single plane on air alert at the present time, and the reason for it is because of the shortage of funds in the Defense Department.

Would you give us a clear-cut answer to that statement?

Secretary MCELROY. Yes. We would like very much to hit that one head-on, Mr. Becker.

Inasmuch as a prepared statement on this point is in General Twining's hands, I would suggest that since this is more a matter of military handling, that this first of all be given by him and then if there are any further questions, he or I will take them.

Mr. BECKER. I would be very glad to have General Twining speak to that point.

General TWINING. For the present time in the Defense Establishment there is no military requirement for an airborne alert posture. There is no requirement for it.

No airborne alert posture has been planned or requested for the present time.

Furthermore, no airborne alert program of the Air Force has been held up for the lack of funds.

At the present time the Strategic Air Command maintains a portion of its forces on ground alert. And they are going to work that up, we hope, to provide about 30 percent of the force on ground alert.

Now, this means they are lined up at the end of the runway; the crews are there with the airplanes 24 hours a day; the bombs are aboard; the crews know their targets they are all set to go and we get those airplanes off the ground in 15 minutes.

Mr. BECKER. Are you finished with that, General?

General TWINING. NO.

Mr. BECKER. Oh, pardon me.

General TWINING. This is adequate because we will get this kind of warning, today and in the next couple of years, certainly, before the missiles come.

As the U.S.S.R. increases its inventory of ballistic missiles in the foreseeable future and as the threat shifts from bombers to ICBM's, there may be a requirement for airborne alert later on.

We have anticipated this and have conducted training exercises to learn about airborne alert.

The planned termination of phase 1 of these training exercises apparently has been confused by some people and has been interpreted as a cancellation of an operational requirement.

It was a training exercise that we got permission to do-one exercise only. So asking a question how many aircraft are on airborne alert today implies that there should be some aircraft on airborne alert and that we are not doing it.

We are not doing it today because there is no military requirement for it today and it would be an ineffective way to operate SAC under the present threat to SAC.

I just wanted to clear the record on it.

Mr. BECKER. Well, General, you have given a very clear and concise answer to the question. But let me ask you this. In the statement I referred to you just answered the question is there any possible twist to this question, that somebody had in mind when they made this very bold statement? Is there some twist to it, General, that they are trying to get over?

General TWINING. I don't know, sir.

Mr. BECKER. In other words, you mentioned that you did have one exercise on air alert, one exercise you authorized?

General TWINING. That is correct.

Mr. BECKER. I presume you

Secretary MCELROY. This was authorized at the highest levels. General TWINING. At the highest levels.

Mr. BECKER. You had the exercise and it accomplished its purpose, apparently, and then you desisted. According to your statement, at this time it would serve no useful purpose except wearing out some planes in the air.

General TWINING. That is correct.

Secretary MCELROY. And some crews.

Mr. BECKER. And some crews, also which is very important. Secretary MCELROY. This is a very strenuous thing on the aircraft, on the crews, and on the entire operation, if it is not needed.