If it is needed as General Twining has indicated here, at some later time we will come up to that and be prepared to face it at that time.

Mr. BECKER. General, I ask you this-not the Secretary. I ask you this as our highest military commander, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To your knowledge, was this at any time prevented by a lack of funds or withholding of funds by the Budget or the Secretary or anybody else?

General TWINING. No, it was not.

Mr. BECKER. That is clear cut?
General TWINING. Clear cut.

Mr. BECKER. I am glad we got that out of the way. I don't know who is feeding the information to people, but when I heard this myself, I was amazed to think that the importance that was laid upon planes for air alert that it was through lack of funds.

I think it is disastrous that statements of that kind are made and stress is being put upon them in the mind of the American people.. Because I firmly believe, General, that we must do as much to build our military defense as well as maintain the morale of the American people.

And this is not a system of maintaining morale, with either the military forces or the people, which I think is so vital today.

Secretary MCELROY. Mr. Becker, I would just like to say that evidence of the fact that we agree that we are doing what we should do lies in the fact that we did request last year and the Congress very helpfully granted these funds to disperse the bomber force and to provide the facilities that were needed in order to put the bomber force on this ground alert-in this ground alert posture that General Twining described. This has taken substantial funds, the preparation of the facilities for the crews at the ends of the runways, and also we have had to construct additional runways in order to disperse. This is all going on and using funds which were requested by this. Department and constructively granted by the Congress in the last

session.

Mr. BECKER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Now, one matter here. We have pursued rather vigorously the question of constitutionality, the question of the abrogation of powers by the Congress and the assumption of powers by the executive branch, of the powers of Congress.

Now I concur wholeheartedly in opposition to the assumption of powers by the executive branch of those powers which are right fully in the Constitution belonging to Congress.

In the question of the legislation passed on 900,000 Army and you are cutting it to 870,000 irrespective of legislation-I remember your statements full well that you concur with the President and the President is your Commander in Chief and, therefore, you go along. with him. I oppose the assumption of powers by the executive branch, those powers of the Congress. And I concur with the gentlemen on my right. I only say this and I would like this to go in the record. And I mean it without any political significance whatsoever. I could only hope that this matter had been pursued just as vigorously and with as much zest and zeal many years ago when it was starting,. and perhaps we wouldn't have this situation today. It was why I supported so vigorously a certain piece of legislation known as H.Ř. 3.

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last year, that had to do with decisions of the Supreme Court. I intend to pursue this also and agree with my colleagues.

The time has to come, Mr. Secretary, when the Members of Congress know that their constitutional prerogatives bear weight with the executive branch, so that we can wholeheartedly then work with the executive branch, with complete recognition of the powers and responsibilities of both.

Now I sincerely hope that what legislation we pass this year with respect to the National Guard, or that which we have passed, will be recognized by the Defense Department. We believe a 400,000 National Guard--and we are not military experts-is a good thing or a reserve component of 300,000 is necessary to our Regular Establishment. I would hope that it would be recognized by you.

Secretary MCELROY. I think I have already testified that the figures on the National Guard and on the Reserve were accepted by the President when he signed the legislation and he has directed the Department of Defense to abide by this legislation in respect to those two branches of the service.

Mr. BECKER. I am glad to hear that, Mr. Secretary. I hope I express the hope it will be adhered to.

I was rather disturbed last night-and this is about the last, Mr. Chairman. I was rather disturbed last night that in all of the talk and in the questions that have been propounded about we being behind the Russians all the time as I said before it sounds like a broken symphony record, the way it is going on, constantly. The purpose of it of course may be recognized.

But on page 7 of the Evening Star last night we have a statement that I think is significant and very clear-cut by the President himself, "Russia can't wipe out bases, the President said."

I would think with this symphony that has been going on that this might very well have been on the front page of the newspapers. Of course I don't print the papers. But I think the statement of the President last night was clear-cut and certainly jells with what you and General Twining have been telling this committee.

Mr. PRICE. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BECKER. I would be glad to.

Mr. PRICE. Of course it is a clear-cut statement, but is it an accurate statement?

Mr. BECKER. Well, in that question I would say to my colleague that I would be questioning the integrity of the President of the United States in the statement and I would hesitate very greatly before I would do that. I would hesitate very greatly before I would question the integrity of the Secretary of Defense. I would hesitate greatly before I would question the integrity of the man sitting down there, General Nathan Twining, for whom I have the greatest respect, for his military ability. He has made the statement there.

Mr. PRICE. Would the gentleman yield there? I wouldn't question the integrity of the statement.

Mr. BECKER. You question the accuracy of the statement.

Mr. PRICE. That statement is based on the interpretation of the information they, themselves, give us.

Mr. BECKER. I would say to you, sir, that with all the information they have given here the past week as to the matter of evaluating or

stress placed upon the best of information that comes to their command-and that is the only way they can place the accuracy of it. I would say they are as nearly accurate as is humanly possible to evaluate at this time.

Mr. PRICE. Would the gentleman yield there? Would the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman, just for one observation?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you yield?

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, I believe I have been

Mr. PRICE. Would you yield for just a minute?

Mr. BECKER. No, I have yielded to the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the courtesy of the time you have given me. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary and General Twining.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Becker.

Mr. Doyle, do you have any questions?

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Chairman, I asked several questions in executive session. If we have another executive session, I have a couple of questions I want to ask.

Inasmuch as my distinguished colleagues have pretty well asked all the questions that I would ask in public session, I think I will not waste the time of the committee by asking the same questions in possibly a little bit different way. I pass.

Mr. PRICE. Would the gentleman yield to me?
The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. Chamberlain, have you any questions?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Secretary, I am deeply appreciative of your coming before the committee and giving us the background of the information you have.

The CHAIRMAN. Let there be order in the committee. Wait one minute, Mr. Chamberlain. Now go ahead, Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I am certain that this is going to be most helpful to us. I am grateful for your coming before us and giving us the background information. I, as a new member of this committee, have found it to be most helpful and I know as we consider legislation in the weeks and months ahead, this is going to be a splendid background.

There are a couple of matters that I would like to pursue with you with respect to the strength of our forces, along the lines that we have already discussed here.

I believe that Congress provided for a 900,000-man army last session and it is now said that you have 870,000 men in the Army at the present time?

Secretary MCELROY. That was the end strength as of June 30, 1959. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. And this reduction was about 3 percent of your total strength. And if I understood your testimony correctly, this, in your judgment, did not impair the effectiveness of our forces because of an improvement in quality. Do I understand your testimony, sir? Secretary MCELROY. Yes, a marked improvement in quality.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Now, with reference to the reduction in the strength of the Marine Corps. That was specified by Congress to be 200,000 and you have come and requested a force of 175,000. Are you inferring that this is because of a reduction of 1212 percent in

the force of the Marine Corps, is it because of an improvement factor there, too?

Secretary MCELROY. Well, the fact is that the Marine Corps was not at 200,000. The Marine Corps was at a figure of about 188,000. So the reduction is from 188,000 to 175,000. If we had gone to the figure that was provided for money wise by Congress, we would have had to have increased the size of the Marines by about 12,000 spaces. So I think this needs to be understood in order to get this into perspective.

We reduced from 188 to 175, which is a figure of about 13,000, somewhere around 612 to 7 percent.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Is that based upon this improvement factor that you mentioned with reference to the Army?

Secretary MCELROY. The improvement factor does not have the same basis because the discontinuation of the lower end of category IV only applies to draftees and the Marines have not had any but volunteers.

So on that particular factor you have not had the basis for improvement quality. However, you have had an improvement quality which comes about in our opinion and in the opinion of the Marines will continue to proceed from the application of the new pay bill that was authorized in the last session and the proficiency pay which we have put into effect in the last 6 to 8 months. That has decreased the turnover in personnel. It has increased the numbers who on renewal of their enlistment, have gone for a 4-year instead of a lesser time enlistment, and in general has reduced thereby the training requirements which are always a price that you pay for rapid turnover. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Secretary, relating to this question, I recognize that we must have a combat ready force in being to move instantly as we did into Lebanon, a striking force that is ready right now. Can you assure us that the reduction in the strength of the Marine Corps will not deactivate any of our Marine units that we have or cause a reduction in these forces, if you reduce them to 175,000? Secretary MCELROY. The three divisions remain, but as was said here yesterday, there will be a reduction in the number of batallions per division.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. So they won't be as strong, then, as they are now?

Secretary MCELROY. They will have fewer combat batallions per division.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Well, Mr. Secretary-in conclusion, I would like to make this observation and ask you your comments with respect to it. I see we have an unfortunate difference of opinion here between the Congress and the Executive with respect to the strength of these forces. It is difficult to reconcile the two views, but it seems to me somewhere along the line some compromise has to be worked out.

It occurs to me that the very least that the administration can do, you people can do with reference to this Marine force would be to leave it at the strength that it is at the present time rather than continue the disregard of the will of Congress, by reducing it from the 188,000 to 175,000. Could I have your comments with respect to a compromise such as that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary MCELROY. Well you may have my comments:

At the present time, however, the instruction that I have and as I have said here in each instance-with which I concur, is that we go to the 175,000. I have no basis on which I could suggest a compromise. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chamberlain.
Now, Mr. Bennett, have you any questions?

Mr. BENNETT. Following up, first of all, the question further with regard to the Marine Corps, to what extent will cuts ordered in the Marine Corps reduce our strength in the Far East and does Secretary Dulles feel that we can safely reduce our forces there at this time? Secretary MCELROY. There is no determination to reduce the size of the Marine forces in the Far East.

Of course, the forces that you have you can place wherever you want to and they will be placed wherever the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard as desirable and necessary in consideration of our international commitments.

Mr. BENNETT. Now, a more general question. It seems to me that statements by persons other than you about a general was being over in 2 or 3 days overlook the lessons of history and the realities of human perserverance and American patriotism. Even in a general war it is not true that the flexibility of our military strength and our fleets at sea, amphibious and highly mobile land forces, and such hidden weapons as the Polaris, can all have a decisive value in the ultimate outcome of even a general war?

Secretary MCELROY. It is our belief that these widely dispersed weapons around the world are a very important factor in the overall strength of this country in general war.

Mr. BENNETT. Isn't it true that if we become dependent on a single inflexible means of fighting even a general war, it will be increasingly easy for our opponents to concentrate on wiping out this defense and crippling it at the outset ?

Secretary MCELROY. That is our belief, Mr. Bennett.

I think that this could be of interest to this committee. We don't know today any way to defeat the incoming warhead of an ICBM. On the other hand, if all we had to defend against was the ICBM and could concentrate all of our technical thinking against that problem alone, my guess would be that we would find the answer and it would probably be one which would not be of the type that we are now thinking of, but would have unusual effectiveness, and such ideas have been put forward.

If it turned out that we had put a disproportionate amount of our attention, or if the enemy had, into one system which would then let the opponent concentrate on a defense against that and the defense turned out to be unusually successful, which is possible in a scientific breakthrough, it would then mean that whoever had put all of his eggs, or most of his eggs, in a single basket, would be really quite vulnerable at that point.

Mr. BENNETT. Even the Polaris-type submarine capability will probably be matched by our opponents at some time, will it not? Secretary MCELROY. I would think so.

Mr. BENNETT. Isn't ita possibility that each nation might cripple one another's missiles, bombers, bases and launching sites, within a matter of days, so the nation which has retained military flexibility,