Bulgaria, Satisfied and Dissatisfied

BY EDWARD G. ELLIOTT

Associate Professor in Princeton University

When Alexander the Second, the Czar of Russia, declared war upon Turkey on April 24, 1877, he issued a manifesto to his people in which he proclaimed that the object of the war was "to arrive at an amelioration of the existence of the Christians of the East." In an address to the troops by the Grand Duke Nicholas, commander-in-chief of the Russian forces, at the outbreak of hostilities, the same idea appears in even more emphatic language. "We march," he said, "not for conquests; we march to defend our brothers, insulted and oppressed, to defend the law of Christ."

The humanitarianism of the Czar and his desire to protect the Christians of the Balkans became in the mouth of the Grand Duke the call of the crusader. The law of Christ was set over against that of Mohammed, the last rallying cry of the Cross against the Crescent rang out!

If we were left to manifesto and proclamation as the sole sources of information respecting the motives and purposes of Russia in this war, we might well believe that we had before us the inspiring example of the defense of the weak by the strong, the chivalrous protection of the oppressed Christians by their religious brothers for the sake of their common faith, and a revival of thirteenth century idealism in the crassest period of nineteenth century materialism. Fortunately for the truth of history we are not entirely dependent upon these sources. Almost contemporaneously with manifesto and proclamation, Prince Gortchakow had issued a circular to the Powers announcing that orders had been given to the Russian armies to cross the frontiers of Turkey. "In assuming this task," he said, "our august master fulfils a duty imposed upon him by the interests of Russia, whose peaceful development is hindered by the permanent disturbances of the East."

The "peaceful development" of Russia was neither a new nor an unimportant factor in the Balkan situation, and to the minds of many the plea of protecting her co-religionists was but a thread

bare cloak for concealing a real purpose of further territorial advances toward Constantinople. Since Peter the Great re-established the Empire and the church of the East, Russians have ever turned a covetous eye toward this ancient seat both of empire and religion, and since Peter first offered his protection to the Christians of the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia-modern Roumania-solicitude for the welfare of the Christians in the Balkans has been a convenient excuse for the extension of Russian influence over them. Religious zeal and material interests have gone hand in hand and through centuries have led step by step southward. In this war, too, these dual objects served a useful purpose; the one enabled the Czar to say to Nicholas, "Constantinople is your goal" and the other, to say to the Powers, "Do not fear for Constantinople!"

England, however, did fear for Constantinople because of her interests in Egypt and in the Suez Canal as the route to India, and in return for her neutrality Russia agreed that she would respect these interests and that the future of Constantinople should not be settled except by a general understanding.

In addition to Russia's interests, both religious and territorial, the aspiration for national independence was an important factor among the revolting Balkan provinces. Floating hazily before them is the traditional glory of their races as triumphant empirebuilders in the middle ages. The reawakened passion of nationality freed them after centuries of oppression from the rule of the Turk and seeks further realization in the establishment of a "Greater Servia" and of a "Big Bulgaria." Freedom from Turkish rule alone does not satisfy this desire for national unity; that can come only when the mass of Roumanians are embraced within the Roumanian state, the Bulgars within Bulgaria and the Serbs in Servia.

These nationalistic aspirations are an integral part of the political thinking of the nineteenth century, but, so far as the rest of Europe is concerned, "nationality" as a political force has lost its effectiveness; only among the excitable folk of the Balkan Peninsular is it still a shibboleth of parties. Hence it is that Servia has been excited almost to the pitch of war with Austria because of the latter's formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; these erstwhile Turkish provinces are settled in

large part by Serbs and have long been regarded by the PanSerbs as the legitimate object of their hopes.

The desire among the Balkan peoples for national independence found progressive realization during the last century, the various stages of which will not be adequately understood if we fail to take consideration of the facts that they have been Christians for centuries under the sway of Moslems, and that Russian interests have led her to play the role of their protector. By the peace of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774 the right of protecting the Christian subjects of the Porte was gained by Russia. So long as this right of protection remained vague and indefinite it was harmless, but, when Russia demanded its express recognition, the whole aspect of the situation was changed. Rather than give it England and France were ready to join the Sultan in the Crimean War. The interests involved were recognized as being European and so it came about that the settlement of the questions which had arisen was referred to a conference of the Powers at Paris in 1856.

The Ottoman Empire had shown an astonishing amount of vitality in the conduct of the war, and the hope was largely indulged in that the Empire was on the eve of a real reformation in government and administration. It was, therefore, formally admitted into the Family of Nations, but its territorial integrity was impaired by the creation of the "half sovereign" states of Roumania and Servia; though they still recognized the overlordship of the Porte, they enjoyed an autonomous administration. Both of these acts had the additional purpose of erecting a barrier against further Russian advance toward Constantinople, and by the compulsory cession of Bessarabia to Moldavia she was even cut off from the Danube, the navigation of whieh was made free to the world under the control of an International Commission. But the most humiliating of all for Russia was the "neutralization" of the Black Sea by which Russian war vessels were excluded from its waters and her fortifications from its shores. The Dardanelles finally were to remain closed to the passage of all war vessels so long as the Porte was at peace.

The humiliation of Russia by the neutralization of the Black Sea was too great to be endured and the opportunity for relief came with the Franco-Prussian war, when, in return for Russian

neutrality at the siege of Paris, Prussia agreed to Russia's rejection of the irksome restrictions.

Europe was in no position to gainsay this breach of the treaty of Paris. It could show its disapproval only by assembling a conference at London in 1871, which proclaimed it as a principle of international law that no state could free itself from the obligations of a treaty without the consent of the other parties to it. Russia's rejection of the neutralization of the Black Sea was, however, acquiesced in as an accomplished fact.

The condition of the Christian subjects of the Sultan was but little improved after the Peace of Paris; the hopes of reform in Turkish administration were doomed to disappointment, and within a few years the "Bulgarian atrocities" became household words. The fire of revolt in the Balkans has always been easy to kindle and quick to spread. In 1877 the whole peninsular was ablaze. When the Porte refused to heed the advice of the Powers or to accede to their demands for a settlement of the questions at issue with its Christian subjects, Russia took the initiative alone with a proclamation of her purposes as outlined above.

The Peace of San Stefano of March 3, 1878, revealed Russia's true objects. Bulgaria was to be freed from Turkish rule and to be erected into an independent principality under the protection of Russia-a "Greater Bulgaria," stretching from the Danube to the Ægean and from the Black Sea far towards the Adriatic. Pan-Slavism was triumphant and the power of Islam in Europe seemed doomed. Such an arrangement, with Russian interest and influence predominant, could not be acquiesced in by the Powers; they accordingly notified Russia that any treaty affecting the terms of the treaties of 1856 and 1871 would have to be submitted for their approval. Bismarck, as "the honest courtier" who desired to see the affair reach a happy conclusion, was chiefly instrumental in securing the Congress of Berlin which met on June 13, 1878, "to submit," as he said at its opening, "the work of San Stefano to the free discussion of the cabinets signatory of the treaties of 1856 and 1871."

Bismarck was the ruling spirit of the Congress, and through it he sought, with a large measure of success, to determine Germany's position in Europe for more than a generation. It was his policy to turn Austria's development away from the Germanic

and toward the Slavic elements within her territories, that the German Empire might be free to play the role of leader of the German nation; to accomplish this the administration of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina was placed in Austria's hands, and thereby her lasting favor was gained for the triple alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. England and Russia were thought to be permanently estranged by the continuance of the restrictions upon the navigation of the Straits. The hatred of Roumania, of "the little brothers" for their ancient friend, the "Czar Liberator," was achieved by the exchange of Bessarabia, north of the Danube, for the Dabnedscha, on the south. Save for the acquisition of Bessarabia and the access thereby gained to the Danube, Russia was deprived of all the fruits of her victory in Europe, while it was rather a matter of gratification than otherwise to Bismarck that she should have increased her Asiatic possessions at Turkey's expense.

Roumania, Servia and Montenegro were recognized by the Congress as independent states: "Greater Bulgaria" under Russian protection vanished, and in its place there appeared a divided Bulgaria, of which the northern part, called Bulgaria, stretching from the Danube to the Balkan mountains, was constituted “an autonomous and tributary principality under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan," with a Christian government and a national militia. The southern portion, or Eastern Roumelia, was to remain a tributary province "under the direct political and military authority" of the Sultan, though with a Christian governor-general and administrative autonomy.

In a conversation with Lord Salisbury in which names for the two Bulgarias were being sought, Count Schouwaloff, the Russian ambassador, suggested that they be called "la Bulgarie Satisfaite" and "la Bulgarie Mécontente," and such they proved to be. It was an artificial condition that could not last, and in 1885 Eastern Roumelia rose in revolt and drove out the governor-general appointed by the Sultan and chose in his place the Prince of Bulgaria. This union of the two Bulgarias, though in violation of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, was in thorough accord with the nationalistic aspirations of the Bulgarian people and the following year was acquiesced in by the Powers and by Turkey.

T