SUDANESE MISSION Question 6. Please describe the nature and extent of the Sudanese mission participation in the Sheik Rahman conspiracies. Answer. No responses were received from Mr. Colgan. QUESTIONS OF SENATOR KYL TO DALE WATSON OF THE FBI Question 1. In November 1991, Emad Salem, a 40-year old Egyptian, is introduced by a FBI foreign counterintelligence agent to two FBI counterterrorism agents who are investigating the ongoing activities of Sheik Rahman. During his recruitment, Salem is told that any information he gathers about the Sheik's activities will be for intelligence purposes only, and that he will never have to testify or make tape recordings of conversations. Salem agrees to these terms. At this time, the state trial of El Sayyid Nosair begins. Nosair is being prosecuted for the November 1990 murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane in Manhattan. Within the jihad community dominated by Sheik Rahman, Nosair is a cause celebre, and his trial becomes an opportunity for law enforcement to gather information on the Sheik. Salem begins attending the trial, where he soon meets Nosair's cousin and aide to Sheik Rahman, Ibrahim El-Gabrowny. Salem quickly meets other associates of El-Gabrowny and Sheik Rahman, and within a month is on a trip to Detroit with the Sheik and several others. During the ride to Detroit, the Sheik asks Salem to participate in the assassination of President Mubarak, a conspiracy later aborted. By the end of 1991, a frequent topic of discussion between El-Gabrowny and Salem is firearms and explosives. These discussions continue through early 1992 and include visits with the convicted Nosair, where Salem is recruited to help construct a series of bombs to kill perceived enemies of Nosair and jihad. Also in early 1992, the FBI polygraphs Salem on his connection to Egyptian intelligence. This upsets Salem, who had previously provided this information to his immediate super visors. In June 1992, El-Gabrowny and his cohorts discuss obtaining a "safehouse" for the construction of twelve bombs for at least two assassinations and "other targets". Salem is asked whether he can construct detonators, to which Salem responds he can not. By mid-June, Salem is given a loaded handgun with extra bullets by another coconspirator. In early July, Salem is told that Nosair wants to see him again. The FBI is now seriously considering conducting electronic surveillance. At this same time, a new supervisory FBI agent in New York decides that the investigation is serious enough to be treated as a criminal case requiring corroborating evidence. Salem is asked to make tape recordings for the FBI. Salem says no, that the FBI has broken their promise to him, and that making recordings would put him in severe jeopardy of his life. The FBI also asks Salem to submit to a second polygraph. Salem does so, but the relationship is then mutually terminated at the conclusion of the polygraph. In September 1992, in an attempt to discourage potential violence by the conspirators, the FBI issues subpoenas on about twenty conspirators. Also in September, Salem agrees to submit to a third polygraph. Only one other piece of information is gathered from Salem until subsequent to the World Trade Center bombing on February 23, 1993: in mid-December 1992, Mohammed Abouhalima leaves a message on Salem's answering machine asking Salem to call him. Salem does not return the call, but does inform the FBI of the call. It is later determined that on this same day Abouhalima bought smokeless powder which is found in the conspirators' storage shed in Jersey City. After the bombing in February 1993, Salem provides information to the FBI on the whereabouts of Abouhalima, who had fled to Egypt. This information helps the FBI bring back Abouhalima to the United States to stand trial for his participation in the World Trade Center bombing. Salem then becomes the key informant for the FBI in stopping the conspiracy to bomb multiple New York City infrastructures in June 1993. The subcommittee understands that the FBI conducted disciplinary inquiry into some agents involved with Emad Salem, and that action have been taken internally at the FBI in order to avert similar issues with informants from arising in the future. The open record from the Sheik Rahman trial indicates that the FBI conducted neither physical nor electronic surveillance on those people identified by Salem as planning bombings and constructing bombs subsequent to the termination of Emad Salem as a FBI informant. Please detail what actions the FBI did take between mid-July 1992 and the date of the World Trade Center bombing on February 26, 1993 to continue gathering information on these conspirators. FOREIGN TERRORISTS IN AMERICA Question 2. Per my letter of invitation, please explain the presence, modalities, supporting infrastructures, objectives, fundraising and recruitment activities of foreign terrorists and their affiliates in the United States, including a discussion of known or suspected criminal activities. In your discussion, please specifically discuss the following information: the physical locations and nature of foreign terrorist operations in the United States; the criminal enterprises and front organizations used to raise money; and whether American citizens are targets for recruitment by foreign terrorist organizations. TRENDS Question 3. What do you see as the trends in foreign terrorist activities in the United States in the future and how are your individual agencies addressing these trends? IRAQI SITUATION Question 4. During the course of the subcommittee hearing on February 24, Senator Kyl entered into the record copies of two religious edicts or fatwas and read into the record the CIA Counterterrorist Center's analysis of the fatwas. Mr. Watson was then asked to comment upon them. In response, Mr. Watson replied that he was not surprised such fatwas would be issued; that Americans should be concerned about these types of fatwas and that "we do see, working with our counterparts at the agency, increased threats toward American targets, not only military but soft targets around the world, U.S. businesses, businessmen, -women, tourists, and targets of that nature"; that fatwas appear to be a trend; and that the FBI was conducting an ongoing investigation into Bin Ladin. Could you please expand upon these comments. More specifically, please: 1. Provide your analysis of these fatwas. 2. State why you are not surprised these fatwas were issued. 3. Explain why Americans should be concerned about these FATWAS. 4. Explain why these fatwas appear to be a trend. 5. Provide an explanation of the FBI investigations into Bin Ladin, including the nature and location of Bin Ladin's activities in the United States and abroad. 6. Provide a copy of "A Declaration of War" released against the United States by Bin Ladin on or about August 23, 1996. Was this Bin Ladin's first fatwa against the United States? WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TERRORISM Question 5. Facts made public during the Ramzi Yousef cases indicate that this World Trade Center 'mastermind' was interested in terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. I am concerned with what we might learn from the Ramzi Yousef cases about the potential for such attacks in the future. Shortly after the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, FBI agents discovered in the storage locker of one of Ramzi Yousef's co-conspirators all the ingredients necessary for making the poison gas hydrogen cyanide. This fact is well known. Less well known is that Yousef told Secret Service and FBI personnel who were accompanying him back to the United States after his capture that he had indeed originally hoped to explode a chemical weapon in the World Trade Center; the only thing that apparently stopped him was lack of funds to finance the operation. Moreover, the indictment against Yousef indicates that two years after the World Trade Center bombing-while Yousef was a fugitive from American justice and planning to blow-up U.S. air carriers operating out of the Philippines-Yousef was reportedly mixing chemicals in his Manila apartment. He also had papers in his possession claiming the "ability to make and use chemicals and poisonous gas against vital institutions and residential populations and the sources of drinking water." * ** These facts-pulled together only after intensive investigation involving two criminal cases and spanning several continents-seem to indicate a serious intent and evolving capacity by Yousef to engage in WMD terrorism. Was there any other evidence recovered during your investigation to suggest that Yousef was attempting to carry out a chemical attack against the United States? Based on all the evidence you collected in New Jersey, Manila and elsewhere, and based on Yousef's own statements, do you believe he had the intention and had gathered the technical expertise and equipment to engage in WMD terrorism? CIA Director Tenet recently testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that we have seen "growing indications" of terrorist interest in WMD. Director Freeh testified that during 1997 the FBI opened over 100 WMD-related criminal cases a three-fold increase over 1996. Could you describe to the Subcommittee these "growing indications"? Does this information-along with our experience with Yousef and subway gas attack in Tokyo-demonstrate that there is a growing risk that terrorists will actually use chemical or biological weapons as a means of terrorist attack? COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND PROSECUTION OF TERRORISTS: THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY Question 6. The United States has a solid record in tracking down terrorists and holding them to answer under U.S. law. This includes, most recently, the successful capture and prosecution of Mir Aimal Kansi, who was responsible for killing two Americans outside the entrance to the CIA. Director Freeh has called this record a central part of our counter-terrorism strategy and a key deterrent against terrorist acts. But there is one area where, inexplicably, we seemed to have walked away from this prudent and effective course. Nine Palestinians, wanted in connection with terrorist attacks in which nine Americans were killed, are presently at large in the West Bank. Under the terms of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority is responsible for extradicting persons wanted in connection with extraterroritorial criminal investigations. I am informed that Arafat has refused extradition requests from the Israeli government for persons wanted in Israel. I further understand that the U.S.government has not requested extradition of these suspects. I appreciate that the FBI is not responsible for the foreign policy considerations at play here. But I wonder if you could share with us your view of the importance of ensuring that terrorists do not have a ready safehaven, outside the reach of U.S. law. TERRORIST ASSETS Question 7. In your testimony, you stated that the 1996 Antiterrorism Act was helpful to the FBI because the designation of foreign terrorist organizations gives the FBI the ability to seize terrorist assets. What terrorist assets have been seized under the Antiterrorism Act? Has the FBI estimated the amount of terrorist assets in the United States and those under the control of U.S. corporations and banks? If so, what is this amount? How are you coordinating this effort with the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control? LEGAL DEFENSE FUNDS FOR TERRORISTS Question 8. In your testimony, you noted that "supporters [of Sheik Rahman] used the internet to solicit funds for his defense" as an example of terrorist activity in the United States. MOUSA MARZOUK Question 9. Why was Hamas chieftain Mousa Marzouk not prosecuted in the United States for providing "material support" to terrorist groups? Can you supply to the Subcommittee copies of all documents found on the person of Mousa Marzouk and his wife? Was there any quid pro quo with Marzouk or any other person or group connected to him or acting on his behalf in exchange for his deportation to Jordan? Did the United States agree to drop possible criminal prosecution of Marzouk in exchange for any agreement by Marzouk? Why did the United States agree to accept a plea of no contest to the terrorist immigration charge? Did the FBI develop separate information about the possible involvement of Mousa Marzouk in violating U.S. laws? WHITE HOUSE BACKGROUND CHECKS Question 10. What procedures are in place which enable or require the FBI to conduct a background check on persons who seek to visit with White House personnel, including the President and First Lady, but may have ties to terrorist groups or terrorist front groups? Has the FBI ever conducted a background check on persons suspected of having ties to a terrorist group or a terrorist front group? THREATS AGAINST AMERICANS Question 11. Is the FBI aware of threats against American citizens or exhortations to commit violence against American citizens issued by militant fundamentalist organizations based or headquartered in the United States? If so, how many Americans have been subjected to these threats? What is the exact nature of these threats? FOREIGN STUDENT TRACKING PROGRAM Question 12. In 1995, an INS task force on foreign student controls submitted a report to the then Deputy Attorney General, Jamie Gorelick, per the concern expressed to her by Director Freeh about security risks posed by foreign students. According to the report, the "guiding principle to the Task Force's effort" was that "the American public needs to have some basic level of comfort in the knowledge that its government is guarding against the danger * [of] instances where terrorists and criminal aliens have been linked to student visas." In 1996, Congress responded to this INS report by passing a mandatory law requiring that a Foreign Student Tracking Program be established by January 1, 1998 and a report on the program be submitted to this Committee in four years. What is your assessment of the value of the national development of this program to the FBI's overall counterterrorism effort? Answers. No response to any question was received from Mr. Watson. Hon. JOHN KYL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Washington, DC, May 13, 1998. Chairman, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR SENATOR KYL: Thank you for your letter of March 18, 1998 enclosing additional questions arising from my testimony before your Subcommittee on February 24th. Please accept my regrets for the delay in response. The questions and answers follow. RESPONSES OF WALTER D. CADMAN TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KYL Question (Priority of conducting counterterrorism). Does INS view its role in combating terrorism as a priority responsibility internally, or more of an ancillary tasking? Answer. Before last fiscal year, INS did not enumerate counterterrorism efforts among its Fiscal Year priorities. However, in both Fiscal Year 1997 and Fiscal Year 1998, counterterrorism has been a subset contained within the larger category entitled, "Interior Enforcement." Thus, while it does not yet stand on its own as a discrete priority, it has garnered recognition within INS as an important program meriting additional attention and better tracking and monitoring systems. Question (INS Counterterrorism Unit). With the INS acting as the gatekeepers to this country, Congress recognized in the Anti-Terrorism Act that the INS plays a critical role in identifying, excluding, and removing terrorists from the United States. And yet, as I understand it, Mr. Cadman, your position as counterterrorism coordinator at INS was only just created at the end of last summer; and you apparently do not have a counterterrorism unit consisting of intelligence and operations personnel that reports to you. What additional resources do you need and programs do you believe need to be in place in order that the Counterterrorism Unit at INS can be a truly effective player in U.S. counterterrorism efforts? Answer. You have accurately depicted the late start INS has had in developing its Counterterrorism Unit (recently renamed the National Security Unit, or HQNSU). Since then, there have been a number of heartening developments (1) Staff Resources. I have had detailed to me from the Office of Programs, a senior special agent and a program analyst. In addition, I have been permitted to select two senior agents to join my staff, both of whom will enter on duty in the very near future. (2) More Streamlined Reporting Channels. In an effort to consolidate oversight responsibility within INS Headquarters for matters involving counterterrorism, I have been given supervisory oversight for the three INS special agents who are assigned fulltime to the International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS) at the FBI. (3) Additional Field Resources. Our Fiscal Year 2000 budget request includes 53 additional special agents to be assigned to Joint Terrorism Task Forces throughout the nation. This request has been supported within INS and the Department of Justice. There are, however, three other areas in which the progress and development of our unit has not been as rapid as could be desired: (1) Responsibility for Terrorist Lookouts. Such lookouts continue to be handled as a part of the larger lookout system, handled by INS Inspections components. As a consequence, we find it difficult to coordinate or, on occasion, to even become aware of "hits" that occur at ports of entry when suspected terrorists arrive from foreign location. (2) Additional Streamlining. Although as mentioned, oversight of the INS agents assigned to the FBI's ITOS now rests with the NSU, this has not happened with the INS agents assigned to the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC). The result in each case mentioned immediately above is a fragmentation and stovepiping within the INS structure that does not lend itself well to consolidation and comprehensive oversight of our developing counterterrorism program. I am confident, however, that these matters will be addressed in the near future. Mr. Chairman, I hope that these responses are helpful to you in assessing the direction of our program. I would like to thank you, the other members of the Subcommittee, and your staff for the kindness and consideration you showed at the hearing and, more importantly, for your interest in, and attention to, the significance of INS efforts in the federal government's counterterrorism program. Sincerely, WALTER D. CADMAN, Counterterrorism Coordinator. Hon. JON KYL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Washington, DC, August 20, 1998. Chairman, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of March 18, enclosing additional questions arising from my testimony before your Subcommittee on February 24, Please accept my regrets for the delays in response. The questions and answers follow. RESPONSES OF DORIS MEISSNER TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR KYL Question (Priority of conducting counterterrorism). Does INS view its role in combating terrorism as a priority responsibility internally, or more of an ancillary tasking? Answer. In both Fiscal Year 1997 and Fiscal Year 1998, counterterrorism has been a key element of one of INS' seven agency-wide priorities. Thus, INS treats its anti-terrorism role and responsibilities as a program that receives ongoing executive attention and support through agency-wide tracking and monitoring systems and quarterly reporting and review. Question (INS Counterterrorism Unit). With the INS acting as the gatekeepers to this country, Congress recognized in the Anti-Terrorism Act that the INS plays a critical role in identifying, excluding, and removing terrorists from the United States. And yet, as I understand it, Mr. Cadman, your position as counterterrorism coordinator at INS was only just created at the end of last summer, and you apparently do not have a counterterrorism unit consisting of intelligence and operations personnel that reports to you. What additional resources do you need and programs do you believe need to be in place in order that the Counterterrorism Unit at INS can be a truly effective player in U.S. counterterrorism efforts? Answer. The INS has taken many positive steps towards developing an effective Counterterrorist Unit (recently renamed the National Security Unit, or HQNSU). The INS has taken significant steps in the following areas: Staff Resources: A senior special agent and a program analyst have been assigned to the HQNSU. One additional senior agent has joined the staff and a third will be selected in the very near future. More Streamlined Reporting Channels: Mr. Cadman has supervisory oversight of the three INS special agents who are assigned to the International Terrorism Operations Section at the FBI. This has strengthened the program by consolidating INS Headquarters oversight of counterterrorism matters. |