rately imparts "to all Air Force personnel a basis for understanding the use of aerospace forces in peace and war."21 These words by General Charles Gabriel in the foreword to Basic Aerospace Doctrine are most important. We must recognize that space is a place and not a mission-but it is a different place than the air. Those functions that can be supported from space best illustrate the capabilities of space forces. The speculative diagram shown in Figure 1 divides the functions supported by space forces into both support and combat roles involving four major types of activities. The long-term trend seems to be from those activities on the left to those on the right. The a ballistic missile defense based on the Strategic Defense Initiative technologies, such systems would fall under that category. Many of the activities outlined in the figure fall technically into either Air Force missions or specialized tasks. Of the four major types of activities listed on the figure, one in particular would seem appropriately called an Air Force mission. That is space control. This is the space age counterpoint to the Navy's mission of sea control and the Air Force's counterair. It consists of "providing freedom of action in space for friendly forces while denying it to the enemy."22 The air-launched antisatellite currently undergoing development testing is an exam shift from traditional support roles toward in-ple of a space control system. It would seem, corporation of more active and participative military roles is analogous to the airplane and its integration into military operations. The U.S. Army first relegated the airplane to support roles such as battlefield observation and courier missions. Later, the airplane was allowed to evolve into more combative roles, such as close air support and interdiction, and ultimately to strategic air power. While there are no force application space systems presently, should the President decide to develop Figure 1. Functions for space forces then, that not only is space a place from which Air Force missions are supported or enhanced, but also it is a place in which the Air Force has missions. However, just as General Mitchell tried his best to get the "old guard" military to recognize that the air was an arena in which valuable missions could be performed, today we should be recognizing that there are missions performed in space which are not air missions. Hopefully, we shall not be guilty of trying to prevent tampering with the sacred functions of the horse cavalry ourselves. There are other examples that AFM 1-1 should have treated as missions or, at the very least, as specialized tasks associated with space. Space support functions of space launch and orbital operations are candidates, especially considering their unique attributes, their support and enhancement of other Air Force missions and tasks, and their assignment to the Air Force as their DOD executive agency. The Need for the Right Stuff The omission of explicit reference to space in favor of the term aerospace did little doctrinal justice for an important segment of the Air Force and our national security. Without a doctrine, the growing importance of space forces will not diminish, but the overall effectiveness of space forces could be hurt, since doctrine is the foundation of strategy. However, my discussion of this doctrinal gap should not be mistaken for a justification to establish a separate space service in a manner similar to the separation of air and ground forces in the late 1940s. Although some of the same seeds for separation are present, the establishment of the Air Force Space Command as a line organization could be a positive step to integrate space forces into the framework of the Air Force, if accompanied by appropriate doctrine. Asked for his view of severing the air arm from the Army, Major Horace Hickam put it succinctly: "I am confident that no general thinks he can control the Navy or no admiral thinks he can operate an army, but some of them think they can operate an air force."23 Neither the Navy nor the Army were doctrinally prepared to integrate air operations into their services. We have the benefit of much more employment experience and understanding of space systems than the early air pioneers had when they began their advocacy. Yet without a space doctrine today, the Air Force is in much the same position as the Army of sixty years ago. The past twenty-seven years of operating space systems in both peace and war have resulted in considerable valuable experience. It is on that experience that a space doctrine must be based. With far less experience in aerial warfare and air operations, Lieutenant Henry "Hap❞ Arnold wrote a visionary article titled "Aircraft and War" in a 1913 issue of the Infantry Journal. He cited uses of aircraft in peacetime maneuvers, as well as limited combat experience in tactical, brushfire wars. He explained that the use of aircraft for reconnaissance had been confirmed, and he further conjectured that aircraft could be used for air superiority, messenger service, forward air controlling, air transport, and offensive operations.24 Whatever Lieutenant Arnold's expectations were in 1913, he laid the intuitive doctrinal foundation, which eventually led to his prominence in the establishment of the Air Force as a separate service. After only ten years of the aircraft's existence and even less demonstration of its practical value, he was able to see the importance of air forces in the future of warfare. By 1945, his thinking was that "any air force which does not keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security."25 The Air Force has had space equipment operational for more than a quarter century, but it does not have a space doctrine to match. Doctrine alone, however, is insufficient without a proper organizational infrastructure. The importance of space and the need for space organization were emphasized in the formation of Air Force Space Command. The future holds a more striking reiteration by the imminent formation of the Unified Space Command. The Air Force ought to be the doctrinal leader of the new Unified Command. As Major General I. B. Holley has stated, "...one can say with assurance: doctrine and organization are intricately and probably inextricably related.”26 T HE Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and continuing conflict there, and the importance of Gulf oil to the U.S. and other Western economic systemsall remind U.S. military professionals of our nation's major security concerns in Southwest Asia. The economic, political, and strategic importance of the area prompts the involvement of many extraregional polities in the security affairs of the region, directly through military intervention, less directly through security assistance programs and arms sales/transfers, or through diplomatic initiatives. One such actor in the region-whose regional activities receive very little attention, even by professionals involved in studying regional security challenges-is the People's Republic of China (PRC). The purposes of this article are twofold: to explore China's security involvement in Southwest Asia, the scope of its activities, and its motivations for involvement; and to note their implications for U.S. and regional security interests. In this article, the term Southwest Asia (SWA) should be understood as coinciding with the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) (see map), which includes all of the Arabian Peninsula (extended northward to include Jordan and Iraq), Egypt, the Sudan, the Horn of Africa and Kenya, plus Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. This culturally, ethnically, and geographically diverse area cannot be considered as a single region except in one respect: as the AOR of a new U.S. unified command, it is the subject of regionally unique U.S. policies, objectives, and initiatives. Importance of the Region The United States has compelling interests in the security and stability of the region, which have been articulated in sequential presidential doctrines since the Second World War. These culminated in the establishment of the U.S. Central Command (formerly the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force) in January 1983. Beyond the obvious importance of access to the region's petroleum resources for the economic health of the Western economic system, the United States is interested in the security and stability of the area's moderate regimes and in keeping the area free of Soviet hegemony. The United States also recognizes the strategic importance of the region, both as a land bridge between Eurasia and Africa and as an air and sea communications crossroads that contains such important geographical constrictions as the Suez Canal, Bab al-Mandab, and the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, the United States strongly values establishment of an enduring and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While Israel and one of its primary adversaries (Syria) are outside the defined boundaries of the region, the instability and tension thrown off by the struggle have a profound impact on intraregional security. Indeed, the Arab-Israeli conflict is viewed by many of the leaders of the area as the most serious and certainly most enduring security issue they face. For several reasons, Southwest Asia is also important to China. First, from the standpoint of China's security, Chinese Communist leaders since Mao have viewed the region-especially the portion comprising Iran, Afghanisand Pakistan-as a barrier to the encirclement of China. They have thus been very sensitive to any major outside power with the might to threaten China, whether it is the United States or the Soviet Union, involving itself in the affairs of the region. tan, Chinese concern about encirclement has been manifested especially at two specific times since the Communists came to power. The first |