It is my understanding that 30 percent of the Army's active duty enlisted personnel are black and that in some combat units the percentage is around 50 percent. I am told that in recent quarters over 40 percent of the new recruits for the selective Army Reserve have been black.

If you add in Spanish-speaking Americans and other minorities it becomes clear, I think, that the All-Volunteer Army is disproportionately manned by minorities. Some view this as an unfair burden, and others see it as providing roads to economic advancement.

How do you view this problem Mr. Secretary? Does the increasing minority composition of our military force disturb you? What, if anything, do you intend to do about it?

Secretary BROWN. I do believe, Senator Cohen, that the military should be broadly representative of U.S. society. If you take the military as a whole, that remains broadly true. If you narrow it down to one service or to specific units in one service, it will on a statistical basis alone, but also for other reasons, become less representative.

Just as you can find disproportionately large representation in some units, so in other units you may find disproportionately small representation. That, I think, is something we want to even out, but I think it depends most of all on changes in American society, changes in the direction in which we want to move to have that happen completely.

The situation does need to be watched carefully. I don't think that going to conscription would necessarily resolve the points you make, because during the Vietnam war when we had conscription the situation also presented some of these same features.

Senator COHEN. In the past we have had many exceptions built into the conscription process.

Secretary BROWN. That is correct, and I think there will always be some concern that that is the case. I think that equitable treatment is very important, but looking back it was not always present.

Also, if you are depending on how much you broaden the definition of minorities you can get a larger and larger number. We have 10 percent in the Armed Forces of women, for example; they are a particular kind of minority in these terms, and there we are trying to increase the numbers.

NAVY DESERTION RATE

Senator COHEN. The chairman has expressed his strong interest in the development of our Navy. It is my understanding that the desertion rate in the Navy during the last fiscal year, fiscal year 1978, was 30 per 1,000 enlisted personnel. That is 1.5 times the rate in fiscal 1974, 30 times the present Air Force rate, and twice the overall Defense Department average. It is also more than twice the Army rate.

What is the reason for this?

Secretary BROWN. That is a matter of concern. I think it is a genuine statistic, at least in trend. I am not sure that the definitions are always applied the same way. But the Air Force has always been very low. The Navy in the past 10 years has increased in desertions and this has been particularly associated, as I recall, with extensive sea duty, and I think that is a very large part of the problem; young people finding themselves away from land for a long time have a very difficult time adjusting.

When you get into a situation where sea duty occupies a larger and larger fraction of the total enlistment, these pressures get greater and greater. That is somewhat peculiar to the Navy and is something that the CNO in particular is paying considerable attention to. You may want to question him further about it when he appears before you. There is an attempt to improve supervision, guidance, and to change the cycle in such a way as to reduce the pressure.

Senator COHEN. What is being done to enhance the ability of the Marines to provide logistical and amphibious support to the Navy's operations?

Secretary BROWN. I believe the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Forces is working on a plan that would introduce into the NATO services during mobilization a large number, not only of United States, but also allied merchant fleets. That would be extremely important in order to assure sustained delivery of supplies to Europe.

AV-8B PROGRAM

Senator COHEN. I have one final question, then perhaps I will yield to some of my senior colleagues. Last year some $87.4 million was added to the AV-8B program. The committee, with some fairly strong language, directed the Department of Defense to expand that program with great immediacy. Information is now available which reveals that the Department of Defense has denied all of the $203 million requested by the Marine Corps and the Navy for fiscal year 1980, for the development of Advanced Harrier.

I wonder whether or not you don't consider the Department's action to be totally inconsistent with the will expressed by this committee and the Congress?

Secretary BROWN. The congressional action, of course, had to do with the 1979 budget and those funds we maintain in the 1979 budget. As we considered the fiscal year 1980 budget we concluded that the expected availability of funds as we saw reasonable budget projections, for Navy and Marine craft, were going to be of a limited size, limited so that to proliferate the number of different aircraft in the inventory would greatly reduce the number of total aircraft available. Senator COHEN. What was the budget figure proposed by the Navy? Secretary BROWN. You mean for this?

Senator COHEN. For fiscal year 1980?

Secretary BROWN. They requested $203 million in research and development funds for the AV-8B and it was on the margin of priorities, partly because of the

Senator COHEN. The Navy's priorities?

Secretary BROWN. The Navy's as well, partly because of this factor that I talked to you about: the limitations on expected total naval aircraft funding. That $203 million dropped out in the final budget reviews. In fact, it came out in the last percent or two, which is an example of what happens if the marginal decisions are different decisions.

Senator COHEN. The Navy submitted its $203 million to the Department of Defense. At what point in time was this amount dropped?

Secretary BROWN. It dropped out in the final month of budget work. It was my decision, it wasn't the Navy's decision. In the Navy's

priorities, it was not of the highest level. It was at a lower level. As the overall budget came out it didn't make it. I will be happy to provide additional information for the record, Senator Cohen.

[The information follows:]

AV-8B DECISION

The following letter which provides additional information concerning the decision of the Department of Defense concerning the AV-8B was received by the Committee. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Washington, D.C., February 6, 1979.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In connection with the statements of Secretary Brown, myself and others on the FY 1980 budget, the question of the priority of the AV-8B program has been raised several times. As you know, the President's FY 1980 budget does not include funding for the AV-8B program. As discussed in the Annual Report to the Congress, Secretary Brown made the decision to terminate this program based on expected limitations on funding for procurement of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft in the 1980's and the need to purchase larger numbers of such aircraft. He also indicated that, while the AV-8B appears to have some potential for Marine Corps close air support missions, its measurable advantages over a conventional aircraft, such as the dual-mission F/A-18, appear minimal. I believe it would be useful to review the history of this program over the past few years to make clear the high priority that the Department of the Navy placed on the program and the reasons for its termination.

In May 1977, the Department of the Navy submitted a five-year program that included $488M for RDT&E and $1173M for procurement of the AV-8B during the FY 1979-1983 period. Discussion at that time centered on the issue of whether the Navy could afford to plan two new tactical aircraft developments (the F/A-18 and AV-8B) concurrently. In August 1977, the Secretary directed the Navy to perform a comparative cost and effectiveness study of the AV-8B and the F/A-18 in Marine Corps tactical air missions. Although the study illustrated the tactical flexibility provided by the AV-8B, the analysis of costs did not provide a clear basis for decision either way. As a result, the Secretary decided to delay the AV-8B program, pending a final decision on its future. In the President's FY 1979 Budget, RDT&E was decreased in FY 1979 from $173.2M to $85.6M, and AV-8B procurement was deleted. In the Spring of 1978, Congressional action restored the AV-8B RDT&E program to the level proposed in the Navy five-year program of the previous May.

In the revised five-year program of May 1978, the Depatrment of the Navy included the AV-8B with its other top priority items that would make up a budget at the decremented (minimum) level of $43.2B (which corresponded to a Defense budget of $135.4B). After consideration of the Navy proposals (and those of the other Services), the Secretary decided to accord the AV-8B a lower priority and instructed the Navy to include it in its "basic" and "enhanced" budget levels, which at that time included those items that would be included in a Navy budget in the range of $43.2B to $47.0B (corresponding to a total DoD budget of $135.4B to $146.2B). In the Navy budget submitted in September, the "basic" submission was divided into three segments, Band 1 ($43.2B to $44.0B), Band 2 ($44.0B to $44.7B) and Band 3 ($44.7B to $45.3B). The AV-8B was included in the highest priority band, Band 1, as the 15th Department of the Navy item (and the 4th Marine Corps item) in priority order of those items to be added above the level of $43.2B, at the level of $43.9B. Those items of higher priority in the Band 1 submission were largely readiness items that were directed by the Secretary of the Navy to be included in the highest priority within each band.

Thereafter, extensive additional adjustments to the Navy budget submission were made by OSD in the budget review process, including the usual "budget scrub" which eliminated over $1B of program below the level set by the Department of the Navy for the AV-8B. With these changes the AV-8B, if not moved to

a still lower priority, would have been within the final approved Navy budget total of $43.3B. Other changes in the Navy budget made by OSD, however, moved several items totaling more than $600M to a higher priority than the AV-8B. and the bands were reconstituted with different values. The AV-8B was then moved by OSD to a lower priority. A reclama by the Navy in December to restore it to Band 1 was denied.

In summary, the Department of the Navy sought from the outset of the programming and budget cycle to place the AV-8B in its highest priority grouping. It was subsequently relocated by the Navy to a lower priority position in accordance with OSD direction, and in the final budget decision the President and the Secretary of Defense concluded that, under all the circumstances, the program did not have sufficiently high priority and should be terminated.

I hope you will find the above information helpful.
Sincerely,

C. W. DUNCAN, Jr.

Senator NUNN. Would you yield just to follow up on that point? You said it wasn't one of the top Navy priorities. Is it true that it was one of the Marine's top priorities?

Secretary BROWN. It was the highest Marine aircraft priority of all, no question.

SALT II PROVISIONS

Senator HART. Mr. Secretary, on SALT, is there anything in the emerging SALT package which would practically preclude during the period after the termination of the protocol period any of the survivable basing schemes for our ICBM systems which are currently under consideration?

Secretary BROWN. Not in my judgment, Senator Hart. I don't think there is really any different view of this in the executive branch.

Senator HART. So both your judgment and the uniformed judgment in the executive branch is that we could proceed with either the socalled multiple aim point system or air mobile systems using the AMST airplane or perhaps some others, following the termination of the protocol?

Secretary BROWN. As far as the provisions of the SALT agreement are concerned; that is correct. There are separate questions of whether you would want to for various reasons. In each of these cases there are pros and cons but legality under SALT is not one of them.

Senator HART. Is that your view also, General Jones?

General JONES. Yes, sir, we worked hard to make sure it could be done under SALT and I am glad to hear the Secretary keep reiterating that it is allowed.

Senator HART. General, as I understand it, the survivable basing schemes that are being considered for our ICBM follow-on force are designed against a postulated threat of a specific number of Soviet warheads.

I am concerned that even if we could invent an effective basing scheme that would insure the survivability of the ICBM in the outyears, at a cost of 20 or 30 or more billions of dollars, absent some cap or control on the number of Soviet warheads, all the Soviets would have to do to counter that is expand the number of warheads they can target on our ICBM's and thus increase the threat once again. Therefore, isn't it going to be imperative, even if we go to an M-X system, and some sort of survivable mode, to have a cap on the total number of

warheads and, therefore, something like the terms of the SALT II agreement that we are presently negotiating?

General JONES. Under an MAP concept, as you state, there is a clear relationship between the number of warheads the Soviets have and the type of deployment required. That is one of the reasons we have been very strong advocates, and were the strongest initial advocates, of fractionation limits in any agreement with the Soviet Union.

So, yes, numbers are important. However, if they increase their numbers there are things we can do, but it does make it easier if the number of warheads they have is smaller.

Senator HART. You concur in that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary BROWN. I believe that a SALT agreement that puts some limit, either directly or indirectly, on the total size of the threat is very helpful to any survivable deployment scheme. As General Jones suggested, there are responses, at least in some of the deployment schemes, to continued increases in Soviet warheads. You can dig more missile silos in the case where you are exposed to the uncertainty as to how many warheads they have.

There is also the issue of exchange ratios in cost. If it costs them more than it costs you to offset it then it is not such a good strategy for them. So it is not a simple matter in any case, but the military people worked on this the hardest. I would agree that a limitation, a cap on the offensive threat, makes the planning much more certain and would be a big help in any of these schemes.

Senator HART. Let me shift to the Navy. We talked about how much money is being spent on the Navy or whether it is enough or how many ships are being built. As you know, my concern over the past several years has been not just the number of ships but what kind, Mr. Secretary.

CV vs CVV

Was it your recommendation to the President on the so-called last big carrier that we build a CV or Kennedy class carrier, or that we build a CVV, as I understand is being proposed?

Secretary BROWN. Well, I laid out for the President the pros and cons of each of these and I will be glad to do the same for the committee. Senator HART. Not at great length because of the time.

Secretary BROWN. At a future time. What the recommendations were, if he wants to reveal that, I would certainly be happy to have him do that. My recommendations to him I will leave with him.

I would say that I believe that the CVV, which is proposed in this budget is a very good, very capable replacement for the Midway class carriers, and that this is a very reasonable decision and one that I fully support.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to pursue the matter or embarrass the Secretary. However, I think on all sorts of occasions in my 4 years of experience we have been able to elicit either from uniformed officials of the services or from various civilian members of the Pentagon their own individual views.

Frankly, I think we are entitled to those, because we are going to have to make a decision ourselves on this carrier. If I am out of