affirmed on many occasions the principle that an international agency functioning on the basis of police-like inspectorial powers can never provide the security required by our terms of reference. This is the heart and core of this problem. This vital difference is reflected in all of the Soviet Union proposals. I see no hope of reconciling the concept of an international agency performing positive functions of operation and management with the concept of nations performing the functions of operation and management and an agency attempting by inspection to meet the requirements of security.

I note that it is further proposed by the Soviet Union in paragraph 6 (d) that the international agency "observes the fulfilment of the rules of technical exploitation of the facilities prescribed by the convention on control as well as works out and prescribes the rules of technological control of such facilities."

What are these rules of exploitation and control? They are certainly vague as compared to the specific proposals set forth in document AEC/C.2/39/Rev.2 to govern production of nuclear fuel. In the same regard, I see that the Soviet Union proposes in paragraph 6 (g) that the agency shall make recommendations to governments on questions relating to production, stockpiling, and use of atomic materials and atomic energy, and also in paragraph 7 (f) that the agency shall have the right to make recommendations and presentations to governments on the matters of the production and use of atomic energy. These two provisions appear to be virtually the same and appear to visualize a world in which individual nations would determine for themselves policies for the production of nuclear fuel. That would not be a world secure from the dangers of sudden atomic warfarethat would be a world of national rivalries in all fields involving atomic energy.

(e) Rights of and Limitations on Inspection

Of all the safeguards found necessary in the first report, inspection is the only one which the Soviet Union has expressed a willingness to consider. But when we come to examine the only Soviet Union proposals which have been made on this subject during the year of existence of the Atomic Energy Commission, we find only vague and general statements. The kind of inspection contemplated would seem to apply only to facilities which nations themselves reported to the international agency. There is not even any definite requirement for nations to make such reports. The question of clandestine or unreported facilities seems to be completely ignored in the Soviet Union proposals. No provision is made for international surveys or explorations to locate unreported deposits or mines containing source material. No provision is made for surveys or inspections to detect clan

destine mills, refineries, processing plants, nuclear reactors, or isotope separation plants. Complying states would not be protected against the hazards of violations and evasions, as called for in the terms of reference given us by the General Assembly.

1

This should be contrasted with the proposals contained in document AEC/C.2/61/Rev.1. The working group devoted two months of careful and exhaustive study to this matter. The Soviet Union Representative was invited to participate, but he refused. The document produced makes very definite and specific proposals as to the rights of inspection, survey, and exploration which the international agency must have, the limitations on these rights, and the procedures to be followed. It represents a serious and sincere effort on the part of all who participated to provide necessary inspection while at the same time giving nations protection against unwarranted interference.

In summary, the Soviet Union proposals seem to me quite inadequate in their provisions and obviously based on the concept of predominantly national control of what is generally recognized as the most dangerous field of activity in the world today. Fourteen months have been spent in a study of the problem, and ten of the nations represented in this group have concluded that to leave activities involving dangerous quantities of source materials or nuclear fuel in national hands is entirely inconsistent with world security. These same nations have recognized that the need for effective international control transcends the claims of national sovereignty in the field of atomic energy.

It is my opinion, and I believe the majority here joins in the opinion, that any international control system based on the concept underlying the Soviet Union proposals would be wholly inacceptable. We of this Commission would fall short of our clear duty if we allowed the people of the world to believe that such a system could possibly afford security.

6. Resolution Concerning the Implementation of the Resolutions of the General Assembly Regarding the Principles Governing the General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments and Information on Armed Forces of the United Nations

[This resolution was passed by the Security Council on February 13 to carry out the terms of a request from the General Assembly that the Council formulate practical measures for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Security Council herein resolved to expedite the work of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and to establish a commission to formulate plans for the regulation of conventional armaments (i.e. not atomic weapons or weapons of mass destruction) which the Commission was charged to submit to the Security Council for approval. The Council specified

that the new Commission for Conventional Armaments was not to encroach on the field already reserved to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Finally, and as a matter of urgency, the Council requested from the Military Staff Committee a progress report concerning basic principles to govern the organization of armed forces placed at the disposal of the Council. The resolution was adopted by 10 votes, with none against and one abstention (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).]

The Security Council, having accepted the resolution of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946 and recognizing that the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces constitute a most important measure for strengthening international peace and security, and that the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly on this subject is one of the most urgent and important tasks before the Security Council,

Resolves:

1. to work out the practical measures for giving effect to the resolutions of the General Assembly on 14 December 1946 concerning, on the one hand, the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and the establishment of international control to bring about the reduction of armaments and armed forces and, on the other hand, information concerning the armed forces of the United Nations;

2. to consider as soon as possible the report submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission and to take suitable decisions in order to facilitate its work;

3. to set up a Commission consisting of representatives of the Members of the Security Council with instructions to prepare and to submit to the Security Council within the space of not more than three months, the proposals:

(a) for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and

(b) for practical and effective safeguards in connection with the general regulation and reduction of armaments

which the Commission may be in a position to formulate in order to ensure the implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly of 14 December 1946, insofar as these resolutions relate to armaments within the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission shall submit a plan of work to the Council for approval.

Those matters which fall within the competence of the Atomic Energy Commission as determined by the General Assembly Resolution of 24 January 1946 and 14 December 1946 shall be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Commission hereby established.

The title of the Commission shall be the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

The Commission shall make such proposals as it may deem advisable concerning the studies which the Military Staff Committee and possibly other organs of the United Nations might be asked to undertake.

4. to request the Military Staff Committee to submit to it, as soon as possible and as a matter of urgency, the recommendations for which it has been asked by the Security Council on 16 February 1946 in pursuance of Article 43 of the Charter, and as a first step, to submit to the Security Council not later than 30 April 1947, its recommendations with regard to the basic principles which should govern the organization of the United Nations Armed Force.

7. Plan of Work Adopted by the Commission for Conventional Armaments

1. Consideration of and recommendation to the Security Council concerning armaments and armed forces which fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission for Conventional Armaments.

2. Consideration and determination of general principles in connection with the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

3. Consideration of practical and effective safeguards by means of an international system of control operating through special organs (and by other means) to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

4. Formulation of practical proposals for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

5. Extension of the principles and proposals set forth in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 above to states which are not Members of the United Nations. 6. Submission of a report or reports to the Security Council including, if possible, a draft convention.

It is proposed that under the six headings listed above all of the references by the various delegations suggested for the Plan of Work will be considered.

It is also understood that this Plan of Work does not limit the freedom of individual delegations to make additional suggestions at a later time.

Appendix III

SELECTED ADDRESSES BY UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVES

Faith and Fidelity-American Pledge to the United

Nations

BY SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE C. MARSHALL

Before the American Association for the United Nations, September 14, 1947 I am glad to participate in the opening of United Nations Week. The interest and the sense of public responsibility shown by the American Association for the United Nations and the scores of other national organizations which have joined in preparing this week of public education in the work of the United Nations is deserving of commendation. It should result in a deepened understanding of the purposes, the accomplishments, and the difficulties of the United Nations and a more understanding determination on the part of the American people to make it succeed.

The General Assembly will convene at Flushing Meadows on Tuesday for its second regular session. Delegates from the 55 member states are now arriving in this country for this meeting. They will receive a warm and cordial welcome from our people, who will follow their work with close and sympathetic attention. The Assembly will consider a number of unusually complex political problems, including those relating to Greece and Palestine, for which solutions must be found. There are already approximately 80 items on the agenda, with still others to be raised in the course of debate.

It is important that the peoples of the world should turn their eyes toward the United Nations while the General Assembly is in session. It is particularly important that the people of the United States. closely follow the proceedings and gain a full appreciation of the nature of the problems faced by the General Assembly. The broad outlines of our foreign policy are determined by our citizens. The American people, fortunately, are free to speak out on matters of policy. They vote; they form their own opinions; and they organize themselves into innumerable groups to give expression to their views.