sessions was to be determined jointly by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France within one year of the treaty's coming into force on September 15, 1947. The Deputies of the Foreign Ministers considered the question until August 31, 1948, taking into account the reports of a Commission of Investigation which visited all the former colonies, and the views of other interested governments. In September 1948, the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris but failed to agree on the disposition of the colonies. In accordance, therefore, with the treaty, the Four Powers referred the matter to the General Assembly of the United Nations for its recommendation. Under the treaty, the Four Powers have agreed to accept such a recommendation and to take appropriate measures to put it into effect.

Because of its crowded agenda, the General Assembly at its Third Session in Paris was unable to consider this item and decided to carry the matter over to the April 1949 session of the Assembly in New York. Pending their final disposal, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, these territories remain under their present administration, which is British for all the territories except the Fezzan in Libya, which is under French military administration.

Treatment of Indians in South Africa; Spain

The matter of the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa, which had been considered by the General Assembly during the course of its meetings in 1946 and 1947, was placed on the agenda of the Third Session at the request of the Government of India. Renewed discussion of the question of Spain at the Third Session was suggested by the Government of Poland. With the pressure of other problems which came before the Paris meeting, neither of these questions reached the stage of active consideration, and both were deferred until the Second Part of the Session.

The Security Council made brief reference to the Spanish question on June 25, 1948, after the Secretary-General had transmitted to it the 1947 General Assembly resolution. The votes necessary to place the question on the agenda were not cast. The Representatives of the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian S.S.R. voted in favor of such action, the Representative of Argentina opposed it, and the remaining eight representatives on the Council abstained.

Organizational Questions

CONTINUATION OF INTERIM COMMITTEE

General Assembly resolution 111 (II) of November 13, 1947, established the Interim Committee for one year over the opposition of the Soviet Union and five other similar-minded Members. This resolution directed the Committee, along with its other duties, to report to the next regular session on the advisability of establishing a permanent committee of the General Assembly to perform the duties of the Interim Committee with any changes considered desirable in the light of experience.

With six members, including the Soviets, not participating, the Interim Committee began the study of this question in April 1948. After surveying the various possible fields of activity of such a committee, it decided that at least the present scope of activity should be maintained. A considerable amount of opinion favored vesting budgetary and administrative functions in the Committee as well, and this question was left to the General Assembly by the Interim Committee without recommendation.

It was agreed that the Interim Committee had shown itself useful and should be continued. It was also agreed that the Committee's existing powers and functions should be maintained and that, in addition, it should be authorized to request advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice on legal questions arising within the scope of its activities. Paragraph 2(c) of the resolution, which authorized the Committee to study and report on methods for implementing the general principles of the maintenance of international peace and security and for promoting international cooperation in the political field, was strengthened to take account of the work in this field accomplished during the past year by the Committee. Finally, it was recommended that in appropriate instances the General Assembly by resolution authorize ad hoc committees and commissions of the General Assembly to seek advice from the Interim Committee or authorize the Interim Committee to assist in the implementation of General Assembly resolutions. Differences of opinion led the Interim. Committee to leave to the General Assembly, without recommendation, the decision as to the period of time for which the Committee would be continued. The report of the Interim Committee, embodying these conclusions, was referred by the General Assembly to its Ad Hoc Political Committee.

Largely as a result of the thorough consideration already given to the subject by the Interim Committee itself, the Ad Hoc Political

Committee was able to come to its conclusions quickly. The debates. made it clear that a large majority considered that the Interim Committee had accomplished useful work and should be continued. In view, however, of the fact that Member States had not made use of one of the Interim Committee's most important functions-the preliminary consideration of disputes and situations for action by the General Assembly itself-of the necessarily short experience of the Interim Committee in its other functions, and of the continuing search for the most effective means of organizing the Assembly's work, the Ad Hoc Political Committee decided, with little opposition, to continue the Interim Committee experimentally for another year before reaching a decision as to its permanence.

On November 20, 1948, the Ad Hoc Political Committee adopted with only slight changes the draft resolution proposed by the Interim Committee. The Assembly on December 3, 1948, adopted the resolution by 40 to 6, with 1 abstention. Throughout the discussions, the six members of the Soviet group stated their objections to the Interim Committee in much the same terms as had been used the preceding year.

In its resolutions relating to Greece and Korea, the General Assembly authorized the two Commissions entrusted with the main responsibility on these problems-the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans and the Temporary Commission on Korea-to consult with the Interim Committee with respect to the performance of their functions in the light of developments.

VOTING IN SECURITY COUNCIL

In November 1947 at the close of its consideration of the problem of voting in the Security Council, the Second Session of the General Assembly instructed the Interim Committee to study this problem, to consult with any committee which the Council might designate to cooperate in the study, and to report with its conclusions to the Third Session of the General Assembly. The General Assembly also requested the permanent members of the Security Council to consult with one another on this question in order to secure agreement among them on measures which would insure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions.

Results of Interim Committee Study

In response to this instruction, the Interim Committee undertook a comprehensive objective analysis of the problem based on a list of

all possible decisions which the Security Council may take under the Charter and under the Statute of the International Court of Justice. A subcommittee of the Interim Committee studied this list and prepared conclusions and comments as to the appropriate voting procedure which should apply to each of the decisions.

In its conclusions, the Interim Committee proposed to the General Assembly among other things that it recommend to the members of the Security Council that they should consider 36 possible decisions to be procedural. The purpose of this conclusion was to supply a clarification which would assist the Security Council in determining what decisions are procedural in as much as a great deal of the disagreement as to the voting procedure in the Security Council has been caused by the absence of a clear definition in the Charter as to what decisions are procedural.

The Interim Committee also suggested that the permanent members of the Security Council should agree among themselves that 21 other possible decisions should be adopted by a vote of any seven members whether the decisions are considered procedural or nonprocedural. This conclusion was based on the assumption that this agreed liberalization of the voting procedure would greatly improve the functioning of the Security Council. The Interim Committee further suggested a code of conduct to be followed by the permanent members in connection with the exercise of their privileged vote. Finally, the Interim Committee recommended to the General Assembly to consider whether the time had come to call a general conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the Charter.

Despite certain reservations maintained by several members, the conclusions of the report as finally adopted by the Interim Committee represent a broad area of agreement obtained as a result of the first comprehensive study of this question undertaken since the San Francisco conference.

The Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries did not participate in the Interim Committee's work.

Developments in Security Council

The Security Council did not appoint a committee for the purpose of cooperating with the Interim Committee in its study of the voting problem as it was requested to do in the General Assembly resolution. Only one consultation among the permanent members took place in response to the Assembly request contained in the same resolution. This consultation, held in January 1948, did not bring about any tangible results and only emphasized the need for a thorough study of the problem.

From the adjournment of the Second Session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1947 until the end of 1948, the Soviet Union used the veto five times. In the Czechoslovak case it blocked the establishment of a fact-finding subcommittee; it prevented the approval by the Security Council of the reports filed by the Atomic Energy Commission; it made impossible the admission of Italy and Ceylon to membership in the United Nations; and it defeated the resolution proposed by the six neutrals of the Security Council outlining a plan for the solution of the Berlin crisis.

During the same period, the practice of abstention was resorted to in numerous instances by all the permanent members, including the Soviet Union. In some questions, the Security Council was unable to take any action because all of the proposals submitted to it had failed to receive the required majority of votes.

Action in General Assembly

The Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly considered the report of the Interim Committee during the First Part of the General Assembly's Third Session. At the outset of the discussions in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted a joint draft resolution embodying in substance the conclusions recommended in the Interim Committee's report. The joint draft resolution recommended to the members of the Security Council that they deem certain decisions enumerated in the annex to the draft resolution as procedural and conduct their business accordingly. In its second recommendation, the joint draft resolution suggested that the permanent members of the Security Council seek agreement among themselves as to the possible decisions of the Council upon which they might voluntarily refrain from using their veto when seven affirmative votes are cast in the Council, giving a favorable consideration to the list of such decisions contained in the conclusion of the Interim Committee report. The most important decisions contained in this list are those relating to peaceful-settlement procedure and admission to membership in the United Nations. Finally, the joint draft resolution incorporated substantially the "code of conduct" recommended by the Interim Committee with special emphasis on the desirability for consultation among permanent members.

The debate in the Ad Hoc Political Committee disclosed the same pattern as appeared in the preceding sessions. The Soviet Union, with the other Eastern European countries, opposed any discussion