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official to serve on a continuing basis, with a member of the Council of Economic Advisers as Chairman. The memorandum said in part:

Federal outlays for defense are of such magnitude that they inevitably have major economic significance: In certain regions of the Nation and in certain communities they provide a significant share of total employment and income. It is therefore important that we improve our knowledge of the economic impacts of such spending, so that appropriate actions can be taken-in cooperation with State and local governments, private industry and labor—to minimize potential disturbances which may arise from changes in the level and pattern of defense outlays.

I know that your agencies have already initiated a number of activities which will improve our ability to assess the economic consequences of the defense program. I do not expect this Committee to undertake studies of its own, but rather to evaluate and to coordinate these existing efforts, and, if it seems desirable, to recommend additional studies-subject, of course, to appropriate review and authorization through established channels.

ACDA also has made common cause with the Defense Department in its studies of ways to ease the economic impact of changes in defense spending.

In addition, the economic effect of agreements on our allies, on the Communist bloc, and on the underdeveloped nations has been studied in an effort to increase understanding of the worldwide implications of arms control and disarmament.

The International Negotiations

We have . . . made some progress on a long journey. We have achieved new opportunities which we cannot afford to waste. We have concluded with the Soviets a few limited, enforcible agreements or arrangements of mutual benefit to both sides and to the world.1

In 1963 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a special communications link between Moscow and Washington, and signed a treaty for a ban on all tests of nuclear weapons except those underground. They also jointly supported a U.N. General Assembly resolution calling on all nations to refrain from stationing or orbiting mass-destruction weapons in outer space.

The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is responsible for the preparation and management of international negotiations in the disarmament field, under the direction of the Secretary of State. In 1963 the principal negotiations took place in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva; at New York, Washington, and Moscow on the test ban, and at the 18th session of the U.N. General Assembly. The Agency also furnished technical support and policy guidance for talks at the Foreign Ministers level among the United States, the Soviet Union, and various other countries in SeptemberOctober 1963. ACDA performs similar functions in relation to the continuing consultations which take place with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) concerning arms control and disarmament proposals.

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 2

On February 12, 1963, the 18-Nation conference reconvened after a 7 weeks' recess. The United States delegation was headed by

President John F. Kennedy in an address at the University of Maine, Oct. 19,

1963.

'Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, and United States. France, while a member of the 18-Nation Committee, has not taken her seat at the conference table.

William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr. Foster remained in Geneva until the first week in March, after which Ambassador Charles C. Stelle took over until the conference recessed for the U.N. General Assembly in the fall.

Negotiations during this period resulted in two important agreements in the area of predisarmament measures: A Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed June 20 at Geneva, providing for a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington, and a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, signed in Moscow August 5. The United States Senate voted its consent to ratification of the treaty on September 24, 1963. The treaty entered into force on October 10, 1963.

Discussions on other disarmament measures remained deadlocked.

The Test Ban

The conference resumed in Geneva on February 12, 1963, after a 7 weeks' recess. An air of expectation was tempered by apprehension over the meaning of the breakdown in January of informal test ban talks which had been held at New York and Washington among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. These discussions, which had been arranged as a result of an exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, lasted less than 3 weeks and were terminated because the two sides were unable to reach agreement on how to approach the question of on-site inspection. The Soviets refused to discuss the details of the new U.S. proposals and the procedures for inspection unless the West first accepted Premier Khrushchev's December offer of an annual quota of "two to three."

In spite of this forewarning of Soviet intransigence, the United States and the United Kingdom presented a detailed exposition of their test ban proposals to the resumed Geneva Conference during the early weeks of the session. These proposals provided for a cessation of testing in all environments, to be policed by a verification system substantially different from that previously offered. The plan was based primarily on nationally owned and operated detection networks and the use of a limited number of automatic recording seismic stations inside the territories of the nuclear powers. The system was to be insured by at least seven on-site inspections. The West unsuccessfully attempted to elicit response and comment from the Soviet delegation on methods for conducting on-site inspections, but-as they had in the January talks-the Russians refused to discuss such "details" until

[graphic][subsumed]

The Conference Room at the Palais des Nations in Geneva as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee resumed its 1963 sessions on February 12.

the West first agreed to the Khrushchev quota of three annual inspections. They insisted there was no technical need for on-site inspection and that their return to the principle was purely a political concession to the West. Indeed, as the weeks passed, it became increasingly doubtful that the offer of three inspections was still open.

Hope for some progress was rekindled, however, when it was learned that the United States and the United Kingdom were continuing their high-level correspondence with the Soviet Union. Then on June 10 President Kennedy announced that agreement had been reached to hold three-power meetings on the test ban in Moscow. He also pledged the United States not to be the first to resume tests in the atmosphere. At this time a shift of Soviet interest to a ban excluding underground tests began to emerge. Premier Khrushchev confirmed this publicly on July 2, in East Berlin, when he called for an agreement outlawing tests in the three environments only, where both sides agreed that their existing verification systems were sufficient to police such a ban. In 1962 the Soviets had rejected an Anglo-American proposal for an agreement of this kind.

On July 15 the United States and the United Kingdom met with the Soviets in Moscow and during the next 10 days negotiated a treaty

banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, which was initialed on July 25.

The "Hot-Line" and Collateral Measures

As the 18-Nation Committee in Geneva proceeded to plan its work for the 1963 sessions, the Soviets refused to reactivate the Committee of the Whole, set up by the conference in 1962 to discuss collateral measures for easing international tension. The source of the difficulty lay in the fact that the United States would not accept the Soviet agenda. The United States was willing to discuss a Western proposal along with a Soviet proposal in accordance with previous practice-the Soviets, however, insisted on simultaneous discussion of all their proposals, including a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The United States considered this item inappropriate for the forum of the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. In view of the impasse, it was decided to devote one plenary meeting each week to any collateral measures delegations wished to discuss without a set agenda.

[graphic]

ACDA Director Foster with Assistant Directors Archibald S. Alexander and Jacob D. Beam (left) inspect the Washington terminal of the "hot line" in the National Command Center. The Moscow-Washington communications link is open and manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

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