Each side proceeded to advocate its own proposals. The United States turned attention to its December 1962 working paper on Measures to Reduce the Risk of War Through Accident, Miscalculation, or Failure of Communications. On April 5 the Soviet delegate suddenly indicated a willingness to negotiate one of these measuresa direct communications link. Two months later, in Geneva, Ambassadors Stelle and Tsarapkin signed an agreement establishing the Moscow-Washington line. It was the first agreement in the 15-month-old conference. The "hot line," as the communications link is called, is intended for rapid contact between the American President and the Soviet Premier in grave crises.

As to the other three items proposed in the "risk of war" paper, the exchange of military missions, advance notification of troop movements, and observation posts, the Soviets continued their refusal-up to the June 21 recess to consider them as separate measures outside the framework of general disarmament.

In his opening speech at Geneva on February 12, V. V. Kuznetsov (who was chief Russian delegate for the first 2 weeks of the session, to be followed by Semyon K. Tsarapkin) laid down the line which was followed by the Soviet-bloc countries until the conference recessed in late June for the Moscow negotiations on the test ban treaty. Kuznetsov charged that the West was accelerating the arms race and speeding the proliferation of nuclear weapons through plans for a NATO multilateral force, the Franco-German treaty, the Nassau agreement, and continuation by the U.S. of its underground testing program. He then tabled a draft declaration banning the use of foreign bases for stationing nuclear delivery vehicles, which called for the dismantling of all bases for rocket-carrying submarines, aircraft carriers, rocket installations, et cetera. This was followed within a few weeks by Soviet proposals for the nonaggression pact and the denuclearization of the Mediterranean area.

The conference recessed at the end of June. During the Moscow negotiations on a test ban, Premier Khrushchev revived the question of observation posts. In a Kremlin speech on July 19, he suggested the possibility of East-West negotiations on a system of observation posts to guard against surprise attack, as well as on a NATO-Warsaw Treaty nonaggression pact, and the freezing or reduction of military budgets.

The three-power communique announcing conclusion of the negotiations on a test ban treaty noted that the question of a nonaggression pact-"along with other measures directed at a relaxation of tension”— had been discussed. The three governments had agreed to consult

with their respective allies about "continuing discussions" on this question.

When the 18-Nation Conference resumed on August 11 in Geneva, there was considerable interest among the delegates in what the "next step" after the test ban might be. The Soviet bloc kept up the pressure for a nonaggression pact. The West continued to maintain that the 18-Nation Conference was not the forum in which to discuss such a pact, and that in any case nothing could be done anywhere prior to full consultation among the NATO allies.

Interest continued on observation posts, partly because both sides had made proposals on the subject at one time or another, and it seemed the most promising avenue to explore. The United States restated the position outlined in its December 1962 working paper on "risk of war" measures and asked the Soviet Union to clarify its views. It developed that the Soviets were reviving their 1958 surprise-attack proposal, which linked the establishment of observation posts with the reduction of foreign troops in Germany and with a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. They were now willing to accept observation posts at airfields, which were excluded from the 1958 proposal, but ruled out the aerial surveillance which had been part of their previous proposal.

The Role of the Eight

The eight new members of the 18-Nation Committee (Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic) concentrated their attention during the first session on the test ban, and in the short post-Moscow session on possible tension-reducing

measures.

The question of a Latin American nuclear free zone entered the deliberations when the Brazilian and Mexican delegates placed into the record the text of a declaration by five Latin American countries calling for denuclearization of their area, which was generally welcomed. The United States took a favorable attitude provided such an agreement was entered into voluntarily by the countries concerned, did not upset the existing military balance, included all the states in the area whose participation was essential, and was accompanied by adequate verification measures. The United States had opposed the Soviet proposals for such zones in Central Europe and in the Mediterranean, since they did not meet these conditions.

In addition, the delegates of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and the United Arab Republic touched on an African denuclearized zone during the discussions.

There had been recurrent interest on the part of some delegations in the possibility of agreement on a collateral measure excluding weapons of mass destruction from outer space, a measure which was contained in both the U.S. and Soviet disarmament plans. On June 21 the Mexican delegate introduced a proposal of this nature at the conference. Five months later, at the U.N. General Assembly, resolution was adopted which called on all states to join the United States and the Soviet Union in their announced intention to refrain from orbiting weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

Thus, in the three areas in which agreed policy has now been recorded, antecedents can be found in the proposals and discussions in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee.

The Treaty Drafts for General and Complete
Disarmament

Following a plan of work agreed to in July of 1962, the conference continued its discussion of first stage disarmament measures for conventional armaments and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. The West continued to advocate its plan for percentage reductions as opposed to the Soviet plan for immediate Stage I elimination of substantially all delivery vehicles.

Considerable time was spent in exploration of the "Gromyko proposal," first put forward by the Soviet Union at the 17th U.N. General Assembly in the fall of 1962. This provided an exception to the Soviet plan on delivery vehicles. Initially, these were to be totally eliminated in the first stage. Gromyko's plan modified this in calling for the retention of "a strictly limited and agreed number" of missiles on the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union through the first two stages of disarmament, thus providing a "limited nuclear umbrella." Unable to elicit an adequate elaboration of this proposal, Western delegates pointed out that such an approach would have the effect of upsetting the existing military balance by altering the present "mix" of arms and forces-nuclear and conventional.

Under strong U.S. pressure for clarification-particularly about verification-Ambassador Tsarapkin indicated the Gromyko plan would permit inspection of missiles on their launching pads to check on the agreed "limited number," but dismissed the concern expressed by the Western delegates about the danger of hidden missiles.

In addition to discussion of the U.S. and Soviet draft proposals on delivery vehicles, the conference took up the two sides' measures on nuclear disarmament. Near the end of the session on August 14, the United States submitted draft treaty language for its Stage I pro

posals designed to: (1) halt the race in weapons manufacture by cutting off the production of fissionable materials used in them; (2) reduce nuclear stockpiles-beginning with the transfer of significant quantities of weapons-grade material to peaceful uses; (3) stop further dissemination of nuclear weapons; and (4) freeze nuclear weapon technology by the banning of tests in all environments. The United States altered its 1962 proposal that each side transfer 50 metric tons of nuclear material to peaceful uses, and offered to take possible “inequities" into account by putting in a larger amount than the Soviet Union. The U.S. delegate suggested an illustrative ratio of 60 to 40. The Soviet reaction was negative; it would do nothing, it was claimed, to eliminate existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The last general disarmament item to come under consideration at Geneva in 1963 was military bases. The Soviets continued to advocate the dismantling of all bases in Stage I, simultaneous with the withdrawal of foreign troops and the destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles. Western delegates responded that the system of military bases was necessary given the defense problem posed for the West by Soviet-based missiles.

In addition to military bases, there still remains on the Stage I agenda: armed forces levels, military expenditures, outer space measures, peacekeeping machinery, measures to reduce the risk of war, transition from First to Second Stages, and establishment of an International Disarmament Organization.

The 18-Nation Conference recessed September 1, 1963, for the U.N. consideration of disarmament matters in its 18th General Assembly. Since March 1962 the committee had met 156 times in plenary session; in 1963 it saw the first agreements signed.

The United Nations

In September, the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations met in New York feeling, as President Kennedy put it, that “the clouds have lifted a little." Most of the delegates attributed this, in large part, to the signing of the test ban treaty.

The Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, referred to "this favorable wind," and proposed to the Assembly that the heads of governments participating in the 18-Nation Conference meet to "discuss both the question of general and complete disarmament and separate measures to achieve the further alleviation of international tensions." U.S. reaction to this was cool. The Soviet Union had made a similar suggestion in 1962, just prior to the opening of the 18-Nation Conference in Geneva. The United States then took the

position that a summit meeting should await developments sufficiently substantial to make such a gathering worthwhile.

The Soviet Foreign Minister also offered to revise the "Gromyko plan" for retention of a limited number of missiles, so as to extend its provisions into the third stage of the disarmament process. The United States expressed interest in exploring the implications of this latest proposal for any sign of "a further move toward realism in the Soviet approach."

Mr. Gromyko also announced that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to agree to prohibit the orbiting of nuclear weapons in outer space.

President Kennedy addressed the Assembly on September 20. Encouraged by the positive Soviet response to the outer space proposal, he indicated U.S. readiness to seek such an arrangement. He also reiterated U.S. interest in measures to reduce the risks of war, the establishment of observation posts to guard against surprise attack, measures to curb the transfer of nuclear weapons, conversion of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes, an effectively verifiable ban on underground testing, and the promotion of a freer flow of information between East and West.

Shortly thereafter, the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on the text of the U.N. resolution on bombs in orbit. The resolution was cosponsored by the other participants in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee and was adopted by the General Assembly by acclamation on October 17, 1963.

The General Assembly adopted four other resolutions related to disarmament. The first, on general and complete disarmament, called on the 18-Nation Conference to resume its disarmament negotiations, and also urged efforts to seek agreement on the tensionreducing measures.

The second, on the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, asked the 18-Nation Committee to study the question of convening such a conference and to report back to the 19th General Assembly. The vote was 64-18, with 25 abstentions. The Soviet Union voted for the resolution. The United States opposed it, because a declaratory measure banning the use of nuclear weapons, without providing for their elimination within the context of general and complete disarmament, would play into the hands of a potential aggressor.

The third resolution, on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, called on all states to become parties to the partial test ban treaty. It "noted with satisfaction" the statement in the treaty preamble that the nuclear powers were determined to