Introduction To a world caught in the grip of an unrelenting arms race, 1963 offered new and encouraging prospects for peace. It is too early to venture predictions as to whether these prospects will result in further tangible gains, or recede before new dangers and increases in armaments. It seems clear, however, that we are now witnessing a period of significant change throughout the world, and that turbulence and calm hover over these events as ever present rivals. It is also clear that developments in arms control and disarmament over the past year have rekindled our hopes and served to invigorate our efforts in the pursuit of peace. In the first days of 1963 agreement on arms control and disarmament measures seemed remote; yet within 5 months that situation radically changed. In June the United States and the Soviet Union concluded an arrangement to establish a direct communications channel between their two governments. A few months later, these two powers, joined by the United Kingdom, signed a limited test ban treaty. Today 103 signatures, in addition to the three original signers, graphically portray the extent of support for that agreement. And finally, in the fall of the year, the United Nations General Assembly, by acclamation, adopted a resolution cosponsored by the participants in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee which called upon all nations to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. To suggest that these initial steps herald the millennium would be foolhardy, but their significance should not be underestimated. It may well be that they reflect an awareness on the part of the major powers of an overriding consideration-so well expressed by President Kennedy in his last State paper: ". . . as our power has grown, so has our peril." With these nine words he pointed up the great dilemma for the world's modern nations: as military strength has steadily increased, national security has correspondingly diminished. The military power of the United States is formidable. No rational enemy would challenge this power, either by surprise attack or by initiating the use of nuclear weapons in a limited engagement. Yet, our peril has grown. In today's thermonuclear environment 721-084 0-64- -2 1 technological advances in offensive weapons development for the first time in our history have created obstacles to providing an effective defense against the weapons of war. Missiles of supersonic speed and global range and nuclear warheads of vast destructive power have outstepped defense capabilities and threaten to continue to do so into the foreseeable future. For this reason our military strategy is based on deterrence, a strategy which depends in large part on the degree of restraint exercised by our opponents. In this situation arms control and disarmament can fulfill an important function. Agreements on practical measures can provide means of assuring restraint by reducing the risk of conflict by accident or miscalculation, by checking the dangers of escalation, and by promoting greater stability. Should the progress achieved in 1963 reflect this understanding on the part of our potential adversaries, then we may be turning a corner in which the "peril" would be lessened and greater security brought to a relatively insecure world. As this report is issued, disarmament negotiations have resumed in Geneva. This in itself is a welcome harbinger. In the new round beginning this year, the negotiating powers seem to share a certain interest in approaching their task on a more limited basis than was previously the case. This suggests that discussions will tend to focus on efforts to work out initial arms limitation and reduction measures. And, while no single measure can be described as ripe for agreement, there are some measures in which a mutuality of interest is evident. Whether the difficulties surrounding these can be overcome and progress made remains, of course, to be seen. For the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1963 was a year which also witnessed the further development of its resources. Additional political and military experts were recruited, government and private contacts were expanded, and the Agency's research program grew, as an increasing number of studies both within and outside the organization—were undertaken. These actions paralleled expansion of activities in the arms control and disarmament field throughout the year and contributed to meeting the requirements inherent in a continuation of the nation's peace offensive. As this annual report suggests, there is heightened activity in the arms control and disarmament world. That this is so stems in no small measure from President Kennedy's persistent efforts in the cause of peace. That this activity will continue is apparent from President Johnson's pledge to engage in an unrelenting offensive for peace. WILLIAM C. FOSTER The Formulation of Arms Control and Disarmament Policy This organization must have such a position with the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the Executive Branch, and the Congress with recommendations concerning arms control and disarmament policy, and can assess the effect of these recommendations upon our foreign policies, our national security and our economy.1 When Congress created the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDĄ) in September 1961, it took a step without precedent; it assigned to a new agency of the United States Government primary responsibility for searching out ways to put an end to the arms race. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is now almost two and a half years old. It is small-the professional staff in December 1963 numbered one hundred and twenty-six people. It is highly expert and specialized; arms control problems cut across many disciplines— military, scientific, political, and economic. The Agency helps to formulate policy and conducts international negotiations. It is also a research agency. In fiscal year 1963, Congress appropriated $6,500,000 for its operation. Almost four million dollars of that was for research. Scientists, scholars, military and political specialists, economists, and lawyers have all been brought together to think and work on the crucial problem of the thermonuclear age. How does this small agency fit into the policymaking machinery of the executive complex? What is its role, its responsibility, its influence, its limitations in relation to the events of 1963 which included agreements on a partial test ban, the "hot line," the United Nations resolution on nuclear weapons in space? The part played by ACDA in relation to these agreements can best be understood by a look at the Agency itself. In developing policy recommendations in accordance with its Congressional mandate, ACDA engages in an extensive program of coordination and consultation within the Government. Its Director is principal adviser on disarmament to the President and the Secretary of State. And since arms control is an integral part of national secu 1 1 Public Law 87-297, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Sept. 26, 1961. rity, members of the Agency maintain day-to-day contacts not only with the State Department but also with other executive departments and agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. The primary device for the review and coordination of ACDA's recommendations to the President is the Committee of Principals. This Committee was established by President Eisenhower in 1958. It is composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. Every major new proposal which the United States makes to the Soviet Union or advances at the conference table in international negotiations receives the President's stamp of approval. Negotiations are never undertaken on an important measure until the Committee of Principals has been consulted. This consultation and review by the President is the final step in the policymaking process. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is responsible for the development of ideas and the preparation of recommendations to the President. A proposal may originate at any level, inside or outside ACDA, or even outside the Government-the result, for example, of research being done for the Agency on contract. Regardless of its origin, if an idea is considered deserving of serious attention, it is usually assigned to a working group within the Agency. The advantage of this approach lies in the fact that it enables ACDA to apply a cross section of expertness to the examination of a potential proposal. Members of each of the Agency's bureaus-International Relations, Weapons Evaluation and Control, Science and Technology, Economics-usually take part in working group studies. In the case of the 1963 agreements, other Government agencies were asked to participate at a working level in such study groups, either at the outset or after the projects had been given preliminary consideration within ACDA. In this way all relevant data were pulled together with preliminary policy recommendations for those who had to make the final decision. Such a recommendation was made, for example, in the case of the "no bombs in orbit" resolution, after an interdepartmental staff group had evaluated the relevant technical data and weighed it in relation to military and political factors. At the study group stage, the Agency's Director may also decide to call on a task force panel of government and nongovernment ex |