The second sheet (CX349) shows the damages to cities and towns, railways, and highways in the entire Tennessee River basin caused by a large flood and also the average annual amount of such damages caused by floods. The information for this table was secured from data collected by the United States Engineer Corps. Reference to this table shows that by far the greatest portion of damages to cities and towns on the main river occurs in the section from Chattanooga to Knoxville, inclusive. This section suffers over 99 percent of the total average annual damages on the main river, over 95 percent of which occurs in Chattanooga, this being the point of greatest concentration of flood damage in the entire Tennessee Valley. The flood problem at Chattanooga has long been recognized as a major one. Surveys, plans, and reports have been made by various organizations on the control of floods over a long period of years and within recent years a floodcontrol district was authorized by the State legislature and later was organized. The second greatest concentration of flood damage in the Tennessee Valley occurs on Emory River at and in the vicinity of Harriman and Oakdale, which suffer more than 75 percent of the total damages to towns and cities on all tributaries. The destruction caused by the great flood of 1929 on this river was so pronounced that the Tennessee Valley Authority included in its report to the Congress on the Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan two striking photographs of that flood, one entitled: "Emory River Flood at Harriman. Scene during high water of 1929," and the other, "Flood Damage from Emory River 1929. Severe damage was suffered during this great flood." Despite these striking facts, the principal hydraulic engineer of the flood-control section of the Tennessee Valley Authority has testified (p. 1834 of printed transcript) that "that flood * * * has limited significance to the work of the T. V. A." and that it is their "duty to construct dams and reservoirs which will have a general benefit rather than local benefits." It thus appears to be the official policy of Tennessee Valley Authority to afford no protection whatsoever against the second greatest concentration of flood damage in the entire Tennessee Valley. This is in direct violation of the first principle of flood-control works.

The major portion of the total flood damages to railways in the entire Tennessee Valley occurs on the Emory River in the vicinity of Harriman and Oakdale and on the French Broad River.

A few moments ago I pointed out the striking fact that less than 8 percent of the total population in those towns and cities on the Tennessee River which suffer damages during floods reside below Chattanooga and now I wish to point out a similar striking fact with respect to the monetary amount of flood damages to cities and towns and also to railways and highways in the entire Tennessee Valley; namely, that less than 7 percent of this amount occurs below Chattanooga From these facts it becomes immediately apparent that in order to achieve the maximum practicable protection against flood damage on the Tennessee River and tributaries a flood control program should be directed especially to protection at and above Chattanooga.

The second basic principle is that no flood-control system can be deemed adequate, either from the standpoint of protection to human life or from the standpoint of protection to large concentrations of improved property in cities and towns, unless it is designed to protect against the greatest flood to be expected. Controlling moderate floods of high frequency and failure to control great floods will surely produce disastrous results. Any system of flood control which reduces only the frequency of submergence of areas by moderate floods will result in inviting encroachment upon areas known to be subject to floods and will result in the end in greater losses to life and property when great floods do occur.

This basic principle of protection against the greatest flood to be expected was the very foundation of the design of the two notable flood-control systems in Ohio, which I have previously mentioned; namely, the Miami and Muskingum systems. Extensive studies of storm rainfall and flood flows were carried out in both cases and these led to the design of both systems for protection against the greatest flood to be expected, which was found to be of considerably greater magnitude than the greatest flood of record.

It follows from this basic principle that protection against the greatest flood to be expected on the Tennessee River and tributaries at and above Chattanooga is one of the fundamental engineering requirements of a flood-control system for the Tennessee Valley. To my surprise I found during the course of my studies that although the Tennessee Valley Authority had been in existence for more than 4 years, there was no public record of a study of storm rainfall in the Ten

nessee Valley leading to a determination of the greatest flood to be expected in various parts of the valley for use in the design of a flood-control system, nor any evidence whatsoever that the Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan had been designed to protect the Tennessee Valley against great floods. In proof of this statement I wish to cite testimony of the principal hydraulic engineer in charge of the flood-control section when presenting an exhibit showing the result of the various reservoirs of the Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan on flood heights at Chattanooga by their proposed system of operation. On that exhibit he showed only three floods, all of which were considerably lower than the maximum flood of record and, of course, very much lower than the greatest flood to be expected. He stated (pp. 1865–1866) that he did not show "what reduction, if` any, would be effected by these reservoirs with a superflood." Continuing, he said, “I attempted to confine these computations to actual occurrences. Whether or not when you are designing anything for flood protection you simply base your design upon some historical fact that has happened in the past, and if the only one for which you happen to have data is a small one, you base it on the small one, would depend on the nature of the problem. The nature of the problem of flood control is usually to protect against damage from a large flood. I would like to explain that if we have cities to be protected and those cities have a levee system, it is necessary to estimate the largest flood which may be reasonably expected and compute the degree of control which is necessary to bring such a flood down to the local system. That situation does not exist in the Tennessee Valley. There are no cities or towns, so far as I know, that have any levees on them, and our problem here is to make such reductions in flood heights and in flood frequencies as we are able to do with the projects authorized by Congress." Later the same witness testified (p. 1867): “Assuming a flood of the character I described in the unified report, that is, 50 percent greater than the maximum flood of 1867, brought about by rainfall spread uniformly over the drainage area above Chattanooga, we have made some studies as to the amount of the reduction in the flood heights at Chattanooga which would be brought about by the Norris and Hiwassee Reservoirs. They were approximate, however, and I have none of those figures here."

The only interpretation I can put on the testimony as to the basis on which the flood-control features of the Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan are being considered is that there is no intent on the part of Tennessee Valley Authority to provide protection against the greatest flood to be expected and that the reasons are two in number. One is the rather anomalous excuse that since the cities and towns in the Tennessee Valley have not heretofore chanced to build any levees in an attempt to protect themselves against floods, there is no reason why Tennessee Valley Authority should so design and operate its reservoirs as to protect them against the maximum flood. The second excuse is that in some way or other Congress has authorized only certain specific projects and Tennessee Valley Authority can exercise no discretion in the matter and can only accomplish such a degree of incidental flood control as is possible within the specific scope of these authorized projects.

Regardless of reasons, the foregoing facts force me to the conclusion that due to failure to provide protection against the greatest flood to be expected, the Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan violates the second basic principle of a floodcontrol system.

In planning my recommended system of flood control, the study of storm rainfall and the greatest flood to be expected was my first work and, just as in the case of the Miami and Muskingum systems, I found the maximum flood to be considerably in excess of the greatest flood of record. I am handing you two diagrams which embody the results of those studies. The first (CX350) shows the variation in flow day by day during the maximum flood at Knoxville, Loudon, and Chattanooga and contrasts it with the greatest flood of record. The second (CX351) shows for the entire section of the river between Knoxville and Chattanooga a comparison between the highest stages reached by the maximum flood and the greatest flood of record.

The third principle is that control works for flood-storage reservoirs should be so operated at all times as to ensure the most effective use of the reservoir if the greatest flood to be expected should occur, and to ensure the release of stored flood waters just as soon and as rapidly as it is safe to do so from the standpoint of the streams below the reservoir. In my recommended system of flood-control reservoirs the operation has been so worked out as, not only to ensure the most effective

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use of the reservoirs in event of the occurrence of the maximum flood, but also to bring about marked reductions in stage of all large floods.

In selecting the type of control works for the reservoirs of my recommended flood-control system in accrdance with the principle I have just enunciated, consideration was given to the relative merits of uncontrolled openings through the dams such as were used in the Miami system and gate-controlled openings such as were used in the Muskingum system. I adopted the combination of a few uncontrolled openings, which would absolutely ensure against any misuse of the reservoirs for seasonal storage, with a large number of gate-controlled openings, which would ensure the most effective operation during floods.

I would now like to present certain information relative to those elements of the Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan which would in any way affect floods at and above Chattanooga. First, I am handing you copies of a map (CX354) of Tennessee River Basin showing the location of the dams and reservoirs of the Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan and second, copies of a sheet (CK355) on which are listed the various reservoirs of the Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan above Chattanooga with various pertinent data.

The Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan includes six projects on the Tennessee River and tributaries above Chattanooga. Three of these projects are on the tributaries, namely, on Clinch River, Little Tennessee River, and Hiwassee River, and three on the Tennessee River between Chattanooga and its head at Knoxville. The total dependable flood-storage volume in the three reservoirs on the tributaries in the greatest flood to be expected would be 620,000 acre-feet. As for the three reservoirs on the main river above Chattanooga, the stages in the Tennessee River between Knoxville and Chattanooga during the greatest flood to be expected would be so high that the dependable flood storage volume in those three reservoirs would be nil. The reservoirs of the six projects above Chattanooga, when filled to the top of the gates on the dams will flood 125,000 acres of land, of which total 110,870 acres will be below normal pool level and therefore permanently flooded.

Having now presented to you at considerable length detailed information both as to my recommended system of flood control reservoirs and as to those elements of the T. V. A. Unified Plan which would in any way affect floods at and above Chattanooga, I will close my statement with a comparison of important features of the two systems.

The first comparison is with respect to dependable flood storage volume available during the greatest flood to be expected at and above Chattanooga. My recommended system would provide a dependable flood storage volume of 6,024,000 acre-feet. In contrast, the T. V. A. unified plan will provide a dependable flood storage volume of only 620,000 acre-feet.

The second comparison is with respect to drainage area controlled by reservoirs. The reservoirs of my recommended system would provide a large measure of dependable control over 78 percent of the total tributary drainage area of the Tennessee River above Chattanooga, in contrast to this extent of control, the only reservoirs of the T. V. A. unified plan above Chattanooga which would have any dependable flood storage volume during a great flood are the three on the tributaries, namely, Norris, Fowler Bend, and Fontana, and these three reservoirs would affect the flow from only 25 percent of the total tributary drainage area of the Tennessee River above Chattanooga.

The third comparison is with respect to reductions in stage of the maximum flood which would be brought about by the two systems. In the summary of my findings which I presented at the beginning of my statement, I have already given you the comparison of the reductions which would be brought about at Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Harriman, but I would like now to hand you three diagrams showing the comparison in greater detail. The first of these diagrams (CK357) shows the reductions in flow day by day which would be brought about under the two systems during the maximum flood at three points on the main river, Knoxville, Loudon, and Chattanooga. I wish to point out in presenting this diagram to you that the reductions in flow, which it shows "might" be brought about by the operation of the reservoirs of the T. V. A. unified plan and which are labeled "not dependable," are based upon the assumption of the water levels of Norris, Fowler Bend and Fontana reservoirs at the time of the occurrence of the maximum flood being such that the effective flood storage volume available would be 2,263,000 acre-feet, or nearly four times as much as their dependable flood storage volume of 620,000 acre-feet. The reductions which could be brought

about by the operation of the reservoirs of the T. V. A. unified plan with only the dependable flood storage volume available at the time of the maximum flood would be so small that they would be negligible and therefore I did not bother to compute them.

Confirmation of the small magnitude of the reduction in stage at Chattanooga which would be brought about by the Norris and Hiwassee reservoirs in the event of a maximum flood is given by the testimony of the principal hydraulic engineer in charge of the flood control section of the T. V. A. when he stated (p. 1867) that "they were certainly substantial, I can not say how small. I should say more than three feet in stage, but I cannot be positive without the figures here." Earlier in my statement I gave my opinion that the resultant protection rendered by the T. V. A. unified plan in the event of the maximum flood would not be sufficient to render practicable the construction of levees at Chattanooga to protect that city. Complete confirmation of this opinion has been given in the testimony (p. 1836) of the principal hydraulic engineer in charge of the flood control section of the T. V. A., which I quote as follows: "Although the works now provided for will not eliminate the greatest floods which have occurred, such as 1867, these reservoirs will reduce such floods very substantially, and as pointed out in the unified report, with desirable storage upon the other three tributaries, the Little Tennessee, the French Broad and the Holston Rivers, a degree of reduction would be attained which would bring the flood problem in Chattanooga within the reach of the city." You will recall that the T. V. A. unified plan calls for a total expenditure of $520,000,000 and this testimony brings out that even after the expenditure of this great sum of money the flood problem at Chattanooga will not be brought within the reach of the city and the city will have to wait to build its levee system until more money is spent by T. V. A. to create additional reservoirs on other tributaries.

The second of these three diagrams (CX353) shows the reduction in flow day by day which would be brought about by my recommended system at Harriman during the maximum flood. You will recall my previous statements to the effect that the T. V. A. unified plan provides no flood protection for Harriman and other towns on Emory River. The principal hydraulic engineer of the flood control section of T. V. A. has, to use his own words (p. 1886), tried to make himself clear that this is not the type of thing with which the T. V. A. is concerned.

The third diagram (CX359) shows for the entire section of river between Knoxville and Chattanooga, first, the highest stages which would be reached by the maximum flood without any kind of flood control system; second, the maximum flood as it might be modified by the T. V. A. unified plan if the Norris, Fowler Bend, and Fontana reservoirs had an available flood storage volume of 2,263,000 acre-feet at the time of occurrence of the maximum flood; and third, the maximum flood as it would be modified by my recommended flood control system without any T. V. A. dams in existence.

Since the making of my detailed studies on the subject of flood control, various engineers of the Tennessee Valley Authority have testified to certain assumed changes in the filling schedules of the various reservoirs and to minor changes in the elevation of the tops of the gates on the Chickamauga, Watts Bar, and Coulter Shoals dams, but these changes are not material and would not substantially affect either the comparisons or the conclusions drawn from them.

The fourth comparison is with respect to areas flooded by reservoirs of the two systems. This comparison is shown in detail and in summary on a sheet (CX360) of which I am handing you copies. My recommended flood control system would flood no land whatsoever permanently. In event of the occurrence of the maximum flood, my system would temporarily flood 132,000 acres of land, all of which is on the tributaries and none on the main river. All of the cultivated land included in this acreage could continue to be cultivated yearly with only an occasional loss of crops. In contrast to this, the reservoirs of the T. V. A. unified plan will forever flood 375,000 acres of land, and this amount will be increased to more than 528,000 acres in time of flood.

In addition to the facts brought out on the sheet which I have just handed you, it is of interest to note that the dams of the T. V. A. unified plan will flood more than 475,000 acres of land in the Tennessee Valley between Knoxville and Paducah in time of floods, whereas the United States Engineer Corps estimates that a great flood would naturally overflow about 480,000 acres in the same section of the river. In other words, after the construction of the dams of the

T. V. A. unified plan in the Tennessee Valley between Knoxville and Paducah, there will be just as great flooding as there was before.

The fifth comparison is with respect to construction cost of the two plans. The cost of my recommended flood-control system would be $81,133,600 and under that plan no power of any kind would be produced. The estimated cost of the T. V. A. unified plan, including Wilson Dam and power plant is $520,958,370 and will produce a large amount of power.

The sixth comparison is with respect to the dam and reservoir on Clinch River. This comparison I am presenting graphically on a diagram (CX362) of which I am handing you copies. My recommended dam on Clinch River, which would form part of my system of flood control, is shown on the right-hand section of the drawing, while Norris Dam is built as shown on the left. The sole purpose of the reservoir volume colored in yellow behind the dam in my recommended plan is to provide dependable flood-control storage. It is intended to release flood waters from storage as quickly as is consistent with the safety of the river below, and their release would be controlled by no other consideration. The reservoir would normally be dry and there would be no power of any kind produced from the water collected in this reservoir.

The reservoir volume indicated in blue behind the Norris Dam of the Tennessee Valley Authority unified plan has as its sole purpose the creation of a head for the production of power and it is permanently maintained for that purpose. This so-called dead storage has absolutely no flood-control value. The reservoir volume indicated in red behind the Norris Dam is power storage and has two purposes. One purpose is that it can be drawn upon during dry periods, which usually come in the summer and late fall, to produce additional flow through the generating units at the powerhouse. It also serves to create a variable head for power which is added to the permanent constant head created by the dead storage. This volume shown in red can create no dependable flood storage for the Tennessee Valley because there are certain months in the year when it will be filled with water for considerable periods of time and, of course, when it is full it can provide no flood control. Whether or not any of that volume would be useful for flood-control purposes depends upon where the reservoir happened to be when floods occur.

The volume shown in yellow behind the Norris Dam, that is, the volume between the top of the gates and the top of the red volume, is the dependable floodcontrol storage behind Norris Dam.

My proposed dam on Clinch River shown on the right-hand side of the diagram would create much more dependable flood-control storage than Norris Dam, the ratio being 2.6 in favor of my proposed reservoir.

The difference in cost between these two projects is very striking. My pure flood-control dam and reservoir with a storage volume of 1,312,000 acre-feet would cost $8,136,000, while the estimated cost of Norris Dam and Reservoir, including the town of Norris, is $36,310,370. In this connection it is interesting to note that Tennessee Valley Authority engaged the United States Bureau of Reclamation to design the Norris Dam and that this Bureau, through one of its engineers, reported that a reservoir for flood protection alone with flood storage of 1,255,000 acre-feet could be built at the site of Norris Dam for approximately $7,150,000.

Mr. BIDDLE. The next exhibit, which will be marked now, as 450, is entitled "Maps and diagrams, accompanying notes from proposed statement by Ford Kurtz."

Mr. MORELAND. It is the exhibits that accompany

Mr. BIDDLE. Which accompany the exhibit 449.

(Whereupon the documents above referred to were received in evidence and marked "Exhibit 450.")

Mr. MORELAND. Similarly, a statement of Mr. Putnam.

Mr. BIDDLE. Will you mark the next exhibit, which is entitled "Statement of Rufus W. Putnam, on the navigation aspects of the Tennessee Valley Authority's improvement of the Tennessee River and its tributaries," as exhibit 451?

(Whereupon the document above referred to was received in evidence, and marked "Exhibit 451.")