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acting as a Moderator of a variously composed Com

mission.

Another instance is that of the Earl of Reading. It can be summarised in this way. In 1910, Sir Rufus Isaacs, who had made his life's success in the calling of the Bar, became Attorney-General, and in 1912 was made a Cabinet Minister-in defiance of constitutional rule and custom. There was no conceivable reason why this innovation should have been permitted, as Sir Rufus had never been more than the shadow of a politician, and the Cabinet had no real need of the services, within the Cabinet, of the Chief Law Officer of the Crown. The innovation, however, was made, and unhappily the precedent so created was acted upon-let us hope for the last time-in 1921-2, in the case of Sir Gordon Hewart.

In 1913, Sir Rufus Isaacs, with the cordial approval of the Bar, was made Lord Chief Justice of England, and from that year until a date in 1915 he admirably fulfilled the duties of his high office. It is true that in the early days of the War the then Chancellor of the Exchequer insisted upon his lending aid to him in dealing with the financial situation created by the War; but, that notwithstanding, he proved himself a worthy successor to the long line of eminent Judges which is ornamented by a Campbell, a Cockburn, and a Russell of Killowen.

In 1915, the Political Executive interposed itself between him and his duty, and, while still holding his judicial office, he was dispatched to America as President of the Anglo-French Loan Mission to the United States of America. There he remained, actively engaged in money-raising operations, until he was suffered to return home and resume his rightful duties in 1916. He was duly welcomed by the Bar on his return, and it was fondly hoped by those to whom the proper administration of the law is a matter of moment that he would henceforth be allowed to act as Chief Justice, and immediately deal with the arrears that his absence had created. The hope was misconceived, for shortly after Lord Reading's return in 1917—that is, in 1918-Mr Lloyd George, then Prime Minister, sent him to America, this time as special Envoy to the United States. Once again the Chief Justiceship' was left to exist only in name,

and once again the dejected expression of the visage of the janitor of the Lord Chief Justice's Court bore eloquent witness to the deserted state of the chief Court of the King's Bench Division.

In 1920, the Lord Chief Justice returned from his diplomatic excursion, and was again welcomed by a 'Bar' whose capacity for hope had been almost exhausted by disappointment. However, it really seemed as if at last some slight respect was to be shown to the Law by the Political Executive, and, after a few months, weary litigants began to think that the claims of finance, the alleged urgency of diplomacy, would no longer be preferred to the doing of Justice between man and man in the country's Courts of Justice. Then 1922 came round, and it soon appeared that the Prime Minister had grown tired of merely spasmodic interference with the course of Justice, and was determined on one final assertion of the over-riding right of the Political Executive to make Justice the hand-maid of any service that such Executive might select. Accordingly in that year, the Prime Minister annexed the Lord Chief Justice to an office which was not less incompatible with his Chief Justiceship than his other temporary employments. Lord Reading became Viceroy of India, and finally surrendered to a novel diplomacy the legal learning and training of a lifetime.

It is difficult to comment on this instance of misuse of our Judiciary with calmness, and without prejudice. In this case we had the dignity of the Law as represented by the Chief of the Permanent Judiciary turned to the base uses of Finance and Diplomacy. The administration of Justice was flouted. The respect which the poorest of us have for the Law, a respect based on the legal detachment and impartiality of the Judges, was jeopardised by the conduct of the Political Executive. Never in our History, since our Judiciary became an Executive of Justice, free to do Justice, has so deplorable a misuse occurred. That the occasion will never again arise is ardently to be hoped: that if it should arise, the Political Executive of the time will not interfere with the course of Justice is equally to be desired, for if politicians in a difficult place, or a Government in doubtful circumstances, interfere with the dispensation

of Justice by the Judiciary, the public respect for law and order will depart.

There are other lesser instances of recent misuse of the Judiciary, and it may be pointed out that, at the time of writing, Lord Justice Atkin has been taken away from an overburdened Court of Appeal to occupy himself with the assessment of damages to certain Irishmen who complain of having been deported to Ireland!

There is, however, another kind of misuse of our Judiciary which is now and again evidenced by the employment of Judges to try Election Petitions. It will be remembered that originally all petitions against the return of Members of Parliament were heard and decided by a House of Commons Committee, but that in 1868 this procedure was altered, and the task was allotted to Judges of the High Court.

The remonstrance of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn to this infliction of political duties upon the Judges is well known. It was couched in lofty language and embodied a noble plea for the dignity of the Law. It contained these passages:

'In conformity with your Lordships' wishes, I have consulted the Judges, and I am charged by them, one and all, to convey to you their strong and unanimous feeling of insuperable repugnance to having these new and objectionable duties thrust upon them.

'We are unanimously of opinion that the inevitable consequence of putting Judges to try election petitions will be to lower and degrade the Judicial office, and to destroy, or at all events materially impair, the confidence of the public in the thorough-going impartiality and inflexible integrity of the Judges, when in the course of their ordinary duties, political matters come incidentally before them. . . . We are at a loss to see how Parliament can, with justice or propriety, impose on us labours wholly beyond the sphere of our constitutional duties, and which no one ever contemplated the possibility of our being called upon to perform.'

The remonstrance failed in its object. First one Judge, and afterwards two Judges, were-and areemployed to decide questions of the political misconduct of rival political partisans. It can certainly be said that the employment of Judges in such non-judicial duties

has led to accusations of partiality against some Judges, and so to some extent has affected the reputation for impartiality of our Judiciary. This misuse, or rather, abuse, should be stopped, and politicians-not Judgesshould estimate these delinquencies.

We now come to the kind of misuse of the Judiciary which is effected by the participation of Judges in party politics. It is the kind that has, during the last two or three years, done much to lower the Judiciary in the estimation of intelligent persons. A short categorical statement will elucidate the position.

In the days that now seem far away, those before the War, two Members of Parliament were united in resistance to the desire of certain Irishmen for Home Rule. One was Sir Edward Carson, the other Mr F. E. Smith. Both were barristers in practice at the English Bar. Sir Edward Carson was one of those fortunate beings who find personal popularity and professional success not mutually destructive. In the Law Courts his ways were those of pleasantness and peace; but occasionally, on such festivals as that of the Battle of the Boyne, he laid aside the placidity of a pleader in 'Saxon' Courts, and crossing to Belfast assumed the office of an Imperial General. And when he had thus enveloped himself in martial display, Mr F. E. Smith was wont to act as his aide-de-camp.

We are not concerned here with the details of the various wars in which these brothers-in-arms engaged; but an acquaintance with the personality of either of them would warrant the belief that each in his own way thoroughly performed the duty which was before him. The Great War intervened. Street-fighting in West Belfast was displaced by the life and death struggle in Flanders. Deeds and not words were the ammunition used-until November 1918; and then the Irish Question began to rage again. In 1920, it came up in an acute form, and found the one-time aide-de-camp converted into Lord Birkenhead, Lord High Chancellor of England.

The translation was in appearance startling in reality it was even more so; for the learned Lord, having abated nothing of his vigour of expression, was prosecuting the interests of his new Party at the polls, on the opposite side to his former Commanding Officer, and on

Nov. 20, 1920, he introduced a Home Rule Bill into the House of Lords. Not only this, but the next year, on Dec. 6, he delivered in the House of Lords two homilies, on the Irish Free State Treaty, the burden of which was the duty of Ulster to be friendly with Southern Ireland. Lord Carson--who had become a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary on May 24, 1921-made, on Dec. 14 of that year, a strong speech against the Treaty, and was answered by Lord Birkenhead. On Feb. 16, 1922, the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill was introduced into the House of Lords; and on Feb. 23, Lord Chancellor Birkenhead, at a dinner-party at the Junior Constitutional Club-to which reporters were admitted-spoke highly of the Government-quorum pars magna fuit-and promised to speak on platforms throughout the coming Election on behalf of the Unionist Party.

On March 16, the said Bill came up for debate in the Lords, and the two noble Judges expressed their divergent views, and terrible was the clang of their mighty weapons.

At this time things were hurrying towards a climax; it was reached between March 25 and 29. The events in their sequence were as follows. On March 25, Lord Carson, in a speech at Burton, somewhat freely attacked the Government, and two days afterwards he was duly reproved by Lord Birkenhead in the House of Lords, where again, two days after that, he defended himself. He denied that there was any rule in that House or out of it which prevented him or any other Judge from taking any part he deemed fit in party warfare. If there was any such rule, it would equally apply to the Lord Chancellor, who had attacked him for making political speeches. Lord Birkenhead in his turn replied that any Lord Chancellor, ex-Lord Chancellor, or other Peer who was qualified to act as an unpaid Judge in the House of Lords, might be active in party politics; but that all paid Judges in that House or elsewhere were prohibited from taking any such part, unless they were Recorders or ordinary Justices of the Peace, when they were negligible. Lord Finlay said that the Rule only applied to Judges of the Supreme Court, and, he might have added, was faithfully observed by those Judges.

This is the end of the narrative of the political doings

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