'In the territories comprised between the frontier of 1814 and the Dutch frontier, France, while rejecting a policy of forcible annexation, must acquire a number of military, political, and economic guarantees which, by freeing this district from Prussian influence, should definitely protect our country from any invasion.'

It is curious to note. the verbal identity of these words with the guarantees, military, political, economic, which during the war the German Government claimed to impose upon Belgium.

A few days later the first contact with this country on this matter took place. At the beginning of December Marshal Foch, in conversation with the Prime Minister, pressed the importance of the Rhine as a material barrier against Germany, and as the only method of protecting France from a new invasion. No formal discussion took place; but Mr Lloyd George contented himself with addressing to Marshal Foch a number of searching questions indicating the difficulties which his scheme would probably arouse. It is from this time that Marshal Foch becomes the protagonist, and, as we should expect, in his hands the scheme assumed a form which, so far as military and strategic considerations were concerned, was very definite and fully thought out. In his mind there was one, and only one, method of guaranteeing France against a future German future German invasion-the permanent occupation of the Rhine and the bridgeheads of the Rhine by an inter-allied force. By this means alone France could be protected against the danger to which she had been exposed three times within a hundred years. It was necessary to prevent the German armies, as they had in the past, using the Rhineland as a base from which they could pour over Belgium and the North of France. There was, indeed, at one time put forward a strategic alternative, which consisted in the actual annexation to France of the territory lying between Alsace Lorraine and the chain of hills, the Hundsruck, which run from the Moselle, near Trèves, to the Rhine. But this was only a last resort which was never seriously pressed.

This, then, was the situation when the Paris Conference met. The French had their plan, which they defended and expounded in innumerable memoranda,

some from Marshal Foch himself, others drafted by M. Tardieu. This plan was a complete whole. The details of it were carried out with great skill and persistence in the committees of the Conference-Alsace Lorraine, the Saar Valley, the navigation of the Rhine, Belgium. The French proposals in each of these matters can only be understood if we remember that they were part of this larger scheme. It is to the history of the larger scheme itself at the Conference that we must now turn.

It had two parts. The first and essential part was the military occupation of the Rhine; the second, ancillary to it, that alteration in the political status of the country on the left bank of the Rhine which would be necessary for the maintenance of the occupation itself.

We need not elaborate the reasons which made this scheme quite unacceptable to the British and to the Americans. It is sufficient to point out that under no circumstances could any British Government consider for a moment an obligation to maintain a permanent army of occupation on German territory; still less could they consent to make it one of the conditions of peace, to be enforced in case of German refusal by a renewal of the war, that seven million Germans should be separated from the rest of their country and placed against their will under what must necessarily have been an alien government maintained by the support of foreign arms. Equally inconceivable was it that the newly formed League of Nations should begin its career, as M. Tardieu suggests, by taking upon itself the responsibility for government of this kind. The French, in defending the scheme, again and again reiterated that they had no imperialistic or selfish designs. What they were thinking of was not the aggrandisement of France, but the security of Western Europe. Let us accept this, but, none the less, even if it was not the intention, the practical result would certainly have been that which they themselves repudiated. It was an essential part of the scheme that the left bank of the Rhine should be brought into a commercial union with France and Belgium. From this commercial union Great Britain would of course be excluded. In practice this union would have meant that the whole resources of this area, the railways, rivers, and canals, would have been brought

under French control; even if Belgium had received nominally a position of equality in the consortium, the real result would have been that not only the Rhineland, but Belgium itself, with Luxemburg, would have become permanently a satellite of France. For all practical purposes it would have been the end of Belgian independence.

It is only if these points are really grasped that it will be seen that British opposition to these schemes did not imply in any way indifference to the future of France herself. All it meant was that no Englishman, however acute his sensibility and affection for France might be, could possibly have given his assent to proposals so ill-advised and so contrary to every sound principle of internal government and of international relations. The result would have been just the same had the British Empire been represented, not by Mr Lloyd George and Mr Balfour, but (shall we say) by Lord Northcliffe and Mr. Maxse.

The French proposals, therefore, could not be accepted. But the Allies of France also recognised that in some other way they must provide that security which she justly claimed. How was this to be done? Some alternative must be found.

Now let us recollect what the French, according to their own statements, precisely asked for. It was not a general guarantee for the maintenance of the whole territorial system set up at Paris, including as this did the new Polish frontiers, the corridor in West Prussia, Danzig, the Polish annexation of Posen and part of Upper Silesia. About this not a word had been said. Nowhere was anything said about a general guarantee of all the treaties. This omission is very remarkable. It can only be explained by the assumption that the permanent guarantee was to be found outside the Treaty in the League of Nations. There was one point, and one alone, which the French had put forward. They must be guarded against the danger of an actual invasion of French territory by German troops; they must have a guarantee against the recurrence of events such as those which had taken place in 1870 and 1914. It was this which the occupation of the Rhine was to provide. Could this be done in some other way?

The first alternative suggested was the guarantee of the League of Nations. President Wilson had spoken of the League as 'a general association of nations . . . for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike'; it was to be an organisation of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right.' A League of this kind would clearly give to the French the security which they desired, and this they would have accepted. But for this purpose the League must have, not only effective control over armaments, but also a military force, ready for action, and sufficient to protect any nation, the integrity and independence of which was in danger. It must be a real and not a paper guarantee. M. Bourgeois, therefore, after consultation with M. Clemenceau, proposed in his draft scheme for the Covenant arrangements for an international force together with the establishment of a permanent international staff, so that the League might have ready for speedy action the whole machinery requisite for the defence of its members. This. proposal, however, was rejected, both by President Wilson and Lord Robert Cecil. Nothing of the kind was included in the British and American schemes, which were the basis on which the Covenant was built up. When it came to the point President Wilson had to give up that which he himself had put in the very foreground of his original plan. When the draft covenant was completed, it contained no provision of any kind which would satisfy the French demands.

The second proposal was the disarmament of Germany. This, as is well known, was carried out in the extremest form. This nation of sixty millions, hitherto the greatest military Power in the world, was forbidden for all time to have an army of more than 100,000. The whole basis of the military organisation was done away with; compulsory service was forbidden; the general staff was abolished; strict provisions were inserted preventing any kind of military training under the guise of voluntary association or police; munitions of warfare, rifles, artillery, cars, tanks, aeroplanes, airships, war material of every kind were strictly limited. Everything was done to render Germany helpless from a military point of view.

In this, however, there was one grave difficulty. Germany might be disarmed, but who could ensure that she would not soon arm herself again? How could Germany be prevented in the future-ten, fifteen, twenty years ahead-from building up a new army? This could only be done by the exercise of external control; but in whose hands could this control be placed? The matter was discussed again and again. Should it be in the hands of the Allies? That would involve the permanent establishment of the Allies as a constituted body exercising suzerainty over Germany—that is, the permanent partition of the continent of Europe into two divisions, the one the ruler, the other the ruled. An impossible suggestion. But, then, could not the League of Nations be called in? Could not they supervise the execution of the Treaty? Here, again, the question arose-could the League of Nations, including as it would neutrals, and eventually ex-enemy States, be made into an organ for maintaining the permanent subjection of Germany?

An additional security was what is called the demilitarisation of the left bank of the Rhine. On this there was general agreement, and articles were drafted by which all fortifications or military works to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east of the Rhine should be disarmed and dismantled, and Germany should be forbidden for all time to reconstruct any new fortifications in this district.

English opinion was that these proposals would give to France a sufficient practical guarantee. In order to explore the situation a conversation took place on March 13 and 14, 1919, between M. Tardieu and Mr Philip Kerr, who was then acting as Mr Lloyd George's secretary, a conversation of which M. Tardieu has given us some account. In it the whole situation, as we have depicted it, was reviewed; the French claim for the separation of the left bank of the Rhine from Germany was strongly pressed, but Mr Kerr restated with the greatest cogency the arguments with which we are now familiar.

The importance of this conversation is, that out of it there arose a suggestion which ultimately was to be the final solution. Mr Kerr put forward for the first time