unrest caused by war. Nothing but war, so far as can be seen, would so dislocate society as to make Revolution possible in this country.

There is, however, one point in our foreign policy which in the near future may give rise to considerable discussion. Every one will agree that the great obstacle to the restoration of peace and to the revival of prosperity in Europe is the Franco-German difficulty or group of difficulties. With regard to the Reparations side of it, nothing useful can be said till the expert committees have reported. But whatever their report, it is very unlikely that a settlement will be reached unless the even more important question of French security, or rather, French and German security, is also dealt with. The position is quite simple. Here are two nations who have been enemies for centuries. They have repeatedly invaded one another, and the invading forces have behaved as such forces usually do. Territory on their borders has changed hands more than once. National humiliation has been suffered and inflicted. At the present time the one that is numerically the weakest is victorious, and with the assistance of her allies has imposed terms that are bitterly resented by the other. A large party in Germany makes no secret of the fact that they hope for revenge, or, at the least, a forcible revision of the Treaty they have been forced to accept. Can anybody wonder that in those circumstances it is the chief preoccupation in public affairs of every Frenchman and still more of every Frenchwoman how they can protect their children, if not themselves, from future German attacks? If to some of us the French seem unreasonable over Reparations, if they appear to pursue a policy which makes their payment so insistently demanded almost impossible, the explanation is to be found in the same cause. In principle, most Frenchmen will admit that unless Germany recover her prosperity she cannot be expected to make large foreign payments. But when suggestions are made which will in fact restore Germany's wealth, the vision of their enemy renewed in power and again a menace to their safety makes the same Frenchmen hastily reject anything which might lead to such a result. Meanwhile, the whole of Europe is kept anxious and unquiet until this great debate has been composed.

If, then, European reconstruction is to proceed and the foreign commerce on which our people so largely depend is to be revived, we must devise some means of appeasing French anxiety. The obvious way is to offer her an alliance against German aggression. That was the plan adopted in the tripartite pact between the United States, France, and ourselves, drawn up at Paris in 1919. Upon its rejection by America that proposal fell to the ground. A similar treaty was suggested by Mr Lloyd George at Cannes, in 1922, confined to England and France. It was rather vague in its terms, and on that ground was in substance refused by M. Poincaré unless it was made much more specific. British opinion also declared against this proposal on the ground that it would tend to perpetuate the division of Europe into two groups, an opinion intensified by the conclusion of the Rapallo agreement a few months later between Russia and Germany. The result is that the Cannes proposals must be regarded as also definitely at an end. France, therefore, which abandoned her claim at Paris that the Rhine should be made her military frontier in return for the tripartite pact, has got neither the physical security of a natural obstacle to invasion nor the conventional security of a military alliance, and her anxiety for the future remains one of the great disturbing elements of the international situation. Meanwhile, the League of Nations has been approaching the problem from another angle. It is part of the League's duty, laid upon it by the treaties of peace, to try to devise some method for a general reduction of armaments. As the result of prolonged consideration, at the last meeting of the Assembly a draft treaty was forwarded to the Governments of the world whereby, in return for measures of general disarmament to be agreed upon, the existing obligations laid upon members of the League to guarantee one another against aggression were to be made more definite and precise for all those who became parties to the suggested treaty. It is unnecessary here to go into the details of this plan. Its importance in this connexion is that French opinion seems inclined to accept as a satisfaction of their demand for security. It has further this advantage, that it offers to all who enter into the treaty an equal guarantee. If,

therefore, Germany adhered to it, and it would be open to her to do so, she would be as much protected against possible French aggression as France would be against her. Along those lines a real solution seems possible. Any other plan must lead sooner or later to the recreation of the group system in Europe, which was one of the main causes of the World War.

It is suggested that this scheme recognises the realities of the situation. It gives to France the security her people demand without creating an international position which experience has shown to be dangerous; and it makes a general reduction of armaments possible, without which our national position may well become alarming. The recent Singapore incident shows the risk we run unless we have some coherent and well-thoughtout policy on the subject. Whatever may be thought of the actual merits of the Singapore controversy it is surely most hazardous to defend the policy of the present Government on the ground that it is a 'moral gesture towards disarmament. How far will that take us? Not apparently at present as far as refusing to replace the five cruisers. But it is difficult to see why not. Both measures were put forward by the highest technical opinion as essential to the mobility and efficiency of our Fleet. If it be sound policy to encourage general disarmament by abandoning one scheme, it is difficult to see the logical justification for maintaining the other. In the absence of international agreement on the subject, piecemeal disarmament by the most pacific of the great powers, ourselves, has no tendency towards permanent pacification. We have already gone very far in that direction, as our experience in air armaments shows. Some general policy is essential for our safety, and it will be thoroughly in accordance with Conservative tradition if the Conservative party are the authors of it.

In Foreign affairs, then, no less than in domestic, there is urgent need for a real Conservative policy neither reactionary nor revolutionary, not merely a reluctant and belated adoption of the measures of our opponents, but one offering a genuine remedy for the distresses and difficulties of the times along lines leading not to confusion but to ordered progress. Let us remember the words

written in this Review some forty years ago by the
statesman who led the Conservative forces to twenty
years of victory:

"The object of our party is not and ought not to be
simply to keep things as they are. In the first place the
enterprise is impossible. In the next place there is much in
our present mode of thought and action which it is highly
undesirable to conserve. What we require is the administra-
tion of public affairs, whether in the executive or legislative
department, in that spirit of the old constitution which held
the nation together as a whole and levelled its united force
at objects of national import instead of splitting it into a
bundle of unfriendly and distrustful fragments.'

That doctrine is at the root of the whole modern
Conservative Creed, and upon it may well be founded a
vital and vigorous Conservative Policy.

CECIL.