L. PBM-3 L. Mariner L. Consolidated L. Called also C-47,

To understand the purpose and scope of the functions performed by the various components of the Naval Aeronautical organization, it is necessary to consider certain background information.

The present INTEGRATED AERONAUTIC MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL, AND SUPPLY PROGRAM, often called the IAP, was developed in 1944 by the Radford Board. The broad aspects of this program, with certain postwar changes, are still in effect.

Application of the recommendations contained in the first Radford Report established clear-cut lines of responsibility between several components of the Naval Aviation organization-principally the Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), the Aviation Supply Office (ASO), and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (BuSandA)—regarding the operation of the IAP. In this chapter, the problems, findings, and recommendations of the Radford Board are presented in order to evaluate the military effectiveness of Naval Aviation.

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THE RADFORD BOARD

From the outset of World War II until early 1944, shortages of Naval aircraft sharply limited the application of retirement, reconditioning, and reassignment policies. All available planes were needed, and had to be kept flying as long as possible.

In early 1944, however, the supply of most types of aircraft became sufficient to permit the consideration of some of the finer forms of control such as, for example, optimum periods of service life, frequency of reconditioning, and most advantageous assignment. Accordingly, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) appointed a Board to develop an Integrated Aeronautic Maintenance, Material, and Supply Program. This Board was composed of the following members:

Rear Admiral A. W. Bradford, USN, senior member; Rear Admiral L. B. Richardson, USN; Capt. C. W. Fox, Supply Corps, USN; Col. A. D. Cooley, USMC, members, and Lt. J. C. Geilfuss, USNR, recorder.

The purposes of the Integrated Program were threefold:

1. To furnish in adequate numbers to all aeronautic activities the most modern, most efficient kinds of aircraft.

2. To maintain such aircraft at peak efficiency wherever assigned, and

3. To supply such aircraft adequately and promptly with all needed parts and equipment.

To provide policies which would aid in the accomplishment of these purposes, the Board made an extensive study of the circumstances surrounding procurement, employment, maintenance, and ultimate retirement of aircraft.

Many of the circumstances of war are beyond the control of planners. To be effective, a control plan must recognize these facts, operating within their limitations, and minimize the disadvantages while capitalizing on

the advantages. The Board's first move was to essay the facts.

FINDINGS OF THE RADFORD BOARD

The first fact requiring consideration in the development of an Integrated Program is the normal pattern of aircraft age. New planes supplied each month are gradually lost, with the result that the age pattern of airplanes on hand is normally a pattern of diminishing numbers and increasing age. Because of the cumulative effect of losses, a considerable number of the planes on hand at any time will be 12 months old or less. Some, however, will still be on hand at an age as great as 36 months.

The characteristics and requirements of aircraft vary as their age advances. These changes affect their suitability to various missions. It was therefore necessary that the Board study these changes and evaluate the usefulness of the aircraft at various stages of their lives.

One of the most important aspects of plane age is its effect upon military advantage. Combat aircraft are constantly being improved. In any given year on a typical aircraft, there are perhaps 15 changes which have an important bearing upon the military advantages of the craft. Because repair organizations in advanced areas are necessarily limited, it is not possible to incorporate new improvements in the planes already on hand. The extent, therefore, to which improvements have been devised but not incorporated in aircraft on hand represents a loss of potential military advantage against the enemy.

Figure 14 indicates these changes by 15 bars rising from the bottom of the chart, representing time by the 12 monthly markings along the side of the chart. The extent to which the bars cross the outlines of aircraft denotes the loss of military advantage due to unaccomplished design changes. Relatively unimportant during