219-218 B.C.

Antigonus Doson, the far-seeing ruler of Macedonia, seemed imminent. Unfortunately the death of the latter reduced Macedonia to silence; while the death of Hasdrubal had again brought the peace-party in Carthage to the helm of the state. But Hannibal was not to be deterred by the opposition of the miserable politicians at home. Having in vain tried to provoke the people of Saguntum to break the peace, he attacked the town in 219 B.C. on the pretext that the Saguntines were oppressing a native tribe subject to Carthage. The authorities at home, whose sanction Hannibal had purposely refused to wait for, did not dare to oppose the war thus begun. Owing to the supineness of the Romans, who were engaged in war with the Illyrian brigands, Saguntum fell after a siege of eight months, and the rich spoils sent home to Carthage roused the people to such a pitch of enthusiasm that they accepted the challenge of war from the Roman envoys, who had been sent to demand the surrender of Hannibal, in the spring of 218 B.C.

Hannibal intrusted the safety of Spain to his younger brother, Hasdrubal, and sent home about 20,000 men to defend Africa. The fleet remained in Spain to secure the communications between that country and Africa. Two smaller fleets were dispatched, the one to ravage the coast of Italy, the other to attempt to surprise Lilybaeum, and to renew the war in Sicily. Hannibal himself, relying on the enmity of the Celts and Ligurians to Rome, determined to make northern Italy the meeting-place, where all foes of Rome might unite and aid him in the achievement of his great enterprise. It is not clear why he chose the land-route, the old pathway of Celtic hordes, in preference to that by sea; for neither the maritime supremacy of the Romans nor their league with Massilia, could have prevented a landing at Genoa.

In the spring of 218 B.C., with a force of 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 37 elephants, he set out from Cartagena to cross the Ebro, and he inspired all his soldiers with enthusiasm by pointing out the main plan and object of his undertaking. Distracted by the unexpected nature of the danger which threatened them, the Romans seem to have been but little prepared with a settled plan of war, and to have fatally delayed both in aiding Saguntum and in meeting Hannibal on the Ebro; the losses inflicted on Hannibal by the native tribes, when he forced the passage of that river, show clearly where the Romans ought to have first opposed him. Part of his troops he left behind to secure the newly

1

218 B.C

won country between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, part he sent home on reaching that chain of mountains; with the rest, amounting to 50,000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, all veterans, he crossed the Pyrenees, nor did he meet with any serious resistance until he reached the Rhone, opposite Avignon; there he was met by a levy of the Celts, but, outwitting them, he crossed the river before the arrival of the consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, who had delayed at Massilia, and reached the Alps in safety. He had the choice of three routes in crossing this mighty barrier. The coast-route was, however, out of the question, as it was not only barred by the Romans, but would also have taken him away from his destination. The remaining two routes at that time consisted of the pass of the Cottian Alps (Mont Genèvre), which, though shorter, passes through a difficult and poor mountain country, and of the pass of the Graian Alps (the little St. Bernard). This, though longer, is far the easiest to traverse; and the route by this pass leads through the broadest and most fertile of the Alpine valleys; moreover, the Celts favorable to Hannibal inhabited the country on the Italian side of the little St. Bernard, while the Cottian pass led directly into the territory of the Taurini, a Celtic tribe at feud with the Insubres, who were Hannibal's allies. Thus every circumstance tended to make Hannibal choose the pass of the Graian Alps. 1

The march along the Rhone toward the valley of the upper Isère, through the rich country of the Allobroges, brought the Carthaginian army, after sixteen uneventful days, to the foot of the Alps, and there the first dangers were encountered from some cantons of the Allobroges, who made constant assaults on the army during its ascent of the first Alpine chain, and during the descent of the precipitous path that trends sheer down to the lake of Bourget. A welcome rest in the fertile valley of Chambéry gave Hannibal time to repair his losses in beasts of burden and horses. Marching up the Isère, the army now entered the territory of the Ceutrones, whose courteous hospitality did but mask their coming treachery. On reaching the narrow track that led to the summit of the St. Bernard, Hannibal found the pass occupied on both sides, and in the rear, by the perfidious Ceutrones. His forethought in

1 Various geographical questions connected with Hannibal's campaigns, such as the route followed through the Alps and later on through the Apennines, the details of the battles of Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae, etc., are still unsettled and matters of much dispute.

218 B.C.

sending forward the baggage and cavalry saved him from the intended robbery of his supplies; but all along the line of his ascent constant conflicts caused not only loss of men and beasts, but confusion and utter despondency in his soldiers' hearts. At last, however, the summit was reached, and after a brief rest the perilous descent began; here the late season, with its fresh mantle of September snows, proved more terrible than the treacherous attacks of barbarians. But all difficulties gave way before the iron will and unshaken confidence of the great general, and at last the shattered army enjoyed a nobly earned repose in the plain of Ivrea, quartered in the villages of the friendly Salassi, clients of the Insubres. Fortunately for Hannibal, no Roman troops were stationed so far north to await his arrival. The Alps were crossed, and Hannibal had attained his object; but to this end he had sacrificed more than half his infantry and three thousand cavalry. The military value of this wonderful achievement may well be called in question, but the courage, skill, and masterly execution of the plan by Hannibal himself admit of no doubt. The grand idea of Hamilcar, that of taking up the conflict with Rome in Italy, was now realized. It was his genius that projected this expedition, and the unerring tact of historical tradition has always dwelt on the last link in the great chain of preparatory steps, the passage of the Alps, with a greater admiration than on the battles of the Trasimene lake and of the plain of Cannae.

Hannibal's arrival in Italy disconcerted the Roman plans. The army of Publius Scipio had already landed in Spain, under the command of Gnaeus, the brother of Publius. The latter, on being foiled by Hannibal at the passage of the Rhone, had himself returned to Pisae with a few troops, and was now in command of the Roman force in the valley of the Po. The army of the other consul, Tiberius Sempronius, had been fortunately delayed in its intended attack on the African coast by the descent of the Carthaginian fleet on Sicily, and was now recalled to northern Italy, but the surprise of the Romans enabled Hannibal to rest his troops after the passage of the Alps and to cement his alliance with the Celts and Ligurians before encountering the famous legions of the Republic.

The two armies met in the plain between the Ticinus and the Sesia, not far from Vercellae, and Scipio was decisively beaten, owing to the overpowering force of the light Numidian cavalry.

218-217 B.C.

Scipio himself was severely wounded, and only saved by the spirited devotion of his son, then a youth of seventeen. He at once wisely recrossed the Po, and, followed by Hannibal, took up a strong position on the hills behind the Trebia. Here he was joined by the second army under Sempronius, and thus strengthened and occupying a highly advantageous position, the Romans might await with confidence the next move of Hannibal. Fortunately for the latter, Scipio's wound caused the sole command to devolve on Tiberius Sempronius, who was fired with impatience to avenge the previous defeat on the Ticinus and the desolation of the villages of such Celts as still remained loyal to Rome. Drawn on by the simulated flight of the enemy's cavalry, the Romans crossed the Trebia in hot pursuit, and suddenly found themselves face to face with the whole army of Hannibal drawn up for battle. The Roman cavalry proved no match for their opponents; but the stubborn courage of the infantry resisted every attack both of foot and horse, until a picked force of two thousand Carthaginians under Mago by an attack in the rear decided the day. Even then the first division of the Roman infantry, ten thousand strong, cut their way through the midst of the enemy and succeeded in reaching the fortress of Placentia. The losses of Hannibal in battle fell chiefly on the Celts, but many of his veterans and all his elephants, except one, perished afterwards of fatal diseases caused by the cold and wet of that bitter December day. The victory made Hannibal master of northern Italy, and the Celtic insurrection spread far and wide without let or hindrance from Roman arms. Hannibal bivouacked for the winter where he was, and organized the Celtic accessions to his army, which are said to have numbered more than sixty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry.

Despite this brilliant success Hannibal was probably well aware of his true position in Italy. He knew that his chance of ultimate victory depended rather on political than military achievements, upon the gradual loosening and breaking up of the Italian confederation: as long as that confederation remained united, and confronted him with its vastly superior resources, he no doubt felt that with his inferior infantry, with his precarious and irregular support from home, with the capricious aid of the fickle Celts, he had no hope of humbling to the dust his proud antagonist. Owing to this conviction, Hannibal's conduct of the war in Italy is marked by a constant change both of the theater of war and of the plan of

Hist. Nat. III

9

217 B.C.

operations, and also by an earnest endeavor to turn every success to good account by posing as the liberator of Italian cities from the tyranny of Rome. With this object in view he released all the Italian prisoners without a ransom, and charged them to report that he waged war against Rome, not Italy, whose saviour and restorer of ancient powers and independence he professed himself. The Roman prisoners, on the other hand, he loaded with chains. as slaves.

In the early spring of 217 B.C. Hannibal set out from the Po; and at a point as far west as possible he crossed the Apennines, while the new consul, Gaius Flaminius, lay idle at Arretium. His army suffered terrible hardships on the other side of the mountains when struggling through the low-lying and flooded country extending between the Serchio and Arno, and Hannibal himself lost the sight of one eye from ophthalmia. However, at last he reached the rich land at Faesulae, where he encamped, having thus completely baffled the consul Flaminius.

The latter, raised by the popular party at Rome to a second consulship, did not wait for his colleague, Graeus Servilius, to leave his useless post at Ariminum, and join him. Fired by his ambition to justify the good opinion of the democrats, and stung by the sight of the devastation which marked far and wide the line of Hannibal's march through Etruria, Flaminius hastily followed, and overtook Hannibal in the district of Cortona. Here Hannibal had chosen his field of battle-a narrow defile between two steep mountains, closed at its outlet by a high hill, and at its entrance by the lake Trasimene. Here he prepared an ambush for the enemy, into which the Roman army in the heavy mist of an early morning marched unsuspectingly and was almost entirely annihilated. Fifteen thousand Romans fell, and among them the consul; and as many more were captured: while Hannibal's loss was but fifteen hundred. The vanguard of the Romans, six thousand strong, proved once more the irresistible might of the legion, and cut its way through the opposing infantry; but they were next day surrounded and made prisoners of war by Maharbal, at the head of a squadron of cavalry. About the same time the cavalry of the army of Servilius, which had been sent forward to support Flaminius, fell in with the enemy and was cut to pieces. All Etruria was lost; and the Romans broke down the bridges over the Tiber, and nominated Quintus Fabius Maximus dictator, to