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dom of Syphax to Massinissa; the surrender of all ships of war except twenty, and an annual contribution of two hundred talents ($240,000) for the next fifty years; an engagement not to make war against Rome or her allies, and not to wage war in Africa beyond the Carthaginian boundaries without the permission of Rome. The practical effect of these terms was to render Carthage tributary and to deprive her of her political independence. The terms of this peace have often been considered too light, and they served as a handle to the charge that Scipio, in his eagerness to secure for himself the glory of finishing the war, forgot what was due to Rome. A true estimate of the peace and of its effect on the future position of Carthage inclines rather to the view that these terms were the outcome of the nobleness of the two greatest men of the age, and a recognition on the part of Scipio of the crime of blotting out one of the main props of civilization merely to gratify the petty ferocity of his fellow-countrymen. The noble-mindedness and statesmanlike gifts of the great antagonists are no less apparent in the magnanimous submission of Hannibal to what was inevitable than in the wise abstinence of Scipio from an extravagant and insulting use of victory.
It remains for us to sum up the results of this terrible war, which for seventeen years had devastated the lands and islands from the Hellespont to the Pillars of Hercules. Rome was henceforth compelled by the force of circumstances to assume a position at which she had not directly aimed, and to exercise sovereignty over all the lands of the Mediterranean. Outside Italy there arose the two new provinces in Spain, where the natives lived in a state of perpetual insurrection; the kingdom of Syracuse was now included in the Roman province of Sicily: a Roman instead of a Carthaginian protectorate was now established over the most important Numidian chiefs: Carthage was changed from a powerful commercial state into a defenseless mercantile town. Thus all the western Mediterranean passed under the supremacy of Rome. In Italy itself, the destruction of the Celts became a mere question of time: the ruling Latin people had been exalted by the struggle to a position of still greater eminence over the heads of the non-Latin or Latinized Italians, such as the Etruscans and Sabellians in lower Italy. A terrible punishment was inflicted on the allies of Hannibal. Capua was reduced from the position of second city to that of first village in Italy: the whole soil, with a few exceptions, was 218-202 B.C.
declared to be public domain-land, and was leased out to small occupiers. The same fate befell the Picentes on the Silarus. The Bruttians became in a manner bondsmen to the Romans, and were forbidden to carry arms. All the Greek cities which had supported Hannibal were treated with great severity: and in the case of a number of Apulian, Lucanian, and Samnite communities a loss of territory was inflicted, and new colonies were planted. Throughout Italy the non-Latin allies were made to feel their utter subjection to Rome, and the comedies of the period testify to the scorn of the victorious Romans.
It seems probable that not less than three hundred thousand Italians perished in this war, the brunt of which loss fell chiefly on Rome. After the battle of Cannae it was found necessary to fill up the hideous gap in the senate by an extraordinary nomination of 177 senators: the ordinary burgesses suffered hardly less severely. Further, the terrible strain on the resources of the state had shaken the national economy to its very foundations. Four hundred flourishing townships had been utterly ruined. The blows inflicted on the simple morality of the citizens and farmers by a camp-life worked no less mischief. Gangs of robbers and desperadoes plundered Italy in dangerous numbers. Home agriculture saw its existence endangered by the proof, first given in this war, that the Roman people could be supported by foreign grain from Sicily and Egypt. Still, at the close and happy issue of so terrible a struggle, Rome might justly point with pride to the past and with confidence to the future. In spite of many errors she had survived all danger, and the only question now was whether she would have the wisdom to make a right use of her victory, to bind still more closely to herself the Latin people, to gradually Latinize all her Italian subjects, and to rule her foreign dependents as subjects, not as slaves,—whether she would reform her constitution and infuse new vigor into the unsound and fast-decaying portion of her state.
A REVIEW OF THE WEST AND EAST. 201-194 B.C. ■ AHE war with Hannibal had interrupted Rome in the ex
tension of her dominion to the Alpine boundary of Italy;
A that task was now resumed. The Celts, aware of the coming vengeance, had again taken up arms in 201 B.C. The insurrection spread far and wide, and Celtic and Ligurian bands sacked Placentia and invested Cremona in the following year. A great battle before the latter city ended in their overthrow, but the struggle continued until 193 B.C. before these people were finally subdued. The Romans intended that the Transpadane Celts should serve as a bulwark against the incursions of northern tribes. It seems that the Celtic nationality in these districts rapidly became submerged in the all-absorbing spread of Latin influence. The terror of the Roman name penetrated even beyond the Alps, and by the founding of Aquileia, about 183 B.C., the Romans showed their determination to close the gates of the Alps forever against the northern nation. New means of communication were opened up by the extension of the Flaminian road, under the name of the Aemilian, from Ariminum to Placentia, and by the reconstruction of the Cassian Way from Rome to Arretium. The result was that the Po, and not the Apennines, now divided Celtic from Italian land, and that south of the Po the old name of Ager Celticus, applied to the district between the Po and the Apennines, ceased to have any meaning.
The same policy was pursued with the Ligurian tribes occupying the hills and valleys in the northwestern highlands of Italy. Some were extirpated, others transplanted, and the mountainous country between the valley of the Po and the Arno was practically cleared. The fortress of Luna was established in 177 B.C., to act as a bulwark against the Ligurians, and as a port for ships sailing to Massilia or Spain. With the more western Ligurian tribes in the Genoese Apennines and the Maritime Alps conflicts were incessant, but no permanent results were effected. Wars, too, of a similar
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