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320-194 B.C.

shaken in their fidelity to their native land and hereditary form of government, places the Macedonians almost on a level with the Romans themselves; in particular, the regeneration of the state after the storm of Celtic invasion in 278 B.C. was as honorable as it was marvelous.

The huge unwieldy empire of Asia, pretending to stretch from the Hellespont to the Punjab, was in reality an aggregate of states in different stages of dependence, or rather a conglomeration of insubordinate satrapies and half-free Greek cities. Along the coast the Great King vainly endeavored to expel the Egyptians; on the eastern frontier he was perpetually harassed by Parthians and Bactrians; while in Asia Minor the Celtic hordes had settled on the north coast and the eastern interior, and on the west the Greek cities were constantly trying to assert and make good their independence. Indeed, in Asia Minor the king's authority was little more than nominal except in Cilicia, Phrygia, and Lydia, for the powerful kingdom of Pergamus embraced a large portion of the west, and a number of cities and native princes practically owned no lord. Egypt, on the other hand, presented a marked contrast to the loose organization of Asia. Under the prudent Lagidae, Egypt had been welded into a firmly united and compact state, incapable of revolt or disruption under the worst misrule. The objects of the Ptolemies' policy were not, like the Macedonian or Persian, vague dreams of universal empire, but definite and capable of realization. The whole traffic between India and the Mediterranean was in the hands of the rulers of Egypt, and owing to their excellent geographical position, whether for defense or attack, the Egyptians established themselves not only in Cyrene, but in Cyprus and the Cyclades, on the Phoenician and Syrian coast, on the whole of the south and west coast of Asia Minor, and even in the Thracian CherThe finances of Egypt were most flourishing, and Alexandria, the seat of the Ptolemies, attracted all the learning, whether scientific or literary, of the time. The mutual relation of these three great Eastern powers was naturally one of antagonism and rivalry; but Egypt, as a maritime power, and the protectress of the Asiatic Greek towns and minor states, was the foe of both Macedonia and Asia, while the two latter powers, though rivals, were ready to combine against Egypt, their common enemy.

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In addition to the various states of the second rank in Asia Minor, such as Atropatene, Armenia, Cappadocia, Pontus, and

201-194 B.C.

Bithynia, there were three powerful Celtic tribes who had settled with their national customs and constitution in the interior. From their barbarous strength and free-booting habits they were the constant terror of the more degenerate Asiatics. It was due to his successful opposition to these hordes that Attalus was raised from the position of a wealthy citizen to that of king of Pergamus. His court was a miniature Alexandria, and, as the patron of art and science, and from his retention, when king, of his simple citizen character, Attalus may not inaptly be styled the Lorenzo de' Medici of antiquity.

In Greece proper we find a great decay of national energy. The Aetolian League, whose policy was alike hostile to the Achaean confederacy and to Macedonia, would have proved of far more service to the Greek nation had not its members pursued a system of organized robbery, and by their unfortunate policy prevented any union of the whole Hellenic race. In the Peloponnese the Achaean League had knit together the best elements of Greece, and breathed new life and true patriotism into the nobler portion of the Hellenes. But, owing to the selfish diplomacy of Aratus and the foolish invocation of Macedonian interference to settle its disputes with Sparta, the league had become entirely subject to Macedonian influence, and had admitted Macedonian garrisons into its chief fortresses. Sparta alone of the other Peloponnesian states showed any vigor, and under the unscrupulous Nabis daily increased its strength. The commercial prosperity enjoyed by Byzantium, the mistress of the Bosporus, and by Cyzicus, on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, was at this time very considerable; but they were both eclipsed by Rhodes, which had secured the carrying trade of all the eastern Mediterranean. Aided by her fleet and the courageous temper of her citizens, Rhodes was the champion of all the Greek maritime cities, and, though as a rule pursuing a policy of neutrality and of friendly relationship with the neighboring powers, she did not shrink, if need be, from adopting sterner measures. The Rhodians became the leaders of a league of the chief Greek cities scattered along the coasts and islands of Asia Minor and elsewhere, such as Sinope, Lampsacus, Halicarnassus, Chios, and Smyrna. This league upheld with success the cause of freedom against the attacks of neighboring tyrants, and securely fostered the arts of peace and the old Greek spirit, uncontaminated by the tyranny of a dissolute soldiery or the corrupt atmosphere of an Eastern court.

215-201 B.C.

Such, then, was the state of things in the East when Philip of Macedon was induced to break down the wall of political separation, and to interfere in the West. The miserable incompetence he had shown in the first Macedonian war, 215-205 B.C., and the contemptible indolence which caused him to utterly disappoint Hannibal at a critical period, have been already pointed out. Now, however, though Philip was not the man needed at this juncture, he exhibited none of those faults which had marred his first war with Rome. Philip was a true king in the worst and best sense of the term. Inflated with arrogance and pride, incapable of taking advice or brooking opposition, he was utterly callous to the lives and sufferings of those about him; bound by no sense of moral tie or obligation, the slave of passion, combining in singular fashion sagacity and resolution with supineness and procrastination, he was yet gifted with the valor of a soldier and the eye of a general; jealous of his honor as a Macedonian king, he could rise to a spirited and dignified public policy; full of intelligence and wit, he won the hearts of all whom he wished to gain.

At the present moment Philip directed his attentions to Egypt. About 205 B.C. he had formed an alliance with Antiochus of Asia. to break up the Egyptian state, now ruled over by Ptolemy Epiphanes, a child five years old, and to divide the spoil. In 201 B.C. Philip had begun his task of plunder, and crossing to Asia had proceeded to make war upon the Greek cities on the coast. Chalcedon saved itself by submission, but Cius and Thasos were stormed and sacked. Rhodes, at the head of her league, declared war against Philip; she was joined by Byzantium and Attalus of Pergamus. Several indecisive battles were fought at sea; towards the close of the year Philip withdrew to Macedonia, where his presence was urgently needed.

At this point the Romans thought right to interfere. They could not view with indifference the possible extension of Philip's power, the conquest of Rhodes and Egypt, the fall of Cyrene, and the future. peril of all the Greek cities, whose protectors they claimed to be, and they could not honorably refuse aid to Attalus of Pergamus, who had been their staunch ally since the first Macedonian war. The policy of interference in the East was not actuated by greed for further conquest, but was dictated by necessity; it redounds to the senate's honor that it resolved to prepare for war with Philip at a time when the Roman citizens were thoroughly weary of

200-197 B.C.

and exhausted by one transmarine war, and when such a war was sure to rouse a storm of popular disapprobation.

At first, indeed, the Romans lacked a pretext for war. Their ambassador, sent to Abydus, after the capture of that city by Philip in 200 B.C., was politely reproved by the Macedonian king for attempting to interfere with his designs. The Athenians, however, had at this time put to death two Acarnanians who strayed into their mysteries. The Acarnanians at once invoked Philip's aid, and he proceeded to lay waste Attica. Athens applied for help to Rome, and the popular assembly was at length induced by various concessions to ratify the declaration of war by the senate, in 200 B.C. These concessions were chiefly made at the expense of the allies, who had to supply the garrison service in Gaul, Lower Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia; volunteers alone, as was alleged, were enrolled for the Macedonian campaign. Two of the six legions, thus called out, embarked at Brundisium under the leadership of the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba.

Antiochus stood

The position of Philip was very critical. aloof; Egypt, despite its anxiety to keep a Roman fleet out of Eastern waters, was utterly estranged from Philip by his recent scheme of partition; the Rhodian confederacy of Greek cities was also, owing to recent events, a pronounced enemy; while in Greece itself many of the most powerful states were ready to welcome the Romans as deliverers, and the Acarnanians and Boeotians alone remained the steadfast allies of Macedonia. The Achaean League, previously estranged by the murder of Aratus, had, under the able leadership of Philopoemen, revived its military power and freed itself from the oppressive influence of Macedonia. Aware of the danger to Greece of invoking Roman aid, this league attempted in vain to mediate between Philip and Rhodes, and in despair remained neutral, awaiting the coming of the Roman troops with undisguised but inactive dread. Thus Philip, by his cruelty and arrogance, had alienated all those Eastern powers which at this critical hour should have proved his staunchest allies in repelling the common danger to Greek freedom and independence.

The Roman army under Galba effected very little, and the result of the first year of the war was on the whole favorable to Philip. A second campaign conducted by a far abler officer, the Consul Titus Quintius Flamininus, was more successful, and the Achaean League went over to the Roman side. Finally, in 197 B.C.,

197-195 B.C.

Flamininus succeeded in bringing Philip to a decisive engagement in the district of Scotussa. The battle takes its name from the steep height of Cynoscephalae, which, lying between the two camps, was the scene of the first encounter between the vanguards of both armies. Owing to the success of the Macedonians at the outset, Philip was encouraged to risk a battle with his whole force, and, after a fierce conflict, in which the phalanx exhibited its ancient prowess, Philip was utterly defeated, and escaped to Larissa.

At this defeat, even his most staunch allies, the Acarnanians, submitted to Rome; resistance was no longer possible. The terms imposed do honor to the Romans. They gave no ear to the malignity of the Aetolians, who demanded the annihilation of the Macedonian kingdom; for they clearly saw that it alone could serve as a bulwark against the encroaching Celts and Thracians. A commission of ten was appointed, at the head of which was Flamininus, to settle the complicated affairs of Greece. The result of their deliberations was the decision that Philip should give up all his possessions in Asia Minor, Thrace, Greece, and the islands of the Aegean; that he should pay a contribution of a thousand talents. ($1,220,000); that he should conclude no foreign alliances without Rome's consent, and wage no foreign wars; that he should enter into the Roman alliance, and send a contingent when required; that the Macedonian army should not exceed five thousand men, nor its fleet five decked ships; that the territory of Macedonia should remain unimpaired, with the exception of some small strips and of the revolted province of Orestis.

With regard to the disposition of the possessions thus ceded by Philip, Rome, having learned by experience in Spain the doubtful value of transmarine provinces, kept none of the spoil for herself, and decreed freedom to the Greek states-a freedom rather in name than deed, when we consider the value of it to a nation devoid of all union and unity. Athens received the three islands of Paros, Scyros, and Imbros, as a reward for the hardships she had suffered and for the many courtesies she had shown to Rome. All Philip's possessions in the Peloponnese and on the Isthmus were ceded to the Achaean League, which was thus practically made ruler of the Peloponnese: but scant favor was accorded to the boastful and greedy Aetolians, who incorporated Phocis and Locris, but were not suffered to extend their power to Acarnania and Thessaly.

Nabis of Sparta obstinately refused to give up Argos to the

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