Chapter XXVII FALL OF THE OLIGARCHY-RULE OF POMPEIUS 70-63 B.C. HE new government had survived the danger of external war and of insurrection in Italy. We have now to consider its relations with parties in Rome during the same decade of years. With characteristic want of energy it had not even completed the half-finished arrangements of Sulla. The lands destined by him for distribution had not been parceled out; even domain lands were again occupied in the old arbitrary fashion which prevailed before the Gracchan reforms. Whatever in the new constitution was inconvenient to the optimates was ignored, such as the disfranchisement of particular communities and the prohibition against conjoining the new farms. Still the Gracchan constitution remained formally abolished, and it was the aim of the democratic party to restore it in its main features, so the old watchwords were heard again-the corn largesses, the tribunician power, and the reform of the senatorial tribunals. The government consented, in the year of Sulla's death. (78 B.C.), to a limited revival of the corn distributions, and in 73 B.C. a new corn law regulated the purchases of Sicilian grain for this purpose. The agitation regarding the tribunician power was begun as early as 76 B.C., and continued in later years, though without result. But for the reform of the tribunals the cry was louder and the need more pressing. The crime of extortion had become habitual, and the condemnation of any man of influence could scarcely be obtained. Not only was there a fellow-feeling with the accused on the part of the senatorial jurymen, many of whom had either been guilty or hoped some day to be guilty of a similar offense, but the sale of the votes of the jurymen had become an established custom. A specially flagrant case might provoke an outcry for the time, but, generally speaking, bribery was so universal that the commission as to extortions might be regarded as an institution for taxing the 71 B.C. senators returning from the provinces for the benefit of their colleagues that remained at home. Even Roman citizens in the provinces, unless senators or equites, were no longer safe from the rods and axes of the Roman magistrates. The opposition did not fail to avail itself of this state of things; for the prosecution of a powerful opponent in the law courts was the only weapon left to it. So Caesar prosecuted Gnaeus Dolabella and Gaius Antonius, and Cicero made himself famous by his indictment of Verres; while the whole party loudly demanded the restoration of the tribunician power and of the equestrian tribunals, and the renewal of the censorship as the only means of purifying the governing board. With all this no progress was made; the restoration of corn distributions had conciliated the mob of the capital, and the senate could afford to be resolute on the other points. Some slight concession was made with regard to the exiles of the insurrection of Lepidus; and the influence of Gaius Cotta, leader of the moderate reform party in the senate, abolished the provision which forbade the tribunes of the plebs to stand for other magistracies; but the other restrictions remained, and neither party was satisfied. The present condition of affairs, so happy for the government, was completely changed by the return of Pompeius from Spain in 71 B.C. Pompeius belonged to the optimates, but he was very little at home in his own party. He had ambition above that of the ordinary aristocrat, and could not be content with passing through the regular routine of office, with nothing before him but a luxurious and indolent retirement. Yet this was all that his own party could offer. The command in the Mithradatic war, which he ardently desired, he knew the senate would never give him. The interests of the oligarchy could not permit him to add fresh laurels to those he had already gained in Africa and Europe; they dared not intrust the Eastern command to any but the most approved and stanchest aristocrat. And there were other grounds of dissension. It was only with reluctance that the senate had conferred upon him the Spanish command; while, in return, the general accused the government of neglecting the Spanish armies and endangering the expedition. Moreover, he demanded for himself a triumph and the consulship, and for his soldiers assignations of land. But Pompeius had never filled any of the subordinate magistracies, and therefore could not legally be consul. Nor could he triumph, for, 71 B.C. in spite of his extraordinary commands, he had never been invested with the ordinary supreme power. There were but two courses open to him: he could either make his demands openly at the head of his army and intimidate the senate into compliance, or he could ally himself with the democrats. The timid nature of Pompeius and his want of political adroitness inclined him to the latter course; he thus gained for himself able political adjutants like Gaius Caesar, while the forlorn democratic party were only too glad of the alliance-they knew that the government could refuse no demand presented by so formidable a combination. There was still one man whose influence, though it might not be able to give victory to either side, was yet considerable. This was Marcus Crassus, who was at the head of the army with which he had crushed the servile rising, and who, moreover, was the richest man in Rome, and had great influence in the political clubs. He, like Pompeius, was a Sullan, but had personal aims, quite outside the ordinary constitutional routine. He chose the safer course of joining the coalition, and was welcomed by the democrats, who were not unpleased to find in him a possible counterpoise to the now all-powerful Pompeius. This, the first coalition, took place in the summer of 71 B.C. The terms were simple. The generals adopted the democratic programme, while they were to have the consulship for the following year. Pompeius, in addition, was to get his triumph and the allotments promised to his soldiers, and Crassus the honor of a solemn entrance into the capital. The senate had nothing to oppose to the coalition, for Metellus had already disbanded his troops. They granted the necessary dispensations, and Pompeius gave formal adherence to the democratic proposals in an assembly of the people. The Sullan constitution was now speedily abolished. Pompeius himself, as consul, introduced a law restoring to the tribunes all their old prerogatives, especially the right of initiating legislation. The law-courts were reformed, probably with the consent of the moderate senatorial party, for the senators were not altogether excluded from the roll of jurymen, who in future were to be composed one-third of senators, two-thirds of equestrians; but, of the latter, one-half must have filled the office of district presidents. As these officers were elected by the tribes, one-third of the jurymen were now indirectly elective. The farming system was reintroduced for the taxes of the Asiatic province; this, of course, was to 70-67 B.C. conciliate the capitalists at the expense of the provincials. Finally, the censorship was restored-probably without the earlier limitation which restricted the term of office to eighteen months. The constitution of Sulla had been based on a monopoly of power by the senate, and on the political annihilation of every other class in the state; but under the new arrangement the senate was held in check by fear of the censors and of the equestrian jurymen. The tribunes of the people could propose new laws and overturn any existing arrangements at will, while the moneyed classes, as farmers of the revenue and as judges of the provincial governors, again raised their heads beside the senate. The further aims of the democrats were not for the present attained. Meanwhile the armies of the two generals still lay before the walls of Rome, and the danger was great lest Pompeius should yield to the temptation of making himself absolute master of the city and of the empire. The coalition had only one bond of union-the de sire to destroy the Sullan constitution; that work being now accomplished, the combination was in reality dissolved. Crassus had throughout played an inferior part, and his terror became so great that he began to make advances to the senate and to attempt to gain over the mob by immense largesses. But Pompeius really lacked the courage to take a decisive step; he wished to be master of Rome and loyal citizen at the same time. The adroit leaders of the democratic party plied him with flatteries, urged him to surpass his former services to the state by a still greater victory, and to banish the fearful specter of civil war. Crassus was induced to make the first overtures for disbandment, and at length the great general yielded, and the troops dispersed. The Mithradatic war appeared now at an end, and as Pompeius would not accept a province he retired at the expiry of his consulship wholly from public affairs. During the next few years the condition of parties was very much what it had been before the time of Sulla. The direction of affairs lay with the senate, while the constitution through which it governed was pervaded by a hostile spirit. The democrats were impotent without a leader, and the chief feature of the period is the increase of the influence of the capitalist party, which, though courted by both sides, on the whole drew closer to the senate. Their influence is seen in the law of the year 67 B.C., which restored to them the fourteen special benches in the theater and in the fact 67-66 B.C. that the senate withdrew, at their instance, the administration of Asia from Lucius Lucullus. But the course of the war in the East soon brought about a change. All the conquests there were lost, and the sea was given up to the undisputed sway of the pirates. The democrats eagerly seized the opportunity of settling accounts with the senate, and Pompeius saw once more before him an opportunity of gratifying his ambition. Accordingly, in 67 в.C., two projects of law were introduced in the assembly of the tribes at his instigation. The first measure decreed the discharge of the soldiers in the East who had served their term, and the substitution of Glabrio, one of the consuls of the year, for Lucullus in the command. The second proposed a comprehensive plan for clearing the seas of pirates. The terms of the proposal are extraordinary, and require close attention. First, a generalissimo was to be appointed by the senate from the consulars, to hold supreme command over the whole Mediterranean and over all the coasts for fifty miles inland, concurrently with the ordinary governors, for three years. Second, he might select from the men of senatorial rank twenty-five lieutenants with pretorian powers, and two treasurers with questorian power. Third, he might raise an army of 120,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, and a fleet of 500 ships, and for this purpose might dispose absolutely of all the resources of the provinces. Besides this, a large sum of money and a considerable force of men and ships were at once handed over to him. By the introduction of this law the government was practically taken out of the hands of the senate; it was the final collapse of the oligarchic rule. But it was more than this-it was practically the institution of an unlimited dictatorship. Like all extraordinary commands, this new office no doubt required the confirmation of the people; but it was an undoubted prerogative of the senate to define the sphere of every command, and, in fact, to control and limit it in all ways. The people had hitherto interfered only on the proposition of the senate, or at any rate of a magistrate himself qualified for the office of general. Even during the Jugurthan war, when the command was transferred to Marius by popular vote, it was only to Marius as consul for the year. But now a private man was to be invested by the tribes with extraordinary authority, and the sphere of his office was defined. by themselves. The new commander was empowered to confer |