51-46 B. C. ern history; that western Europe is Romanic and Germanic Europe classic; that the names of Themistocles and Scipio have to us a very different sound from those of Asoka and Salmanassar; that Homer and Sophocles are not merely like the Vedas and Kalidasa attractive to the literary botanist, but bloom for us in our own garden-all this is the work of Caesar; and while the creation of his great predecessor in the East has been almost wholly reduced to ruin by the tempests of the Middle Ages, the structure of Caesar has outlasted those thousands of years which have changed religion and polity for the human race and even shifted the center of civilizatíon itself, and it stands erect for what we may term perpetuity. Chapter XXX THE JOINT RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR 57-52 B.C. F the three joint rulers, Pompeius, Caesar and Crassus, the first-named was the foremost in the eyes of the Roman world. Nor is this surprising, for Pompeius was undoubtedly the first general of his time, while Caesar, so far as he was known, was only a dexterous party leader. In the eyes of the multitude he was to Pompeius what Flavius and Afranius had beena useful instrument for political purposes. And if the position of Pompeius under the Gabinian law was compared with that of Caesar under the Vatinian, the comparison was to the advantage of the former; for Pompeius had almost the whole resources of the state under his control, and ruled nearly the whole empire, while Caesar had only certain fixed sums and four legions, and ruled two provinces. Caesar, again, was to resign his command after five years, while Pompeius had fixed his own time for retirement. But Pompeius attempted a task beyond his powers when he undertook to rule the capital-a problem always infinitely difficult, because there was no armed force at the disposal of the government, whatever it might be. The result was complete anarchy: after Caesar's departure the coalition still ruled doubtless the destinies of the world, but not the streets of the capital. The senate. felt its impotence, and attempted no show of authority; Pompeius shut himself up and sulked in silence; the sound portion of the citizens, who had at heart freedom and order, kept rigorously aloof from politics. But for the rabble of all sorts, high and low, it was a time of carnival; demagogism became a trade, which accordingly did not lack its professional insignia-the threadbare mantle, the shaggy beard, the long streaming hair, the deep bass voice. Greeks and Jews, freedmen and slaves, were the most regular attendants at the popular assemblies, and often only a minority of those voting consisted of burgesses legally constituted. The real rulers of Rome were the armed bands, raised by adventurers out 57 B.C. of gladiatorial slaves and blackguards of all sorts. These bands had hitherto been usually under the control of the popular leaders, but now all discipline was at an end, and the leaders of the bands. fought either for the democracy, for the senate, or for Crassus: Clodius had fought at different times for all three. The most noted of these street leaders was Publius Clodius, whom the regents had already made use of against Cato and Cicero. During his tribunate he had exerted all his great talent, energy, and influence to promote an ultra-democratic policy: he gave the citizens corn gratis; prohibited the obstruction of the comitia by religious formalities; reëstablished the street-clubs, which constituted a complete organization of the whole proletariate of the city according to streets; and set the seal of divine favor upon his doings by erecting a grand Temple of Liberty on the Palatine. The position of Pompeius was soon seriously compromised: Clodius opposed him in a trifling matter about the sending back of a captive Armenian prince, and the quarrel became a serious feud. Pompeius revenged himself by allowing the return of Cicero, the bitter enemy of Clodius. But the real battleground was in the streets, and here, though Pompeius had his own hired gangs, Clodius was usually victorious. To complete the spectacle, both parties in the quarrel courted the favor of the senate; Pompeius pleased it by recalling Cicero, Clodius by declaring the Julian laws null and void. Naturally no positive result came from this political witches' revel-it was quite aimless; demagogism was a mere makeshift in the interregnum between republic and monarchy. It had not even the effect of kindling the desire for a strong government based on military power; for those citizens likely to be affected in this way lived mostly away from Rome, and were not touched by the anarchy which prevailed there; and besides, they had already been thoroughly converted to the cause of authority by the Catilinarian attempts. The only important result of all this confusion was the painful position of Pompeius, which must have had considerable influence upon his future conduct. Far more important than the change in the relations of Pompeius with Clodius was his altered position with regard to Caesar. While Pompeius had failed to fulfill the functions assigned to him, Caesar had been brilliantly successful: he had crushed the threatening German invasion, and in two years had carried the Roman arms to the Rhine and the Channel. Already, in 57 B.C., the senate 57 B.C. had voted him the usual honors in far richer measure than had ever been accorded to Pompeius. Caesar was now the hero of the day, master of the most powerful Roman army; while Pompeius was merely an ex-general who had once been famous. No rupture had taken place, but it was evident that the alliance must be at an end when the relative position of the parties was reversed. At any rate Pompeius found it necessary to abandon his attitude of haughty reserve, and to come forward and attempt to gain for himself a command which would again put him on equal terms with Caesar. To do this he must be able to control the machinery of government: but by his awkward quarrel with Clodius he had lost command of the streets, and therefore could not count on carrying his point in the popular assembly; and at the same time it was doubtful whether after his long inaction even the senate was sufficiently under his influence to grant what he wished. The opposition to the regents had been growing in strength and importance, and they were powerless to check it; in consequence, a change occurred in the position of the senate, which found itself largely increased in importance. The marriage alliance of Caesar and Pompeius, and the banishments of Cato and of Cicero, suggested unpleasantly to the public mind the decrees and alliances of monarchs, and men began to perceive that it was no modification of the republican constitution which was at stake, but the existence of the republic itself. Many of the best men who had hitherto belonged to the popular party now passed over to the other side. The "three dynasts," the "three-headed monster," were phrases in everybody's mouth. Even the masses began to waver: Caesar's consular orations were listened to without a sound; at the theater no applause greeted his entrance, and his tools and associates were publicly hissed. The rulers hinted to the equites that their opposition might cost them their new special seats in the theater, and that the commons might lose their free corn. Caesar's wealth was employed in every direction to gain adherents; no one, unless hopelessly lost, was refused assistance in distress, and the enormous buildings set on foot by Caesar and Pompeius brought gain to great numbers of men in every position. But corruption could touch only a comparatively small number, and every day brought proofs of the strong attachment of the people to the existing constitution and of their hatred of monarchy. Under representative institutions the popular discontent would have found an outlet at the elections, but 57 B.C. under the existing circumstances the only course left for the supporters of the republic was to range themselves under the banner of the senate. Thus, for the moment, the senate rested on a firmer support than it had enjoyed for years; it began to bestir itself again. With its approval and support a proposal was submitted to the people, permitting the return of Cicero. An unusual number of good citizens, especially from the country towns, attended on the day of voting, August 4, 57 B.C., and the journey of the orator from Brundisium to Rome was made the occasion of a brilliant demonstration in favor of the senate and the constitution. Pompeius was helpless, and his helplessness disarmed the party in the senate favorable to the regents. Had the senate possessed a leader their cause might even yet have won; they might have canceled the extraordinary powers as unconstitutional, and summoned all the republicans of Italy to arm against the tyrants. But the necessary leader was wanting, and the aristocracy were too indolent to take so simple and bold a resolution. They preferred to side with Pompeius against Caesar, in the hope that a rupture between the two was inevitable; and to settle matters with Pompeius, after victory, might be expected to be no very difficult matter. It seemed natural that an alliance between Pompeius and the republicans should be formed, but the matter was brought to a test when, in the autumn of 57 B.C., Pompeius came before the senate with a proposal to intrust him with extraordinary official power. His proposal was based upon the price of corn in the capital, which had again reached an oppressive height, owing to the continuance of piracy and the negligence of the government in supervising the supply. He wished to be intrusted with the superintendence of all matters relating to corn supply throughout the whole empire, and for this purpose to be invested with unlimited control over the state treasure, with an army and fleet, and with powers superior to those of the ordinary governor in every province; and to this command he hoped that the conduct of the impending Egyptian war would naturally be added. The senate accepted the proposal in principle with outward obsequiousness, but made alterations which seriously curtailed the general's authority. Pompeius obtained no unlimited power, but merely certain large sums and fifteen adjutants for the purpose of organizing due supplies for the capital, and, in all matters relating to grain supply only, full proconsular power throughout the empire for five years. The decree of the senate was ratified |