52 B.C. Milo was the great rival of Clodius in the game of the streets, the Hector to the Achilles of Clodius. As Clodius was on the side of the regents, Milo was of course for the republic; and Cato and his friends supported his candidature in return. In a chance skirmish between the rival bands on the Appian Way, not far from the capital, Clodius was wounded and carried into a neighboring house, from which he was afterwards dragged to be murdered by Milo's orders. The adherents of the triumvirs saw here an opportunity for thwarting the candidature of Milo, and carrying the dictatorship of Pompeius. The bloody corpse was exposed in the Forum, speeches were made, and a riot broke forth. The mob set fire to the senate-house, and then besieged the residence of Milo till they were repulsed by his band. They then saluted Pompeius as dictator and his candidates as consuls; and when the interrex, Marcus Lepidus, refused to hold the elections at once, he was blockaded in his house for five days. Pompeius certainly desired the dictatorship, but he would not take it at the hands of a mob. He brought up troops to put down the anarchy in the city, and then demanded the dictatorship from the senate. To escape the name of dictator, this body, on the motion of Cato and Bibulus, perpetrated a double absurdity, and appointed the proconsul Pompeius "consul without colleague." "2 Pompeius at once proceeded energetically to use his powers. against the republican party in their strongholds, the electioneering clubs, and the jury courts. B.C. The existing election laws were repeated and enforced; and a special law, which prescribed increased penalties for electioneering intrigues, was endowed with retrospective force as far back as 70 The governorships were to be conferred on the consuls and pretors, not as heretofore, immediately on their retirement from office, but after an interval of five years. The years which must. elapse before this arrangement could be brought into action were to be provided for by special decrees of the senate from time to time-a course which put the provinces for the next few years at the disposal of the person or persons whose influence might be supreme in the senate. The liberty of the law courts was curtailed by limiting the number of advocates and the time of speaking allowed to each; and the custom of bringing forward laudatores 2 Consul means colleague, and a consul who is at the same time a proconsul is at once an actual consul and a consul's substitute. 52 B.C. as witnesses to character was prohibited. The senate decreed that the country was in danger, owing to the disturbances connected with the affair on the Appian Way, and accordingly a commission was appointed by a special law to inquire into all offenses connected with the affray, the members being nominated by Pompeius. At the same time all the men capable of service in Italy were called to arms, and made to swear allegiance to Pompeius; troops were stationed at the Capitol, and the place where the trial respecting the murder of Clodius was going on was surrounded by soldiers. By these measures opposition was checked, but not, of course, destroyed. The reins were drawn tighter and the republican party was humbled. Milo was condemned by the jurymen, and Cato's candidature for the consulship frustrated. But many mischances occurred through the maladroitness of Pompeius; he was attempting an impossible task-to play at once the parts of impartial restorer of law and order and of party chief. Thus he allowed many subordinate persons belonging to the republican party to be acquitted by the commission, and looked on in silence while every man who had taken part for Clodius-that is for the regents-in the late riots was condemned. At the same time he violated his own laws by appearing as a laudator for his friend Plancus, and by protecting from condemnation several persons specially connected with himself, such as Metellus Scipio. Still, the regents were on the whole satisfied, and the public acquiesced, even to celebrating the recovery of Pompeius from a serious illness with demonstrations of joy. On August 1, 52 B.C., Pompeius laid down his special command and chose Metellus Scipio as his colleague. Chapter XXXI CRASSUS AND THE RUPTURE BETWEEN POMPEIUS AND CAESAR. 54-49 B.C. F OR years Marcus Crassus had been reckoned one of the regents of Rome without any claim to be so considered. But after the conference at Luca his position was changed: Caesar had allowed the consulship and the governorship of Syria to be assigned to him, in order to counterbalance the great concessions he found it advisable to make to Pompeius; and at the close of his consulship Crassus had an opportunity, as governor of Syria, of attaining, through the Parthian war, the position acquired by Caesar in Gaul. Avarice and ambition combined to inspire him, at the age of sixty, with all the ardor of youth. He arrived in Syria early in 54 B.C., having left Rome even before the close of his consulship, eager to add the riches of the East to those of the West, and to achieve military glory as rapidly as Caesar and with as little trouble as Pompeius. The Parthian war had already begun. Pompeius had not respected his engagements with regard to the frontier, and had wrested provinces from the empire to confer them upon Armenia. Accordingly, after the death of King Phraates, his son Mithradates declared war upon Armenia. This was, of course, a declaration of war against Rome, and Gabinius, the governor of Syria, soon led his troops across the Euphrates. But meantime Mithradates had been dethroned by the grandees of the empire with the vizier at their head, and Orodes now reigned in his stead. Mithradates took refuge with the Romans; but at this juncture Gabinius was ordered by the regents to restore the king of Egypt to Alexandria by force of arms, and he had to give up the Parthian war for the present. But he induced Mithradates to make war on his own account, and the prince was supported by the cities of Seleucia and Babylon. Soon afterwards, however, Seleucia was captured by storm, Babylon was reduced to surrender, and Mithradates was captured and put to death. Gabinius, who had finished the Egyptian campaign, 54-53 B.C. was on the eve of resuming operations against the Parthians when Crassus arrived in Syria and relieved him of the command. Crassus spent the summer of 54 B.C. in levying troops and contributions, and in making an extensive reconnaissance. The Euphrates was crossed and a victory won at Ichnae; garrisons were placed in several of the neighboring towns, and then the troops returned to Syria. This reconnaissance determined the Romans to march against the Parthians straight across the Mesopotamian desert, rather than by the circuitous route through Armenia; for the numerous Greek and half-Greek towns in the region of the Tigris and Euphrates were found ready at once to shake off the Parthian yoke. Next year, 53 B.C., the Euphrates was again crossed, and after some deliberation it was decided to march across the desert to the Tigris rather than down the Euphrates to Seleucia, where the two rivers are but a few miles apart. The Roman army consisted of seven legions, four thousand cavalry, and four thousand slingers and archers. For many days they marched, and no enemy appeared. At length, not far from the River Balissus, some horsemen of the enemy were descried in the distance. The Arab prince Abgarus of Edessa, who had been loud in his protestations of loyalty, and who had been mainly instrumental in determining Crassus to adopt the desert route, was sent out to reconnoiter. The enemy disappeared, followed by Abgarus and his men; and after a long interval it was resolved to advance, in the hope of coming upon the enemy. The river was crossed and the army was led rapidly forward, when suddenly the drums of the Parthians were heard, their silken gold-embroidered banners were seen waving, and their helmets and coats of mail blazing in the sun; and by the side of the Parthian vizier stood Abgarus and his Bedouins. The Romans saw at once the net in which they were ensnared. The whole Parthian army consisted of cavalry; the vizier had seen that no Oriental infantry could cope with that of Rome, and had dispensed with the army altogether. The mass of his troops were mounted archers, while the line was formed of heavy cavalry, armed with long thrusting lances, and protected-man and horseby armor formed of leather or of metal plates. The Roman infantry were quite unable to bring such an enemy to a close engagement, and, even if they had been able, these ironclad hosts would probably have been more than a match for them. In the 53 B.C. desert every advantage was on the side of the enemy and none on that of the Romans. The strength of the Roman system of warfare lay in the close order in which the legions fought, and in the custom of forming entrenched camps, which made every encampment a fortification. But the close order now only served to make them an easier mark for their enemies' missiles, and in the desert ditches and ramparts could often hardly be formed. It is curious that the irresistible superiority of the Roman infantry led the enemies of Rome at about the same time, in widely different parts of the world, to meet it, and meet it successfully, by the same means-by the use of cavalry and missiles. The Parthian vizier was only carrying out on a larger scale, and under infinitely more favorable conditions, what had been completely successful under Cassivelaunus in Britain, and partially successful under Vercingetorix in Gaul. Under such conditions the first battle between Romans and Parthians was fought in the desert, about thirty miles south of Carrhae. The Roman archers, who began the attack, were driven back; the legions, which were in their usual close order, were soon outflanked and overwhelmed by the archers of the enemy. In order that they might not be completely surrounded, Publius Crassus, the same who had served with such distinction under Caesar in Gaul, advanced with a select corps of cavalry, archers, and infantry. The Parthians retreated, hotly pursued, but when completely out of sight of the main army of the Romans the heavy cavalry made a stand and soon completely surrounded the band of Crassus. All the valor of the Romans and of their leader was in vain; they were driven to a slight eminence, where their destruction was completed. Crassus and many of his officers put themselves to death; out of the whole number of six thousand only five hundred were taken prisoners; not one was able to escape. Meanwhile the main army was left comparatively unmolested, but when it advanced to discover the fate of the detached corps the head of the young Crassus was displayed on a pole before his father's eyes, and the terrible onslaught was at the same time renewed. Night alone put an end to the slaughter. Fortunately the Parthians retired from the field to bivouac; and the Romans seized the opportunity to retreat to Carrhae. They left the wounded and the stragglers said to have been four thousand in number on the field, and as the Parthians stayed to massacre these, and the inhabitants of Carrhae marched forth in haste to succor the fugitives, |