53-51 B.C.

the remnant of the army was saved from destruction. But the Romans, either from want of provisions or from the precipitation of Crassus, soon set out from Carrhae and marched towards the Armenian mountains. Marching by night and resting by day the main body arrived at Sinnaca, within a day's march of safety. There the vizier came to offer peace and friendship, and to propose a conference between the two generals. The offer was accepted and terms were discussed; a richly caparisoned horse was produced—a present from the king to Crassus, and as the servants of the vizier crowded to assist the Roman general to mount, the suspicion arose among the Roman officers that it was a design to seize the person of their leader. Octavius snatched a sword from a Parthian and stabbed the groom. In the tumult which followed all the Roman officers were killed, Crassus refused to survive as a prisoner, and the whole Roman force left behind in the camp was either captured or dispersed. Only one small body, which had broken off from the main force, and some straggling bands found their way back to Syria. Ten thousand Roman prisoners were settled in the oasis of Merv; one-half of the whole force had perished.

This disaster to the Roman arms seemed likely to shake the very foundations of the Roman power in the East. Armenia became completely dependent upon Parthia, and the Hellenic cities were again enslaved. More than this, the Parthians prepared to cross the Euphrates and to dislodge the Romans from Syria. But, fortunately for Rome, the leaders on each side had changed. The vizier was executed by the Sultan Orodes, and the command of the invading army given to the young Prince Pacorus, while the ad interim command of Syria was assumed by the able questor Gaius Cassius. For two years the Parthians sent only flying bands, which were easily repulsed. Owing to the negligence of the Roman government the great Parthian invasion, which came at last in 51 B.C., found nothing to oppose it but two weak legions which Cassius had formed from the remains of the army of Crassus, and which could, of course, do nothing to oppose the advance. However, under an ordinary general the Parthians were no more formidable than any other Oriental army; and though the Syrian command soon devolved upon the incapable Bibulus, nothing was effected by the invaders, and Pacorus soon came to an agreement with the Roman commander, and turned his arms against his father Orodes instead. It is an ominous sign of the times that the national disasters Hist. Nat. III

22

54-53 B.C. of Carrhae and Sinnaca attracted almost less attention at Rome than the pitiful brawl upon the Appian Way. But it is hardly wonderful; the breach between the regents was now becoming imminent. Like the boat of the ancient Greek mariners' tale, the vessel of the Roman community now found itself, as it were, between two rocks swimming towards each other; expecting every moment the crash of collision, those whom it was bearing, tortured by nameless anguish gazed into the eddying surge that rose higher and higher and were benumbed; and while every slightest movement there attracted a thousand eyes, not one ventured to give a glance to the right or left.

After the conference at Luca it seemed that the division of power was made on a basis sufficiently firm to ensure its endurance, provided that both parties were disposed to act in good faith. This was the case with Caesar, at any rate during the interval necessary for the completion of his Gallic conquests; but probably Pompeius was never even provisionally in earnest about the collegiate scheme. Still, though he never meant to acknowledge Caesar's equality with himself, the idea of breaking with him formed itself but slowly in his mind. In 54 B.C. the death of Julia, followed closely by that of her child, destroyed the personal bond between the rivals; and when Pompeius refused Caesar's overtures for fresh marriage connections, and himself married the daughter of Quintus Metellus Scipio, the breach had unmistakably begun. Still the political alliance remained, and Pompeius, after the disaster of Aduatuca in 54 B.C., lent Caesar one of his Italian legions, while Caesar gave his consent and support to the dictatorship of Pompeius. But as soon as the latter found himself in a position completely outweighing in influence that of Caesar, and when all the men of military age in Italy had tendered their military oath to himself personally, it became clear that he had made up his mind to a rupture. The proceedings of the dictatorship told largely against the partisans of Caesar. This might have been accident; but when Pompeius selected for his colleague in office his dependent Metellus Scipio instead of Caesar, still more when he got his governorship of the two Spains prolonged for five years more, and a large sum of money assigned to him for the payment of troops, without procuring similar arrangements for Caesar, it was impossible to mistake his intention. Lastly, the new regulations as to the holding of governorships had the ulterior object of procuring Caesar's premature recall. No moment

53 B.C.

could have been more unfavorable to Caesar. In June, 53 B.C., the death of Crassus occurred-and Crassus had always been the closest ally of Caesar, and a bitter personal enemy of Pompeius. A few months later the Gallic insurrection broke out with renewed violence, and for the first time Caesar had to encounter an equal opponent in Vercingetorix. Pompeius was dictator of Rome and master of the senate; what might have occurred if, instead of intriguing obscurely against Caesar, he had boldly recalled him from Gaul?

The impending struggle was, of course, not between republic and monarchy, but between Pompeius and Caesar for the crown of Rome. Nevertheless, each of the rivals found it convenient to adopt one of the old party battle cries; neither dared to alienate from himself the mass of respectable conservative citizens, who desired the continuance of the republic, by openly aiming at monarchy. Caesar, of course, inscribed upon his banner, "The people and democratic progress." He had been from the outset an earnest democrat, and the monarchy meant to him something which differed in little but name from the Gracchan government of the people. To Caesar this subterfuge brought little advantage, except that he thus escaped the necessity of directly employing the name of king. But Pompeius, who, of course, proclaimed himself the champion of the aristocracy and of the legitimate constitution, gained besides a large and influential body of allies. In the first place, he rallied round him the whole republican party, and the majority, or, at any rate, the soundest part of the burgesses of Italy. Secondly, what was no mean advantage for so awkward a politician, it relieved him of the difficulty of finding a plausible pretext for provoking the war. His new allies would be willing enough to provoke a conflict with Caesar, and to intrust the conduct of the war to Pompeius, who would then come forward, in obedience to the general wish, as the protector of the constitution against the designs of anarchists and monarchists-as the regularly appointed general of the senate against the imperator of the streets.

Thus the republican party became once more a factor in the politics of Rome, owing to the rupture between the rulers. The heart and core of the republican opposition was the small circle of the followers of Cato, who were resolved to enter on the struggle against monarchy under any circumstances. The mass of the aristocracy, though averse to monarchy, desired, above all things,