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the eye of the law, at least, all arbitrary distinctions were abolished. The different gradations, which age, wisdom, and wealth always produce in society, were lessened by the system that pervaded Roman life. That system aimed rather at a uniform level of ability than at bringing into prominence those more highly gifted. Rich and poor alike lived frugal lives, avoiding even the luxury of silver plate. From the last war with Veii down to that against Pyrrhus, the farmers played a more important part than the old patriciate; the exploits of a plebeian, like Decius, and of a poor farmer, like Manius Curius, now began to take equal rank with, and even eclipse, those of the noblest aristocrat. But, great as the strides to this republican equality were, the government still remained aristocratic. The mere opening of state magistracies to the humblest and poorest burgess does not remove the difficulties which always hinder the rise of a man from the ranks. Moreover, a new aristocracy, consisting of the wealthy plebeians, had existed from the first, and now developed fresh powers. Their policy had always followed lines distinct from, and often opposed to, that of the plebs. This new aristocracy coalesced with the old patriciate, and largely adopted its views, and soon practically took its place. A natural result of this development was the rise of a new opposition. This new democratic party was formed no longer of plebeians, as such, but of the lower classes and the small farmers. But, fortunately for Rome, her struggles with foreign foes caused the leaders of the two new state parties to forego their quarrels in the face of a common danger; and thus we find the patrician Appius Claudius uniting with his personal foe, the farmer Manius Curius, for the purpose of crushing Pyrrhus. The breach was already formed; but the adversaries still shook hands across it.

Finally, let us consider what effect the political abolition of the old nobility had upon the relations between the burgesses, the magistrates, and the senate. Although the powers of the burgess assemblies were increased in certain directions, chiefly with respect to the number of magistrates nominated by them, they did not as a rule interfere with the administration of government. They kept a firm hold on their right to declare war, and occasionally settled disputes between the governing powers, when appealed to by the disputants, and in 390 B.C. they even annulled a decree of the senate. The Hortensian law probably marks the extension of the powers of the comitia tributa, which came to be consulted as to the conclu

390-265 B.C.

sion of peace and alliances. Still, the influence of these assemblies on public affairs towards the close of this period began to wane. This was mainly due to the extension of the bounds of Rome, whose burgess-body no longer composed a city, but a state. Thus the interest felt in their proceedings on ordinary occasions was comparatively slight, inasmuch as only those residing in the capital as a rule attended. Moreover, the magistrate who convoked the assembly could prevent all discussion; hence the assemblies became mere instruments in his hands, and played a passive part, neither helping nor hindering the administration of the government.

With regard to the Roman magistrates, a great loss of power was the outcome of party contests. The close of the struggle left the consular power subdivided and weakened. Jurisdiction, city police, election of senators and equites, the census and financial administration, were all transferred to magistrates elected by the community, and occupying a position coördinate with, rather than subordinate to, the consuls. In addition to this creation of collateral standing offices such as the pretorship, the senate now annually defined, though it did not directly assign, the different departments of the consuls; and the senate no longer allowed the consuls to conclude peace, without first receiving instructions from the assembled senators. Lastly, the senate could in emergencies sustain a consul by creating a dictator; and, although nominally designated by the consul, the consul-elect was, as a rule, really chosen by the senate. Even the dictator's power was no longer regarded as absolute and unlimited. The definition of the functions of the dictator, as of that of the consul and other magistrates, came to be regarded as a constitutional necessity. Thus we find in 363 B.C., and again in 351 B.C., a dictator appointed for a special and limited duty, such as the performance of a religious ceremony. Moreover, restrictions were imposed in 342 B.C. by plebiscites, enacting that no one should hold two magistracies in the same year, and that the same man should not hold the same office twice within

a period of ten years. Later, again, in 265 B.C., the Marcian law forbade anyone holding the censorship twice. Although the rule forbidding pluralism, i.e., the holding of two offices at the same time, was strictly observed, we frequently find instances of a relaxation of the other restriction. The change, which thus transformed the supreme power of the state into a limited magistracy with definite functions, also affected the tribunate. Now that this office

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had accomplished the purpose for which it had been used, by securing the abolition of the legal disabilities of the commons and of the privileges of the old nobility, the original object of the tribunate as counsel and protector of the humblest and weakest was as odious to the new plebeian aristocracy as it had been to the patrician. Therefore, under the new organization the office lost its old character of a weapon of opposition, and became an instrument of government. The tribunes no longer sat on a bench at the door of the senate-house, but took their seats by the side of the other magistrates, and took part in the discussions. Like the other acting magistrates, they did not during their year of office vote in the senate, but they had the right of convoking it, of consulting it, and of procuring decrees from it. Thus, by becoming magistrates of the state, the tribunes for the time lost their old revolutionary and obstructive character, and paved the way for the steady growth of the power of the new aristocracy; indeed, the tribunes were, as a rule, members of that body. Yet the preservation and the associations of the name of tribunate might well forbode danger in the future. For the moment, however, and for a long time to come, the aristocracy was so absolutely powerful, and so completely possessed control over the tribunate, that no trace is to be met with of a collegiate opposition on the part of the tribunes to the senate. What opposition did arise came from single independent tribunes, and was easily crushed, often by the aid of the tribune-college itself.

The real governing power became vested in the senate. The Ovinian law, probably passed soon after the Sexto-Licinian laws, regulated the composition of that body. All who had been curule ediles, pretors, or consuls became members. The action of the censors was in this way greatly restricted, although it was still their duty to fill up all the vacancies which remained after the abovementioned officers had been placed on the senatorial roll. Even in making this selection the censors were bound by oath to choose all the best citizens. Moreover, usage, if not law, seemed to have ordained that burgesses, who had filled a non-curule office, or who were eminent for personal valor, or who had saved the life of a fellow-citizen, should be selected for the honor. Those thus chosen by the censor voted, but took no part in debate. The main part of the senate, whose election was determined by the Ovinian law, and not by the selection of the censors, and who held the reins of government, were in this way indirectly elected by the people. The

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Roman government in this way made some approach to, although it did not reach, the great institution of modern times, representative popular government, while the aggregate of the non-debating senators furnished-what it is so necessary, and yet so difficult to get in governing corporations—a compact mass of members, capable of forming and entitled to pronounce an opinion, but voting in silence. No magistrate submitted a proposal to the people without, or in opposition to, the senate's opinion; if he did so, the senate, by means of the vetoing power of the magistrates and the annulling powers of the priests, easily thwarted him; and in extreme cases the senate could refuse to execute the decrees of the people. Through the presiding magistrate the senate practically exerted a paramount influence on the elections, and, as was shown above in the case of the consuls, bore no small part in settling what was to be the special sphere of the elected magistrates. Further, the senate acquired the right, which by law belonged only to the community, of extending the term of office to the consul or pretor, acting outside the city's limits; and the consul or pretor, whose term was thus prolonged, was said to be acting "in a consul's or pretor's stead" (pro consule, pro praetore). From the year 307 B.C. the term of the commander-in-chief was regularly prolonged by a mere decree of the senate. Finally, as regards administration, war, peace, and alliances, the founding of colonies, the assignation of lands, and the whole system of finance, the senate became practically supreme. Great as the powers intrusted to the senate were, the senate proved fully worthy of the trust. Although it is clear that the steps above described arrested the free action of the burgesses, and reduced the magistrates to mere executors of the senate's will, the assembly, by its ability to govern, justified its usurpation of power. Its members owed their position to merit and the people's choice, not to birth; those unworthy of their high position were liable to removal by the censors every fifth year. Their life-tenure of office freed them from the necessity of trimming their sails to the shifting breeze of public opinion, and gave them a complete control over the executive magistrates, whose office annually changed hands. This continuity of existence rendered possible a firm, unwavering, and patriotic foreign policy; and never was a state more firmly and worthily represented in its external relations than Rome in its best times by its senate. We cannot deny that, in matters of internal administration, the senate too

307-265 B.C.

often favored the selfish interests of the moneyed and landed aristocracy, which was largely represented in that body. But, when we consider its conduct as a whole, we must allow that the Roman senate was the noblest organ of the nation, and in consistency and political sagacity, in unanimity and patriotism, in grasp of power, and unwavering courage, the foremost political corporation of all times-still even now" an assembly of kings," which knew well how to combine despotic energy with republican self-devotion.