partiality? It is argued, that none of them deserved a crumb from Joseph, whom they had sold; and if he pleased to give to one and not to another, he had a right so to do. Then we say, he had a right to be partial. We are travelling through a large and extensive wood, and many miles from any inhabitants; we find ten persons who are lost; they have been out of provisions for several days; and having fatigued themselves, in wandering from hill to hill, from stream to stream, striving, to the utmost of their abilities, to find inhabitants; having given up all hopes of ever seeing their homes again, and having, in their minds, bid their wives and children a long farewell, they are waiting for hunger to do its last work! The moment we discover ourselves to them, with large supplies of wholesome and rich provisions, every eye glistens with unexpected joy; the current of life starts afresh in their veins, and they all advance to meet us on their enfeebled hands and knees, with eagerness to receive the staff of life! We hasten to improve the opportunity of showing our sovereignty and goodness; we feed five of them to the full, the other five, we neglect. They beg for the smallest crust, which we do not want but to no effect. Those whom we feed solicit us, every mouthful they eat, to bestow some on their fellow sufferers, but we refuse. We tell them, however, not to construe our conduct into partiality, but to learn our power and sovereignty by it. The five whom we have fed, we assist out of the wood and leave the rest to their wants!

We inquire still further, did the Almighty know, before he made man, that he would become a sinner? Did he know that he would deserve an endless punishment? If the answer be in the negative, it supposes God to be wanting in knowledge, and that he created be

ings at an infinite risk, as he did not know what would be the consequences. If the question be answered in the positive, it proves that an infinite cruelty existed in God; for unless that was the case, he would never have created beings, who, he knew, would be infinitely the losers by their existence.

Those who believe in the system which we are examining, believe in the existence of the Devil, whose existence we have refuted in this work. We are willing, however, for the sake of the argument, to admit the existence of their God, and Devil likewise. But wish to inquire, which of them is, in reality, the worst being. God, when he created mankind, perfectly knew that some of them would suffer endless torment, for their sins; he must, therefore, have intended them for that purpose. For, it is inconsistent to suppose, that the Almighty would create, without a purpose; and his purpose could not be contrary to his knowledge. The matter then stands thus, God created millions of beings for endless misery, which they could not escape; the Devil is desirous of having them miserable and does all in his power to effect it. Now, reader, judge between these two beings. Had this Devil been consulted, by the Almighty, when he laid the plan of man's final destiny, we cannot conceive him capable of inventing one more eligible to his infernal disposition, than this which we are now disputing.

As reason will not consent to the plan of God, as described in the foregoing scheme, we will show that the scriptures equally oppose it. It is granted, that Jesus Christ died for mankind, as the scriptures declare; but not in the way, in which thousands have believed. But supposing he died instead of the sinner, in the way which we dispute, we still wish to prove, that he died for the whole of Adam's posteri

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ty, as much as he did for any. If Isaiah did not believe that that would be the case, we cannot reconcile his words to his opinion, which we find in chap. liii. ver. 5, 6. "But he was wounded for our transgressions, he was brusied for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed. All we, like sheep, have gone astray: We have turned every one to his own way; and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all.' St. Paul must have been of this opinion, when he wrote to Timothy, or his words are his belief. See 1 Tim. ii. 5, 6. God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; who gave himself a ransom for all to be testified in due time." 1 Epistle General of John ii. 1, 2. "My little children, these things write I unto you, that ye sin not, and if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ, the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." Hebrews ii. 9. "But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels, for the sufferings of death, now crowned with glory and honor; that he, by the grace of God, should taste death for every man." The above scriptures, with their connexions and corresponding passages, as fully prove that Christ died for ALL men, as any one thing can be proved from the bible. Now, as there is not, in all the scripture, a single hint to the reverse of these passages which we have introduced, it appears strange and unaccountable to me, that any person, who professes to believe the testimony of the bible, should ever have entertained the idea, that what these passages say, is false, and that which is not said, in contradiction to what is, is true!

Look, ye readers, and submit to astonishment, at what has been believed in, as divine truth. An almighty, infinitely wise and good being, creates an innumerable multitude of rational intelligences; they rebel against him, and raise an infinite dissatsifaction in his mind toward them; this infinite dissatisfaction gets removed toward part of the offenders, by the sacrifice. of innocence! With the rest, God is still displeased ; yet, he is almighty and infinitely wise and employs his power and wisdom to make the works of his own hand as miserable as their natures will bear, for being just such creatures as he knew they would be, before he made them. But it is argued, that God's knowing what sort of creatures men would be did not influence them in the smallest degree, to be what they are. Let this argument be granted. But did not God know what would influence men to be what they are? Answer, yes. Was it in his power to remove this influential cause? If it were, why did he not do it, if it were like to displease him? If it were not in his power to prevent the mischief, we wish to know whether it were in the creature's power to prevent it? If it were not in the power of either of them to prevent the operation of things in the way in which they have, and do take place why is God's anger so warm against his poor impotent offspring? It seems an unhappy circumstance, for both Creator and creature. The Creator is not satisfied with his creatures; his creatures find themselves introduced into an existence infinitely worse than none. We are born into this world of sorrow and trouble; the first vibration of sense is want; we endeavor to supply our wants, and to maintain our existence, which our Maker has bestowed upon us; but as soon as we come to years of understanding,we are told of an infi

nite debt which stands against us, which we owed thousands of years before we were born; and that our Maker is so angry with us, and has been ever since the debt was due, that he has prepared a furnace of endless flames to torment us in, according to the due requirements of justice! My father gives me his farm, and puts me in possession of it; I am pleased, and prize it very highly. In consequence of my possession, I paint to myself many pleasing prospects; but, to my mortification, a person comes and presents me with a mortgage of my farm, for five times its value, the mortgage running so as to hold the possessor to clear it; I will leave the reader to say, whether my father was kind or unkind. Yet, the circumstance into which the Almighty has introduced millions of his creatures, is infinitely worse according to the doctrine which we are examining. It is argued, with much assurance, that God has a just right to do with his creatures as he pleases, because he has it in his power so to do; and that he never does any thing, because it is right; but what he does, is right, because he does it.

If the above statement be just, moral holiness consists in the power of action, and not in the disposition that designs the action. If so, our argument in favor of sin's existing only in the design of the actor, and not in the action, is groundless; and we are driven to say, that unholiness, or sin, is the want of power to perform an action; and holiness consists in hav ing the power to do it. One man designs to murder another for his money, he makes the attempt, and fails; his sin consisted in not having power to execute his design; but, in the design, there is no evil. On the other hand, he makes the attempt, and succeeds; here is no evil at all, because he had power to do it.