An attempt to show my countrymen that not even a Nelson might be able to save us from defeat by FAMINE, is the sole object of, and excuse for, this book.

APPENDIX.

PRINCE BISMARCK AND THE POSITION OF ENGLAND.

(FROM THE Standard's CORRESPONDENT.)

Berlin, July 20, 1896.

Prince Bismarck's paper, the Hamburger Nachrichten, which has recently been giving the world its views on International affairs generally, publishes an article on England to-day, and heads it "English Anxieties." The principal passages of this effusion I give, in deference to the quarter from which it is supposed to be inspired. The writer says―

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'English policy is governed by anxiety about the conflict which England must fight out with Russia and France. France is striving for the Soudan, Russia for India, and as England is their common antagonist in these aspirations, they are natural allies even without a treaty. Egypt is of great strategic importance to England's position both in the Soudan and in India, and is, therefore, now the pivot of British policy, the anxieties of which have been not a little enhanced by Russia's recent attitude towards the Egyptian question. England will not give up Egypt, but does not feel herself a match for Russia and France, and is, therefore, casting about for help-hitherto, and, let us hope, in future, in vain, so far as Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary, are concerned. As regards Italy, the case is somewhat different. England and Italy have large common interests against France, because she threatens both in the Mediterranean. In case of need, the British Fleet is to protect the Italian coast, but Italy

cannot offer any counter-service, and England does nothing gratis. It is known why Italy's withdrawal from the Triple Alliance cannot be a matter of indifference to her allies, and it may be assumed that an Italy completely under the influence of England might threaten such withdrawal in order to effect secret alterations in the Triple Alliance Treaty, extending the casus foederis to all violations of her Mediterranean interests which are identical with those of England. We presume that all such attempts will be rigorously repelled, for otherwise a situation would be created which would bring the Triple Alliance into collision with France and Russia. England would be in a position to exult over that, for she would once more have found the big stupid strong fellow who fights her enemies in her stead. This would be bad for us. History teaches that England, being safe from war in virtue of her insular position, would once more utilize the mutual conflict of the fatally bleeding Continental States for a piece of Europe as an opportunity of developing her commerce and industry, annexing whole countries in other continents, and finally robbing her exhausted allies of the fruits of their victories by calmly going over to the enemy. A wise policy must, therefore, take care that we hold aloof from England's conflict with France and Russia, which will not seek war with us, when fighting England in three Continents, and that we should reserve our strength in order to be able to throw it into the scale when things come to be rearranged.

"But the British are tormented by another anxiety. They no longer believe entirely in the unassailability of their European Island Empire, for, whereas many things have changed elsewhere in the last decades, England's system of defence is still the same as in Wellington's time. It suffices for non-European countries. In view of the world-wide extent of her interests, she must have more ships on foreign coasts than Russia and France. But the Power or Powers which preponderate where the conflict must be decided-that is, in the Channel and the North Sea-will be victorious. But the French Channel Fleet alone is already a match for the English, and its junction with the Russian Baltic Fleet would put an end to England's superiority in the waters in which the conflict must be decided. Add to this that just her insular position involves the danger of England being starved out by the enemy so that she must unconditionally surrender, if a victorious hostile fleet should succeed in cutting off her supplies. England has not ignored this danger, and is, therefore,

working diligently at the task of increasing her Navy to such an extent that it will be superior under all circumstances. If she maintain her superiority at sea, her antagonists must try to convert the sea war as quickly as possible into a land war, and to seek a decision where all the nerves of the World-Empire meet— that is, in London. The essay entitled, Attempts to Invade England,' by Baron Lüttwitz, a Prussian officer of the General Staff, expresses the opinion that the question of the possibility of such an invasion must be answered in the affirmative. The attempt to invade England is still, indeed, a risky, but no longer an impossible enterprise."

The article concludes by saying that—

"The possibility of an invasion is not of burning interest at present, but the above description of the situation will suffice to explain several striking symptoms of the nervousness of the present British policy."

It will be seen that Prince Bismarck quotes the opinion of Captain Lüttwitz, of the German General Army Staff, as to the possibility of invading England. I have only recently been able to obtain a sight of Captain Lüttwitz's paper, which ran through one or two numbers of the Militär- Wochenblatt-the official organ of the German army and navy. The paper is a well-written account of invasions and attempted invasions of Great Britain and Ireland. In my chapter entitled "A Menace to other Nations" I have given reasons for thinking that we might find ourselves at war with Germany, France, and Russia, and to me much the most important and significant thing in Captain Lüttwitz's article are his opening words

"Russia, France, Germany, and Italy have of late years progressed with more or less success in the domain of Colonial extension; it is not impossible that respect for their mutual world-wide interests may banish the spectre of a European Continental war which has threatened since 1871."

In other words, he thinks France and Germany might join Russia against us. I had not seen his paper when I made the same suggestion. His view, briefly stated, is that if the three countries named attacked our Channel Fleet, they could at any rate so lame

it as to get time to throw an army into England, then a rapid march on London, and it would only need a little judicious pressure to bring us to terms, to include the division of our fleet and colonies among them. A pleasing picture-from the Continental point of

"Those who think that the millennium has begun, because there is some chance of a Treaty of Arbitration between this country and America, should read an article entitled, "Arbitration and the Colonies," which appeared in the National Review for January, 1897. I give the following extracts and criticism of it from an article in the Daily Graphic, January 8, 1897 :

"Colonial,' who writes in the New Review for January, 1897, on 'Arbitration and the Colonies,' gives a summary of what this means of settling disputes has done in the past-of what it is likely to do in the future. Excellent in theory, it is too ideal to be practical, and it has almost invariably been unfavourable to the interests of England, even when right was so clearly on her side as to make it a matter for surprise that she went to arbitration at all.'

'For, with the exception of the award on the Alabama Claims, boundary and other disputes between Great Britain and foreign countries have been settled by arbitration at the expense of Newfoundland, Canada, and South Africa. And it has never dawned across the arbitrationist intelligence that these Colonies have also a right to consideration on the question. . . . Arbitration is, no doubt, a lofty ideal, but to Britons Imperialism should be one loftier still. The one, however, demands sacrifices from Englishmen at home as well as abroad: the other demands them only from Colonials. Hence the popularity of arbitration.'

Arguments have been strongly urged lately in favour of a permanent treaty for the settlement of future disputes between England and the United States, but 'Colonial' wants to have none of them. After one memorable treaty Canada, whose southern boundary had until then been the Ohio River,