We have, as a result of this recent recall, found several areas in which our Reserve components program can be improved. I should like to briefly cover the actions which preceded the recall.

All our estimates last summer indicated that it might be necessary to have immediately available a much larger active duty force than was then available.

The President requested and was given authority to recall up to 250,000 Reserve component personnel for up to 1 year. Why was this necessary and how did we arrive at the units which should be recalled?

Take the Army alone as an example. While the Army had, on paper, 14 divisions, only 11 were combat ready. The remaining three were training divisions, involved in recruit training. Of the 11 combat-ready divisions, 5 were deployed in Europe, 2 in Korea, and 1 was spread between Hawaii and Okinawa, leaving 3, the 4th Infantry Division, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division, available in the Strategic Army Corps for use. It was estimated that 16 combat-ready Army divisions were required to meet the international situation, 5 more than were currently available. The question then was how to secure these forces in the time available.

The Army could relieve its training divisions of their training mission and begin a program of accelerated training to ready three additional divisions for combat. These units could become combat ready very early since a relatively large cadre of well-trained personnel was available in the units. Through the use of recruits then in basic training to build up the permanent strength, processing time and training time could be reduced substantially. This action was taken. A gap of two divisions remained between the number of divisions available and the number required.

There are two ways of closing such a gap, only one of which would have met the requirements in the time period available. Two divisions could have been formed and trained, making use of drafted personnel with the cadre coming from the Active Forces. Such divisions would not have completed training, even with an accelerated program until late summer or early fall of this year. In addition, to provide a sufficient cadre would have lowered the combat readiness of the remainder of the Army divisions at the very time the maximum readiness was required.

The second method, the calling of Reserve component divisions was adopted. For a moment I should like to discuss what was accomplished by the Army buildup.

Units totaling approximately 119,000 in authorized strength were called. As I have indicated, these consisted of the 32d Infantry Division, a National Guard division from Wisconsin; the 49th Armored Division from Texas, also National Guard-both National Guard elements; the 100th Training Division, a Reserve unit from Kentucky, and many combat and service-support units. I think there is one other major formation that should be indicated. There is an armored cavalry regiment from West Virginia, a National Guard unit.

The two National Guard divisions provided us with our 15th and 16th divisions. They entered on an accelerated training program designed to develop combat readiness at an early date. For the record, these units performed in a magnificent fashion, attaining their com

bat-readiness posture approximately 8 months sooner than newly formed divisions could have.

The 100th Training Division was required to establish a new training center. This unit absorbed a portion of the mission previously performed by the three divisions of the Active Army which were placed on an accelerated training program. In order to open Fort Chaffee as a training center and Fort Polk for the 49th Armored Division, two U.S. Army garrison units from the Army Reserve and the necessary supporting units such as a station hospital, were called to duty.

The Active Army, in order to have a balanced force capable of being employed anywhere in the world, required additional combat-support and service-support units. As an example, four National Guard tank battalions, an armored cavalry regiment, engineer combat battalions, and a large number of field artillery units were required. These were procured from the Reserve components, again because of the time period required to form and train new units.

Continuing with the Army: The draft calls were increased substantially to 25,000 for the month of September 1961, and 20,000 for the month of October. Even before these increased draft calls, the Selective Service System had been requested to deliver a larger number than originally requested for August. Since this has some bearing on future discussion I have provided a table indicating the draft calls and number delivered for last half of calendar year 1961 and the calls for 1962 up to the most recent. If it is satisfactory, I will insert this in the record here rather than read all the figures. Selective Service induction quotas

Mr. HÉBERT. You don't have to read the figures. It is all right. Secretary RUNGE. As you will see, the increased draft provided a substantial increase to the Active Army. After passage of Public Law 87-117 all personnel whose tours of duty would have expired were involuntarily extended, an action sanctioned by Public Law 87117. As is now evident to you, we then had this situation during the latter months of calendar 1961. No personnel were leaving the Army but rather large numbers were coming in. Our enlistment and reenlistment rates also rose substantially.

What did this condition provide us? We increased the strength of the Active Army over 100,000 during the last 6 months of 1961. We also recalled about 113,000 ready reservists. It is not pure chance that these two figures are so close.

Those personnel who entered the Army by the draft and by enlistment in the months of the buildup received their basic training and

were utilized to activate two new divisions for the Active Army, as well as other new units necessary for an expanded Army. In effect, these are the two divisions which we could have formed instead of calling two Reserve component divisions. However, as announced by the President on February 14, their training as divisions will not be completed until August and September.

I should say for the record that those two units are the 1st Armored Division, now in training at Fort Hood, Tex., and the 5th Division, Mechanized, training at Fort Carson, Colo.

Those two units are the 15th and 16th Divisions, for the Active Army, and the 32d and the 49th Armored Divisions have been filling that role and will continue to fill that role until August, at which time the 1st Armored and the 5th Division, Mechanized, will be ready for duty.

In the meantime, as I have said, we have had the 16 divisions available for use if needed through the recall of the National Guard formations.

One of the problems applies to the recall of personnel in all the services but can best be discussed in connection with the Army recall. The President announced on July 25 the seriousness of the international situation. Authority was requested from the Congress for the recall of 250,000 ready reservists and the hearings on Joint Resolution 120 and debate in the Congress developed rather fully the need. Public Law 87-117 was overwhelmingly approved by the Congress and we believed that there was a general understanding and acceptance that the recall action was necessary to build up the Active Force for a crisis which was upon the Nation.

Apparently many reservists and citizens of the country believed that the recall was for training only and would last for only 2 or 3 months. This was not the case. These units were recalled to be trained, it is true. Obviously they could become combat ready much quicker in an active status than in a reserve status. The primary purpose for the recall was to build up our active combat potential and to accomplish this, the units were required to remain on active duty as a portion of the shield behind which we could mobilize and train other units.

Recent events in the case of the Army point up this intent. A second corps-the 3d Corps-has been established and instead of one Strategic Army Corps of three divisions which existed last September, we now have two corps, the 18th and the 3d Corps-each with four combat-ready divisions. Our Strategic Reserve has more than doubled. Two of the divisions in this Reserve are the two National Guard divisions now on duty, whose place will be taken later this year by the two new Active Army divisions.

With respect to other units of the Army Reserve which were recalled, it should be recognized that when we speak of two divisions, we are in reality speaking of two division forces. As you gentlemen know, a division does not fight alone. In addition, the Active Army required reinforcement, particularly in the support field and other of the recalled Reserve units, are performing this task.

As you will recall, the authorized strength of the Active Army for fiscal year 1961 was 870,000. The budget for fiscal year 1962, the last budget of the previous administration, provided for an end strength of 870,000. The budget proposed by this administration for

fiscal year 1963 plans an end strength for the Army of 960,000, an increase of 90,000.

If I may, I should like to summarize our actions with respect to the Army: 113,000 reservists were recalled to man Reserve component units totaling 119,000 in authorized strength. Remaining spaces were filled by Active Army members to obviate the necessity for recalling additional fillers.

The strength of the Active Army was increased by 90,000 spaces to make possible the replacement of the reservists as rapidly as new accessions to the Army could be trained.

We increased the draft and increased our rate of enlistment and reenlistment to secure the personnel to fill the revised Active Army strength.

Three Active Army divisions were relieved of their training mission and placed on an accelerated training program to become combat ready.

In order to retain the skills existing in the Active Army, personnel whose tours of duty would have expired were extended.

Navy and Air Force: I have discussed the Army at such length due to the size of the Army recall as opposed to that of the Department of the Navy and Department of the Air Force. The same general discussion applies to these services.

Active Navy strength has been increased from the 625,000 planned by the previous administration for fiscal year 1962 to 665,000 and the Active Air Force strength has increased to 868,000 from the planned fiscal year 1962 strength of 823,000. This increase was for the purpose of increasing combat potential and as you well know, many of the recalled Navy and Air Force units were deployed early in the buildup, the destroyers of the Navy Reserve joining the fleet and some Air Force Reserve component units moving to Europe.

All the recalled Reserve component units are now part of the defense team and in the case of the Army, all Reserve component units recalled have been designated as part of the Strategic Army Command except for units totaling 4,712 in strength. Those 4,712 men make up the 100th Training Division and support units which opened Fort Chaffee and Fort Polk.

Selection of units: Moving on to another problem in our recent action, I will discuss the two together since they are interrelated.

As you will recall, there was a sense of urgency last summer. The President spoke to the Nation on July 25, and on July 26 requested authority to recall 250,000 Ready reservists. Hearings on this request were conducted and the bill was presented to the President 5 days later for approval. In order to develop the troop list of units to be called, a number of assumptions had to be made and the troop lists were developed in a minimum of time. As a result, numerous changes were required between the initial list and that finally announced.

Time was not sufficient to check each detail and although I will again use the Army with its larger recall as an example for discussion, I should point out that the Air Force made several changes to its proposed list between the initial actions and final announcement.

The Navy, with a somewhat simpler problem, experienced little difficulty. Their recall was for one purpose-the strengthening of our antisubmarine warfare capability. Approximately 8,000 reserv

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ists of the ASW component of the Navy's Selected Reserve were recalled. They reported to active duty in the 40 ASW ships and 18 ASW air squadrons in which they had been training regularly as units. No excessive period of training was required to attain operational readiness. Their only problem was to update some of the older equipment in these ships and aircraft.

The Air Force and the Army had another problem and the problems of these two services are closely related. A crisis threatened in Berlin and no one could foresee the future turn that might take place there or the eventual involvement as a result of conflict in Europe. As you will recall, there was the distinct possibility of added tensions to the south and our commitments in southeast Asia as well as Korea and other areas of the Pacific required our being prepared for any contingency. This required the reinforcement of the Army as I have discussed earlier. However, the Active Air Force, in order to provide the required support to the Army, found it necessary to call units to duty and this increased capability was, of necessity, tailored to meet several contingencies.

The Air Force had a much less problem than did the Army and I have therefore elected to use the Army as an example again. Three major actions had to be accomplished.

First, a troop list of the units required for the buildup was required. This involved the development of a troop list to meet crises in several areas of the world. The Active Army Forces needed reinforcement and two additional divisions and supporting forces were needed. To cite only three examples of problems in this field which have received some attention in press reports. The recall troop list included a Logistical Command, certain Army Security Agency units and civil affairs units. The question has been raised as to why these type units were called. Visualize for a moment, if you will, a major crisis in southeast Asia requiring the commitment of a substantial U.S. force. There did not exist in the Active Army sufficient units of the type mentioned above to support such an operation and to maintain a force for another area. The Army then was required to develop a capability for such employment. Unfortunately, the public seems to have thought of the crisis as involving Berlin only and it is true that many of the units might not have been added for use in Europe alone. The crisis existed in many areas, however, and it was for possible involvement in many areas that the units were needed.

The second action involved the matching of the troop list with units in the Reserve components. I would like to discuss this at some length in an attempt to provide you with the information I believe you would be interested in having.

There are over 8,000 units in the Army Reserve components. These units vary from division-size to detachments with fewer than 10 individuals. The 8,000 units are scattered throughout the 50 States and Puerto Rico. The troop list of required units involved approximately 500 units of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. The two divisions presented no great problem of selection although certainly a decision had to be made between divisions. The purpose, of course, was to secure divisions which could be ready in a minimum of time, and that meant in the greatest possible strength of readiness.