1 Section 269, title 10, U.S.C. provides that after a combined total of 5 years of active duty (other than for training) and satisfactory service in the Ready Reserve, individuals subject to the 6-year obligation may request transfer to the Standby Reserve for the remaining 1 year of obligated service. As a matter of equity, Army authorizes transfer to the Standby Reserve of those with 2 or more years active duty if their combined active service and participation in the Ready Reserve unit totals 4 years.

2 Section 262, AFRA of 1952, as amended, provides for enlistment in Ready Reserve units of the Reserve components, excluding the National Guard, for a total of 8 years, including initial 3-6 months ACDUTRA (active duty for training). Section 6(c) (2) (A), Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, provides that a person enlisting in the National Guard prior to attaining age 181⁄2 years is deferred from induction so long as he continues to serve satisfactorily and, upon attaining age 28, is exempt from induction. However, if he completes 8 years of satisfactory service including 3 or more consecutive months of ACDUTRA, he is also exempt. The memorandum of understanding provides that Army Guardsmen performing 6 months initial ACDUTRA will be required to serve a total of only 31⁄2 years in the Ready Reserve. This was extended to the Army Reserve by Army policy.

38 weeks.

Until age 28.

55 years, 44 weeks.

Prior to discussion of this question at length I should state categorically that the Department of Defense is opposed to placing all Reserve participation on a volunteer basis. I will develop our reasons in some detail.

First: We do not believe that monetary incentives alone can provide sufficient volunteers to adequately man the Reserve component units.

To attempt to provide sufficient monetary incentives for voluntary service in Reserve component units would probably result in the reservist drawing such an amount that he would be paid for a few drills more than his active duty contemporary receives for full-time duty.

Second: As you know, the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard are now made up of volunteers. However, it is probable that the present compulsory provisions assist in maintaining the strength of the volunteer units, in the same sense that Selective Service helps to maintain the voluntary strength of the active Navy and Air Force. Third: To remove the compulsory requirements would vastly increase the requirements for 6-month trainees. There is a serious question in my mind that sufficient 6-month trainees can be recruited to

maintain the Reserve components at their required strength. If one assumes that recruiting of the required number is feasible, the task of providing training for this number of personnel looms large. Certainly more training centers will be necessary, requiring an increase in the Active Forces.

The effect of eliminating Ready Reserve obligations for reservists who have completed 2 years of active duty would so impair the Navy's current mobilization base, and future input thereto, as to render the fulfillment of mobilization requirements for ready-trained personnel impossible. The Navy's presentation will cover this subject in full detail.

Fourth: If the objective of a Volunteer Reserve program is to eliminate so-called inequities and complaints, this objective would not be met.

If the Congress questions the wisdom of statutory compulsion for Reserve service, we believe that it will be necessary to take an altogether new look at the Reserve component program and design a new system of Reserve Forces. Our plans as of this date have been made within existing legislation, legislation which proved its worth during the recent recall. Pending completion of a new Reserve program and its adoption by the Congress, we believe the strength of the Reserve components would be seriously reduced by elimination of the statutory compulsion.

SUMMARY OF RECENT RECALL

Mr. Chairman, I cannot conclude this statement without again paying tribute to the Reserve personnel who were recalled. For the first time we had a Reserve component program in being which enabled the President to call on a reinforcing capability when it was needed.

We believe that the Reserve component program is basically sound. However, there are certain changes which should be made to improve our capabilities. The changes which will be presented later by the military departments is a start. As we succeed in developing other plans they will be presented to Congress or will be implemented by the Department of Defense as the case may warrant.

Mr. HÉBERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Your statement was certainly very informative and very complete. I just have one or two questions to ask, because I know the members of the committee are all very knowledgeable on this subject and there are many they would like to ask you.

For the record, I would like for you to describe the type of unit. which was called up and to indicate whether these were paid drill units or not.

I want the record to be complete, is the reason I ask these questions. Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

You asked as to the type of unit?

Mr. HÉBERT. In other words, the callup involved those reservists who were receiving pay for their drills and their summer training? Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

All of the men that were called up as members, as a part of the unit, were on a drill-pay basis.

However, as you know, these units were not at full strength. Therefore, they had to be supplemented with individuals drawn from the reinforcement pool.

Those who were drawn from the reinforcement pool were not on a drill-pay basis, except for those who may have attended a summer

camp.

We attempted to follow the priorities agreed by the Secretary and the Congress. Within the filller group, we called, first, those who had a minimum of active service; namely, 6 months' active duty for training.

Out of the total fillers called in the Army, approximately 11,000 people who had had only 6 months' training, but were no longer associated with a unit, were called as fillers.

Mr. HÉBERT. Now, right there, Mr. Secretary, define what you mean by "fillers."

Secretary RUNGE. A filler is an individual called to fill a vacancy in a unit. The vacancy exists because of the strength of the unit as it goes on active duty and because of the requirement for a particular skill.

Mr. HÉBERT. Now, this is the individual who is, in effect, a standby without pay, but obligated for a certain period of military service. Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir. He is an obligor. He is not a standby in the sense that this is, as you know, a statutory term, for the Standby Reserve.

People put on active duty as fillers came out of the Ready Reserve reinforcement pool.

Now, there were some few exceptions of individuals who were transferred from the Standby back to the Ready Reserve. But when they were ordered to active duty, they came out of the Ready Reserve.

Mr. HÉBERT. Now, what activity does a filler engage in-I mean military training activity.

Secretary RUNGE. The filler for the most part does not engage in military training activity, except that some percentage of these fillers do go as individuals for 2 weeks of summer training. He may come out of the service one year, there may be a gap of a year or a year and a half, and he may then go for 2 weeks of summer training.

But by definition, if you are in the reinforcement pool, you are not engaged in week-to-week training.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well, in other words, the fillers are people who have no obligation to continue their training effort, except when called up to active duty?

Secretary RUNGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, they have an obligation to

serve.

Mr. HÉBERT. That is it.

In other words, they do not have to report for a weekly drill, or a semimonthly drill?

Secretary RUNGE. That is so, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HÉBERT. They could stand by and put the fat on, and then when they are called up they are out of condition, in effect. That is what it amounts to, isn't it?

And that is what happened in this case, where you had units which were not up to full strength. You called the flabby ones in and tried to put them in with people that were in condition already.

Secretary RUNGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I should say that it is something more than the flabby ones. Because in many cases a unit would not have a man actually qualified in a particular skill. The services reached into the reinforcement pool to find a man with that skill to take that place to take the position.

This is one of the reasons why the Army was not more successful in using the 6-month people who were no longer in units. It was because of the time factor, of getting a man with the skill to take a position in the unit.

Mr. HÉBERT. Now, do you have any statistics, or any figures to indicate how many 6-month men were in these so-called filler groups? Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir; we have those statistics.

Mr. HÉBERT. How many 6-month men were in the filler groups? Secretary RUNGE. The Army had approximately 61,000 6-month trainees in the Ready Reserve reinforcement pool, not assigned to units. They called from that pool 14,573. As of November 30, 1961, I think this was the number called.

But the number actually on duty at this point in time, of these 6-month fillers, is something less than the 14,000 figure. I think it is in the neighborhood

Colonel HOLLINGSWORTH. 11,000, sir.

Secretary RUNGE (continuing). Of 11,000-plus.

Mr. HÉBERT. You mean the 61,000-I think your filler callup, as I recall your figures, was almost 61,000.

Secretary RUNGE. 61,000.

Mr. HÉBERT. You mean to say that in that pool of 61,000 you could only find 14,000 or 11,000 to call up with 6 months' duty, and the rest called up involved people who had much more duty?

How does that figure in with the announced plan of calling up individuals with the lowest amount of military service?

Secretary RUNGE. Mr. Chairman, the Army, as I indicated, made their first effort to find their fillers from this pool.

However, this has to be put in the context of the spaces to be filled. It wasn't mere numbers. It was to find people with the qualification and the skill.

For example, if a unit was short a radio operator, or an electronic technician, in all likelihood that skill could not be found in the pool of 6-month people.

These are people who have had 6 months of training, have been in a unit for a time, and for one reason or another are no longer available to participate in the unit.

They simply didn't have the capability to fill the role in the unit that they were to serve in.

Mr. HÉBERT. Then you are telling the committee, Mr. Secretary, that two-thirds or three-fourths of these 61,000 6-month fillers were not qualified to go back into the Army?

Secreary RUNGE. Well, sir, they were not qualified for the vacancies that existed.

Mr. HÉBERT. Are these vacancies such skilled vacancies that threefourths of your trainees weren't qualified?

What were they trained for?

Secretary RUNGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, the 6 months of training consists of 4 months of basic military training, and then

there is some degree of specialized training, depending upon the individual. But if this person has not gone beyond that point or had extended duty with the unit, there is real question as to whether that man can come in and fill a specialist vacancy.

The units recalled in the Army-there were two infantry divisions, or rather an infantry and an armored division. But there were a great number of technical and supporting units that had very real skills required and there were skilled deficiencies in the units.

I think this explains in substantial part why the 6-month trainees who were not in units were not qualified to fill these vacancies— Mr. HÉBERT. I

Secretary RUNGE. In order to put the units called into the best possible shape in the shortest period of time.

Mr. HÉBERT. I think what you said, Mr. Secretary, is an indictment of the 6-month program.

We are just wasting our time keeping people there for 6 months because when the callup comes, we have to rely on those who had the longest service.

So what is the use of 6 months' service? Except for them to do the situps or calisthenics and wear a uniform and learn how to salute and all the basic training of the military man.

I am persuaded by what you said that the 6-month program certainly should be given another look because certainly it has failed, when you get in a position that you can only call up one-fourth, approximately one-fourth of the men who have received 6 months' training and then that three-fourths of them are not qualified.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Mr. Chairman, may I just insert in there that it is more than 54,000 6-month men that they have had on duty, but only 54,000

Mr. HÉBERT. That is right-were in the pool.

Mr. KOWALSKI. It is much larger than that.

Mr. HÉBERT. I understand.

So you can multiply the number of unqualified people by that many times.

Secretary RUNGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, in the units on active duty, as Mr. Kowalski pointed out, that went in with the units, I think that in the Army alone-and we have the statistics which we can look up40,000 or 50,000 of the people than went on active duty as members of units were people that had come out of the 6-month training pro

gram.

Mr. HÉBERT. And still you indicated, by you callup, that your units weren't up to full strength because you had-out of a callup of some 170,000, you had to call up 58,000 fillers. So your Reserve units were a third under strength.

Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. Isn't that correct?

Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. So there is something wrong there, in the Reserve program, in the followup and the supervision of the Reserve program? Secretary RUNGE. The units ran anywhere from 50 or 55 or 60 percent to as high as 75 percent.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well, why was that? Didn't they have supervision? Couldn't they get people in?