other 6 months you will reorganize the Reserve again? You have been chopping up these units over and over again.

Secretary RUNGE. Mr. Kowalski, I went through one of those reorganizations in the 32d Division, when we changed from the old triangular division to the ROCID division.

This does mean some shift of units within any given State or area. It is difficult to accomplish, because you are given certain fixed situations.

It is accomplished, I should say, with greater dispatch than it may appear from looking at the magnitude of the problem.

If and when the decision is made to put the Army as a whole on this basis, of course, this would require reorganization within the States.

Mr. KOWALSKI. But you are in the middle, shall I say, of a reorganization, contemplated reorganization of the Active Army. Yet you are going ahead planning a reorganization of the Reserves. Is this the proper time to reorganize the Reserves?

Secretary RUNGE. Mr. Kowalski, it is my understanding that the Army has developed their general reorganization pattern to accommodate the shiftover, whenever that time may be, to the ROAD organization in their divisions.

And I should also say that where the Army is proposing to organize separate brigades, where, in fact, there is establishment of a new unit, they will be put on the ROAD basis.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Well, I am not questioning the need for a reorganization in the Active Army. I am questioning your judgment in reorganizing the Reserve component when you are in the middle of another reorganization in the Active Army which may cause you to reorganize again, and I would like to follow through with another question.

It is my understanding from your testimony that you propose to drop something like 58,000 men from the Reserve?

Secretary RUNGE. From the paid-drill strength.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Yes. Well, this will chop up units, again. And you have 40,000 men, at least, in the so-called Ready Reserve pool that have been completely worthless and useless.

Now, if you are going to try to get rid of some men, why don't you move those fellows?

Secretary RUNGE. Well, Mr. Kowalski, the people in that pool are not, as you know, on a drill-pay basis. And the reason that they are out of their units is because there is no compatability with their civilian job and the unit. They either moved from the town where the unit was located or they are working at hours that don't allow them to drill.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Well, then, the reorganization in the Reserve is based on a financial situation. You have got to save money.

Secretary RUNGE. No, sir.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Is this why you are reorganizing?

Secretary RUNGE. No, sir.

Mr. KOWALSKI. You want to drop men.

Secretary RUNGE. If I may comment on the Army Reserve plan, though the Army will go into substantial detail on this proposal with you.

This plan is based on a consideration of what is needed in the Reserve components to augment the Active Army and to fulfill the strategic requirements.

And if I may pursue this just a bit, I should say that they have redone their troop base. In other words, they have looked at the units that are obsolete and they should go. They looked at the units that, in fact, have long deployment times-6, 9 months-that could be organized later, and these may go.

They have put into this program the units that they now need to round out the active-this 16-division Active Army.

I should say that the Army staff and that the then Chief of Operations, General Hamlett, now Vice Chief of Staff, have reviewed and worked with this program, and they have developed this troop list. The Army will have-if I may summarize it-six priority divisions; that is, four infantry and two armored.

There will be 11 brigades, separate brigades, 8 of which will be on the ROAD concept.

There will be air defense units, which we now have-the NIKEHERCULES and NIKE-AJAX units.

There will be units to round out the Active Army.

And then, of course, this mobilization base, which is the other 21 divisions.

If I may, Mr. Kowalski, show you the shift of emphasis in terms of meeting the military requirement.

Air defense stays about 1 percent of the personnel. These are relatively fixed, static units.

Priority division forces, 25 percent of the personnel now, and 35 percent in the future, are in the proposed plan.

Units to round out the Active Army: From 20 percent of the strength to 25 percent of the strength.

Brigades, the separate brigades, from 1 to 5 percent.

The mobilization base: From 53 to 34 percent.

And I should say also, Mr. Kowalski, that this plan, in terms of drill-paid strength, has a relationship to the filler proposal that the Army is developing.

In past years we have had 53,000 men and officers, with about 32,000 enlisted men, going on 2 weeks of summer training. They are not members of units, but they go on 2 weeks' summer training.

The Army proposes to increase this total figure to 124,000, with 100,000 enlisted men going on summer training.

As we know from this experience, it isn't just the people in the units, but in addition to the people in the units we have to have this filler group properly selected, under control, and with refresher training. And that is why 100,000 men will go to summer training.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Can we go now to this pool of 61,000 6-month trainees 61,957.

What percentage of these are incompatible with their military— incompatible with military and civilian duties?

Secretary RUNGE. Well

Mr. KOWALSKI. You spoke-you seem to indicate that this was the mass of the men in that pool.

Secretary RUNGE. Well, the Army's overall ready reinforcement mobilization pool is some 700,000 men.

Mr. KOWALSKI. I am trying to stay with just the 61,000.

Secretary RUNGE. Yes. There are 61,000 men who took the 6month training program, out of a total of close to half a million over the period of the last 6 years, who for one reason or another are not able to participate in a unit. And the reason that they are allowed out of their unit and into this pool is this sort of situation.

A lad may live in Minneapolis when he goes into the unit, and maybe he is in the unit for 6 months, and then he gets a job in a town in northern Minnesota in which there is not a unit in which he can drill. He stays in the pool because he has an obligation, but he can't drill with the unit. Or it may be that if he works in Janesville, Wis., and works the night shift at General Motors-this is a situation I know specifically.

Mr. KOWALSKI. But the real thing I am concerned about is that the law provides that you call them in with lesser service to duty rather than 2 years' service. You call the 6-month men instead of 2 years. Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Now you say, because of skills, you have to resort to inducting men with 2 years or more service.

Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Do you have any kind of a program to train these 6-month reservists up to a skill, or are they just sitting around?

Secretary RUNGE. Mr. Kowalski, because of the experience we have had with this recall-in other words, we are not satisfied, as I think I have indicated

Mr. KOWALSKI. I don't think anybody is. And certainly the man that has had 2 years and has to come in is not satisfied. Now, what kind of a program do you have to train these fellows up?

Secretary RUNGE. This relates back to this summer training program in the Army's proposed plan.

The Army wants to have a selected group within this very substantial pool, something in the neighborhood of 150,000, that would fill all the vacancies in the Army Reserve and guard troop structure that I have outlined in general terms; know who they are and know what their skills are and have them designated.

Now, to the maximum extent possible, that 150,000 pool, using that rough figure, should include these 61,000 6-month trainees.

The question of proper utilization runs two ways.

One, the matter of what the situation is in the unit, and also what the man has to bring to it.

Using this example that I gave of the 32d Division, where you had a higher proportion of skilled people, you could use more 6-month people because the vacancies were in lesser skills.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Well, you are not suggesting a program of training them up, though. This is what I am asking about.

Secretary RUNGE. Well, that is my next point, Mr. Kowalski. These 100,000 spaces for enlisted summer training will be devoted principally to taking the 6-month man who is no longer in a unit, and bringing him to summer training for 2 weeks and giving him the maximum training to qualify him so that he can fill a vacancy, a designated filler.

Mr. KOWALSKI. You had 6-month trainees in units that came into the Active Army. You had 6-month trainees who remained in the filler pool, some 40,000 of them. And in addition to that, you had 6-month trainees in units that stayed at home.

Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Didn't any of these men have any skills that they could have been brought in, instead of the 2-year men?

Secretary RUNGE. Mr. Kowalski, these people may well have had skills.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Pardon me?

Secretary RUNGE. These people may well have had skills that were required in another unit.

The general policy with respect to fillers was to take them from the pool and not out of units. Unit integrity was preserved, I think, to the maximum extent.

We did not take people out of the 33d National Guard Division to fill the 32d. In other words, that concept of unit integrity was preserved to the maximum extent.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Well, what you are saying, then, is that we can expect in the future a similar situation, where men with 6 months would not be called in in large numbers?

Secretary RUNGE. Well, if there are 60,000 people in that 6-months pool, it would be the Army's plan when filling units again, to take a substantial portion of those people and increase this percentage substantially over what we did this time, because of the training of these people, the selection and designation of them, as opposed to using the 2-year men.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Now, I would like to examine the 6-month training itself. Because this is really under scrutiny, I think. How valuable is it? What is it? Is it 6 months, is it 4 months?

Secretary RUNGE. Well, the program, Mr. Kowalski, is 6 months less, I think, 2 weeks of leave time that they give them between their basic training period and such advanced

Mr. KOWALSKI. Well, will you describe the type of training they have, in the weeks of basic?

Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

In the Army-first of all, the man enlists, as I indicated to the chairman, in either a Reserve unit or a guard unit.

At the appropriate time he goes off-usually I think they concentrate these people by Army areas. The 5th Army area: I think most of their people go to Fort Leonard Wood. The 6th Army area: to Fort Ord. And so on.

The first 4 months of their training is the basic training of any soldier. In some cases the Army runs special units for these reservists and guardsmen, and in other areas they are commingled with other basic trainees that either come in from enlistments or from the draft.

And this, of course, is all the basic school of the soldier, including all of the basic infantry weapons and marches and bivouacs and sanitation, first aid-all the basic training of the soldier.

The second 2 months, roughly, or the last 2 months of the 6-month period, may be of two kinds.

One, they may go to relatively short-term school-type instruction. Secondly, they may take on-the-job training, depending upon what skill they are to be trained for, with an existing Active Army unit. And I should say that those who receive the school training I think come out with greater military competence and capability than those who are on-the-job training.

Mr. KOWALSKI. I agree with you, Mr. Secretary.

And I would like to particularly bring your attention to the 6 weeks of on-the-job training. I had an experience, for example, as a colonel in the Army. They called me up one day and said, "Look, we have two soldiers who are clerks. You want to use them for 6 weeks." I had no use for them, but they kept insisting, so I took these two men, very fine men, who just sat around because I really didn't have a job for them.

I have talked with many men who are lawyers, who were sent to the motor pool to sit around, just hang around in the motor pool for 6 weeks.

There are many of them policing the yard, and so on.

Now, the real question is this: Do we need a 4-month training program? Is this what we want? Or do we need an 8- or a 10-month training program? Let's not waste the time of these men.

And I think the sitting around of the 6 months during the socalled on-the-job training is not increasing their skills and you are not doing much about it when you get them into the units or into the pool.

Secretary RUNGE. Mr. Kowalski

Mr. KOWALSKI. It is a very questionable program.

Secretary RUNGE. I would say that the Army has an obligation to review and to make this 6-month training program just as good as they can, to the end that we send back to the unit a person that we have put as much skill into as we possibly can. And it may be that if the schools if it is a 3-month school rather than a 2-month school, we could work out some arrangements to keep them for a seventh month and give them the proper schooling.

Mr. KOWALSKI. That is what I am trying to say, Mr. Secretary. I think we ought to look at this program. If you have 40,000 men you couldn't use in the little mobilization like the one we had-if you have men sitting around for 6 weeks, let them go at the end of 4 or set up a program that is going to produce soldiers.

Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

But going back to my other point: There are two ways to work at this skill mix. One is what we draw out of the pool which we have been talking about. The other: If we can raise the 32d Infantry Division or the 26th Division of Massachusetts to 85 percent of strength and if we can recruit it to that point, you have cut at the problem two ways. You have reduced the number of fillers. Instead of taking 30 percent fillers, you automatically cut it to 15 percent of fillers. And for the people who are in units in the Reserve and National Guard, the more school training that we can get into them while they are members of those units, the fewer skilled fillers you have to have.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Of course.

May I ask one more question?

Mr. WINSTEAD. Will you yield?

Mr. KOWALSKI. Yes.

Mr. WINSTEAD. If you build up to 95 percent and take away from those who have 60 percent and cut them back to 50, you still have vacancies. If you fill one group up to 85 percent and take them away from another group who already had 60 percent and cut that group back to 50 percent, you haven't accomplished much, have you?