we will begin to build up our pilots and also begin to receive the airplanes at the same time, which should make a pretty useful basis.

Granted their capability as units will be reduced by the loss of the equipment and the number of pilots that stay on active duty. And the Air Force accepts this.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. When will this capability be restored?

General WILSON. I should say we will be back in 15 months.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. I would like to move to the question of tactical airlift. And perhaps General McCarty could speak to this.

What percentage of tactical airlift requirements are met by Reserve units of the Air Force now?

General MCCARTY. As I mentioned a moment ago, about 40 percent of the Active Force requirements to training of the Army in exercises and training with the Tactical Air Command.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. When was that 40 percent figure arrived at? General MCCARTY. Well, this is based upon the daily each day each Reserve wing furnishes a stated number or requested number of aircraft to the Tactical Air Command for a period of a few days to as much as maybe 10 days at a time. And these rotate among the crews who are available to take that duty, and they go to Fort Bragg and they go down to Fort Campbell or to any other place where an exercise might be going on.

Now, the source of the information, that this comes to approximately 40 percent, is the fact that CONAC reported that 5 of the 12 months, or five-twelfths, of the Tactical Airlift requirements of the Army last year was furnished by the Reserve forces. This amounts to approximately 40 percent.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Well, but this is a peacetime requirement. How about the mobilization requirement?

General MCCARTY. I wonder if I understand your question here. The requirement for total or for Reserve?

Mr. SLATINSHEK. The Reserve contribution, or the Reserve portion of the airlift requirement.

General MCCARTY. We would have 15 wings, 2 of which are 124's, which could be used as tactical, but the other 13 are definitely tacticaltype airlift.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Well, perhaps I should put it this way. The Active Army has increased in strength by two divisions. Does this increase in strength create a greater demand for tactical airlift, and can you meet it?

General MCCARTY. It conceivably-it would depend a little bit upon the theater where they are engaged and the type of engagement.

It would naturally-the more people who are engaged in a combat. theater, the greater the demand for intratheater airlift for combat type of airlift.

That is really the large portion of the mission of tactical airlift. In addition to that, there is the vertical envelopment theory of the Army-the training and dropping of airborne troops and the aerial resupply of troops in the field.

Fifteen wings, in addition to what the Active Establishment has, probably would not be enough under those circumstances, with large commitments in the field.

Mr. SLATINSHEK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record the reply made by the Air Force in respect to detailed information regarding the units called to active duty by the Air Force.

As you will recall, the committee requested a great deal of background information on all these units. And with your permissionMr. HÉBERT. It will be put in the record at this point, without objection.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

Question. Why was the 108th aircraft control and warning flight (NYANG) deployed to Sembach Airbase, Germany?

Answer. The 108th aircraft control and warning flight was deployed to Germany during the period of November 1-15, 1961. Personnel were flown by MATS and the equipment was shipped by MSTS from Philadelphia port during the same period.

USAF and Tactical Air Command movement directives showed Hamm, Germany, as the destination for the 108th Squadron. However, during the period the unit was in transit it was discovered that the Hamm site (south of Munster) could not accommodate more than 50 to 60 personnel under ordinary circumstances. The 108th had approximately 300 officers and airmen assigned. It was also learned that the water system and sewage system had deteriorated badly during an extended period of nonuse. Based on those factors the MATS flights were diverted to Sembach Airbase, near Kaiserslautern, west of RheinMain, Germany, where space was available to house the personnel. The equipment arrived at Sembach between December 10-31, 1961, and was unpacked and assembled in operating condition. No equipment was permitted to radiate at that site, however, because of interference with other equipment already operating in that area. Soon after arrival at Sembach, the unit was advised that 17th Air Force was planning to move it back to Hamm and Gutersloh for a split-site operation. During the time 17th Air Force was negotiating with the RAF for the use of these sites, the unit arranged with Sembach Base to have personnel work in the base facilities (communications center, dining hall, base auditor's office, finance office, library, etc.), and although personnel were kept busy they had no operational mission nor responsibility.

The 108th was advised by 17th Air Force on January 24, 1962, to move to Hamm-Gutersloh and the move was accomplished between February 1-9, 1962. The stay at Sembach was approximately 2 months.

After return to the Hamm-Gutersloh area, the unit billeted approximately 75 personnel at the Hamm site, approximately 45 in a leased hotel in Hamm about 8 miles from the operating site, and the remainder (approximately 170) at the Gutersloh site.

Many problems were encountered in the use of the water and sewerage system at Hamm but with the assistance and cooperation of the British engineers they have made the system usable.

The 108th had their equipment "on the air" and operating by February 15, 1962, with acceptable housing, dining, and other essentials.

AIR FORCE

Question 27. Provide a list of every Reserve component unit called up which

will:

(a) Identify the unit.

(b) Its home base or post.

(c) Strength at time of call versus T.O. & E.

(d) Number of men who did not report to active duty and reasons.

(e) Number of fillers required to augment and bring unit up to full strength-what skills involved.

(f) Percentage of authorized combat equipment on hand at time of recall. (g) Percentage taken to active duty.

(h) Military function of unit.

(4) Utilization on active duty.

(i) Training program.

(k) Estimated date of combat readiness.

(1) Present station.

Answer. See the attached.

(Further answers are as follows:)