first three reports, at least 64 have now been adopted in whole or in major part. One major recommendation from our fourth report, for an intelligence fusion center, was adopted by the President in his State of the Union address and has now become the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Having said that, there are other recommendations that continue to need to be addressed, and some that could still use additional resources or policy direction. Fourth Report-Implementing the National Strategy Strategy and Structure • That the President create an entity that will become the all-source fusion and analysis center for potential terrorists attacks inside the United States from foreign terrorists and their supporters. That center would also house, in a separate component, the intelligence collection against such terrorists currently in the FBI. • That more comprehensive assessments of threats to the homeland be developed That the new DHS have the necessary capability and authority to perform the critical infrastructure vulnerability and warning functions envisioned in its enabling legislation That the President clearly define the responsibilities of DHS and other federal entities before, during, and after an attack has occurred, especially any authority for directing the activities of other federal agencies That the President direct a restructuring of the Federal interagency mechanisms to ensure better coordination within the federal government, and with states, localities, and the private sector, to avoid confusion and to reduce unnecessary expenditure of limited resources at all levels And to repeat an earlier recommendation of the panel: • That each House of the Congress establish a separate authorizing committee and related appropriation subcommittee with jurisdiction over Federal programs and authority for Combating Terrorism/Homeland Security. I will be happy to address any questions that Members may have concerning those recommendations. Use of the Military The panel continues to address issues involving the use of the military inside the United States for various responses to terrorism. In its next report, the panel will make recommendations dealing with: • Command and control issues involving the new U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) • Developing a more comprehensive, coordinated process to identify the potential needs of States and localities, as well as other Federal agencies, for military support against terrorist attacks • Additional authority for use of the National Guard in a Title 32 status • New roles and missions for certain National Guard units • Better training and exercise programs for military units for performing homeland missions • Better structure and policies for DoD civilian oversight of the military Clarification, consolidation, and explanations of laws for use of the military domestically Health and Medical The panel continues its efforts to address the important issues in health and medical planning, preparedness, and response to terrorism and will make recommendations on the following subjects: • Sustaining and prioritizing resources to improve the public health and medical infrastructure • Exercising and training health and medical response entities in the larger emergency management context of terrorism response including exercising the use of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile • Centralizing, coordinating, and simplifying Federal information on resources, best practices, and research for state and local access Implementing the full range of research to improve health and medical detection of and response to terrorist attacks Developing and operationalizing the laws and regulations for health and medical response to a terrorist attack including the clarification of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) guidelines and the rules for quarantine • Defining who is in charge in response to a bioterrorist attack • Developing a strategic information plan for educating and communicating with the public and the media before, during and after an attack • Improving intelligence collection related to health and medical issues • Establishing a national vaccine strategy • Responding to the threat of a smallpox attack Critical Infrastructure Protection For the Fourth Report, the panel has expanded its consideration beyond cyber security to include issues of physical protection of critical infrastructure. It will make CIP recommendations in the following areas: • Federal reimbursement for certain costs incurred by States, localities, and the private sector for improvements to infrastructure security • Improved training, standards, and protocols for government and private sector responders, to include facilities, responder equipment, and communications compatibility and interoperability • More comprehensive and concise policies and enhanced capabilities for intelligence and information sharing involving critical infrastructure among government entities and with the private sector • Improvements in security measures for and in the screening of non-passenger cargo aboard commercial aircraft • Development of significantly enhanced security measures for general aviation aircraft, passengers, and facilities • Expanded research and development into CIP security measures • Comprehensive revamping of Federal laws to address privacy, freedom of information, liability, anti-trust, indemnification, insurance, and related issues • Enhanced security for agriculture and the food supply structure Agroterrorism The panel once again addresses the issue of Agroterrorism, and will make recommendations in the following areas: • Developing threat assessments for potential terrorist attacks against U.S. agriculture • Including Agroterrorism as an Emergency Support Function in the principal Federal response plan Improving processes for testing for and identifying agroterrorism attacks • Creating a system of fair compensation for losses due to an attack • Enhancing education, training, and exercises on attacks to agriculture We must develop processes that help us understand better how we set priorities for homeland security. We must answer some fundamental questions about preparedness, including the overarching one: "Preparedness for what"? Without a firm grasp on how to answer that question, how will we know that we have out priorities set forth correctly, and that the expenditure of scarce resources at every level of government is appropriate. A more educated and enlightened assessment of the threats we face is critical to answering that basic question. An integral part of that issue is the absolute necessity to have national standards for how entities at all levels of government and in the private sector train, equip, and plan for, and then coordinate responses to attacks. We are still a long way from having any standards for a variety of these issue related to homeland security. Mister Chairman, in the panel's second report, submitted in December of 2000, we addressed this issue head on. We did so in the context of our recommendation at that time for the creation of an office in the White House, very similar but not exactly like the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) headed by my friend Tom Ridge. We called it the National Office for Combating Terrorism, rather than "Homeland Security." We would have placed some very specific responsibilities in that Office and in other entities for the development of national standards and for processes for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) to further the implementation of those standards. Those recommendations are worth repeating. (To avoid any confusion, the references to the "National Office" and "Assistant Director" are to the specific construct that we recommended in 2000, not to anything that currently exists in OHS). We said in 2000: "Improve Plans for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation for Combating Terrorism" "The national strategy developed by the National Office for Combating Terrorism must contain a clear set of priorities for RDT&E. The program and budget authority of that office must be exerted to ensure effective application of Federal funds devoted to this purpose. "The White House Office of Science & Technology Policy should play a major role in the effort. We recommend that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards of the National Office for Combating Terrorism either enter into a formal relationship with OSTP or have appropriate members of the OSTP staff detailed to the National Office for Combating Terrorism on a rotational basis. "Wide varieties of equipment that have potential application for combating terrorism are available from commercial vendors. Nevertheless, many local responders have told us that some equipment they purchased does not meet the specifications described by the vendor. At present, no viable program is in place for testing and evaluating the effectiveness of equipment for combating terrorism. We recommend that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards develop equipment testing protocols and continue to explore the prospect of financial support from vendors for equipment live agent test and evaluation, leading to Federal certification. We recommend that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards develop, as part of the national strategy, a comprehensive plan for long-range research for combating terrorism; this should include better coordination among the National Laboratories. The focus of those efforts by National Laboratories should be dual- or multi-purpose applications. "The National Office for Combating Terrorism should also integrate other indirect, yet applicable, research and development projects into its information-dissemination process. For example, the Deputy Directorate for Operations (Combating Terrorism) within the Joint Staff provides executive seminars on its Best Practices Study for anti-terrorism and force protection. This program also collects information on "commercial off the shelf" resources and equipment to support its anti-terrorism mission. These studies and resources may not directly relate to policy and standards for combating terrorism at the State and local level but may well contribute to State and local preparedness. "The top priorities for targeted research should be responder personnel protective equipment (PPE); medical surveillance, identification, and forensics; improved sensor and rapid-readout capability; vaccines and antidotes; and communications interoperability. "Develop National Standards for Equipment, Training, and Laboratory Processes "One of our basic assumptions is that no single jurisdiction is likely to be capable of responding to a major terrorist attack without outside assistance. That leads to the inescapable conclusion that the development of national standards is a critical element of any national plan. Firefighters or EMS technicians in the jurisdiction where an attack takes place must not be concerned that responders from other jurisdictions, providing "mutual assistance," will arrive with equipment of a different standard than local responders, even at risk of becoming casualties themselves. "We recommend that the Assistant Director for RDT&E and National Standards in the National Office for Combating Terrorism establish a national standards program for combating terrorism, focusing on equipment, training, and laboratory processes. The fundamental objectives for equipment standards will be nationwide compatibility, and dual-/ multi-purpose applications. For training, they will be interdisciplinary curricula, and training exercises based on realistic scenarios. For laboratories, the focus should be clear, strict protocols for identification, forensics, and reporting. The ultimate goal of the national standards program should be certification of the specific equipment, training, or laboratory and a recapitulation of certifications in a "Consumers Digest," for use by response entities nationwide. "We recommend that the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) be designated as Federal "co-lead agencies" for the technical aspects of standards development. The Executive Branch and the Congress should provide resources for the development of national standards, and Congress should be presented with a detailed budget request for that purpose at the earliest opportunity. In addition, the Interagency "Board for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability should be subordinated to the National Office for Combating Terrorism. "The Federal co-lead agencies should develop certification standards in coordination with appropriate Federal agencies and with advice from State and local response entities, professional organizations that represent response disciplines, and private and quasi-public certifying entities." Mister Chairman, those functions that we recommend now almost two years ago still need to be performed, now obviously more urgently that before. Unfortunately, we are still a long way from achieving any coherence in standards and testing, especially for "first responder" equipment and communications capability. It is still the case that the only "standards" available are what vendors say are the capabilities of their wares. We continue to need something like an "underwriters laboratory" for a wide variety of protective equipment and communications. We have before and will again recognize the efforts of the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and InterOperability, National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (in the Chairman's home state of Pennsylvania) and the Technical Support Working Group. Those efforts will not, however, be nearly enough, at least not at the level of current resources. For training, the panel is encouraged that the majority of Federal training programs, at least those currently in FEMA and DOJ, will apparently be combined in the new DHS. Nevertheless, other Federal agencies-EPA, DOE, DoD, DHHS as examples-will continue to conduct training that will need to conform to a set of national training standards. That effort has not yet been undertaken, but it should be required on an urgent basis. Fifth Report-A Return to Normalcy The Commission will end its five years of work on behalf of the Congress with its final report on December 15, 2003 to the Congress and the President. Mister Chairman, in our second report in 2000, we recommended a Director of Homeland Security in the Executive Office of the President to develop a national strategy, and to direct its implementation among the array of cabinet departments and agencies. We recommended that the Director have great authority over the Federal bureaucracy, including budget certification authority. We did not recommend a separate Department of Homeland Security because of concerns that delays resulting from setting up the new Department would slow the implementation of the national strategy. It has been decided that the advantages of a Department organization outweigh that risk, and our goal is to assist the new Department and the federal, state, and local governments by strategic thinking on Homeland Security. We believe that the national goal must be to implement a true national strategy that assesses the true risk to the nation and reasonably prepares for those risks. Complete security is not possible against a stealth terrorist attack, but a good national strategy can reduce that risk, and direct our resources to the correct priorities. Only then can we manage the costs of Homeland Security and know the money we are spending is effective within a national strategy. We must then have a frank dialogue with the American people that all risk cannot be eliminated. We must decide what roles are appropriate for federal, state, and local governments, the private sector and the people themselves. Then we should return to normalcy, and understand our definition of normal. Normalcy will never again be an unguarded or inattentive state, but we also must decide how much is enough, and continue on with the array of priorities we will pursue as a nation. Defining preparedness and the roles of states and localities will be a key part of our Fifth Report. We also will draw attention to the need to maintain our Civil Freedoms as we make the nation more secure. Our traditional values of liberty cannot be balanced against or traded off for security. We also must be cautious that those responsible for security do not simply redefine away our freedoms in the name of security. It is preparedness that must be defined, not our definition of freedom that has already gained its meaning from the blood of American patriots, including those that died on September 11, 2001. This, too, will be discussed in the final report this December. Conclusion The Advisory Panel will continue to be relentless in pursuing appropriate solutions to these difficult issues, even if our recommendations are controversial and cross some "turf" boundaries. We will always-always-consider as an overarching concern the impact of any legal, policy, or process changes on our civil rights and liberties. Our Constitution, our laws, our judicial system, our culture, our history all combine to make our way of life unique in all the world. Thank you again for this opportunity. Chairman Cox. Thank you, Governor. Thank you both for your outstanding testimony, for the work that you have done in preparation for it and for your assistance to the Congress and to the President in our work. Ms. Hill, one of the Joint Inquiry's recommendations that you cited in your own testimony today is for, quote, full development within the Department of Homeland Security of an effective, allsource terrorism information fusion center. That all-source center is supposed to have continuing to quote the recommendation-full and timely access to all counterterrorism related intelligence information, including raw supporting data as needed. We share that view. I stressed in my opening statement that I believe this is a bipartisanship view of virtually every member of this committee. That is what we think we legislated, having read the statute many times over, in creating the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate within the new Department. We want that mandate implemented, and we are somewhat troubled by the implications that perhaps it isn't. Your testimony notes, for example, creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC, not within the Department of Homeland Security but as a nonstatutory DCI-supervised interagency joint venture. Can you outline the reasons that the Joint Inquiry specifically recommended full development of an effective, all-source terrorism information fusion center, quote, within the Department of Homeland Security? Ms. HILL. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the reason for a fusion center, wherever it is, was the numerous examples, in the hearings and our work, of the failure to bring all of that information into one place to look at the big picture, to connect the dots, to analyze it the way it should be analyzed and then to get it to the people who need it. So any fusion center is hopefully designed to do that. The reason, as I recall that-the recommendation speaks specifically to the one in the Department of Homeland Security-was because at the time the committees considered these recommendations that had been statutorily enacted. They were aware that there was a statutory provision to set that up in the Department of Homeland Security. I think the National inclination was Congress has decided that is where it is going to go. If it goes there, it needs to be effective. I think a large part of the thrust of the recommendation was not just that you should have it at Homeland Security but that whatever is set up there should be done the right way, specifically, to include things like access to raw data, which had been a problem, and a whole host of other issues that we had heard about that were problems for the analytical community. Chairman Cox. Now, I strongly support the use of TTIC as an interim step. I don't want us to drop a stitch while we are building something new at the Department of Homeland Security, and obviously TTIC is an executive creation without any Congressional authorization whatsoever. But it is filling a gap, and it is ensuring that we are doing things professionally, immediately not eventually, and there is some eventually when it comes to the creation of this brand new Cabinet department. But my concern runs to the longer term, because the statute hasn't changed since you wrote your report. The very reason you made your recommendation, as you have just explained it, obtains today. The statute says the same thing now that it did then, the legal requirement is exactly the same now as it was then. And so I am concerned now that there is a risk that the DCI, who has pledged his support to TTIC, is now going to have to provide support both to TTIC, and to whatever might go into Homeland Security. If we want a fusion center, having two of them doesn't exactly fit the bill, does it? |