MUSEUM

OF

Foreign Literature, Science and Art.

MARCH, 1840.

From the Quarterly Review.

BELMAS'S SIEGES OF THE PENINSULA. Journaux des Sieges faits ou soutenus par les Francais dans la Peninsule de 1807 a 1814, redige d' apres les ordres du Gouvernement, sur les Documents existant aux Archives de la Guerre et au Depot des Fortifications. Par J. Belmas, Chief de Bataillon du Genie. 4 vols. Paris, 1836.

to give even a summary, much less any details: we can only indicate to the military student where the information is to be found-but a few particulars which may interest the general reader we shall endeavour to condense into manageable limits.

The most remarkable of these documents are as

suredly certain Notes and Instructions, dictated from time to time by Buonaparte himself, relative to the military operations in the Peninsula—a subject which never can be uninteresting to a British reader, parTHIS work, though neither so trustworthy nor so ticularly when as in the present instance, he can interesting as the title-page promises, is yet deserv- obtain a glimpse of the real motives and movements ing of some notice. M. Belmas's redaction of the of the French, divested of the falsehood and fanfaseveral operations, though less unfair than the works ronnade of their published despatches. M. Belmas of the modern French school generally are, cannot of does not state where he found these documents, nor course be of the same value that the original documents to whom they were addressed, nor on what authority from which he professes to have compiled his narra- they are given. It might be concluded from his tive would have been. He has subjoined, however, title-page that he found the Notes, as well as Buonato his own narratives copious appendixes of those parte's direct correspondence with several of the original documents-some of which are very curious; generals, in the official archives at Paris. But such but even their authority is seriously impaired by is not the fact. M. Belmas did not like to own the fact that they are only a selection of such parts of whence they came: we can supply the omission: the general correspondence as it suited his own views they were addressed to King Joseph and his staff at to produce. Admitting them to be authentic and Madrid, as the materials on which these puppets valuable as far as they go, it is obvious that they do were to frame their orders to the several armies; and not give the whole truth and are rather to be consider were taken with the rest of Joseph's effects after the ed as ex parte statements than as a complete body of battle of Vittoria: they were published (and more historical evidence. than M. Belmas has republished) in the Appendix The first volume is dedicated, not to the sieges, but to the first volume of Colonel Napier's History, and to a general summary of the Peninsular War-occu- noticed in the Quarterly Review, vol. 56, p. 155; pying two hundred and ninety pages, followed by but some further communications between Joseph nearly five hundred pages of pieces justificatives. The and Napoleon, and a considerable portion (not all) of other volumes contain respectively narratives of the a correspondence with the Generals commanding the sieges of,

II. Saragossa, Roses and Girona.

III. Astorga, Lerida, Mequinenza, Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Tortosa, Tarragona, Olivenza, Badajoz, and Campo Mayor.

6

French armies in Spain, are new to us, and we heartily wish that M. Belmas had been able, or (what we doubt more) willing to enrich history with a fuller and less select collection of such valuable documents. We are grateful for every attempt to lift IV. Tarifa, Saguntum, Valencia, Peniscola, Castro even a corner of that almost impenetrable curtain of Urdiales-all by the French;-Ciudad Rodrigo, falsehood lined with terror,' behind which BuonaBadajoz, the forts of Salamanca, Burgos, St. Se parte prepared the various incidents of his wonderful bastian, Pampeluna, and Monzon (a small town drama; and in this view the present publication has and chateau in Aragon)-by the English:- many interesting points. All the Buonaparte papers, -each of these being followed by an appendix, more though applying to a single subject and a narrow or less copious, of the original correspondence. Of period, mark strongly the character of their author operations so various and extensive we cannot pretend the affectation (if, indeed, like other impostors, he VOL. XXXVIII.-MARCH, 1840.

32

had not grown to believe in himself) of omniscience spite of its affected precision, very vague-as in this and omnipotence which prompted him to prescribe very instance: Bessieres, he says, at Rio Seco, had from Bayonne, St. Cloud, or even Vienna, the move-75 chances for, to 25 against him; while Dupont, he ments (some of them in minute detail) of his armies says, with 21,000 men, would have 80 chances for, in Portugal, Valencia, or Andalusia-the harsh pre- and only 20 against him. sumption with which he criticised what any one else Now the result was the very reverse of Bonaparte's did, and the severe injustice with which he visited opinions, predictions, and calculations. Bessieres, on individual officers the natural impediments or in- with 15 or 16,000 men, had more than enough; for evitable accidents that happened to thwart his insolent Bonaparte afterwards admits that he had employed and often injudicious designs; and-with all this but 8000 in winning the great battle of Rio Seco,personal arrogance-the patience or policy with which, though the success was more complete than which he bore-if indeed he did not (as we rather could be hoped for, had very limited results: while believe) foment-the squabbles, jealousies, and in- Dupont, with more than the specified force, instead deed almost continual insubordination, of his gene- of being in the best possible position, was beaten, rals amongst themselves. Provided they obeyed and, instead of recrossing the Sierra, was forced to him, he seems to have been totally indifferent how surrender to Castanos-the single event which had they behaved to one another. His very interests the greatest influence on the ultimate destinies of the were often sacrificed to his vanity; and even the war. We are amused with a couple of instances of reverses of his lieutenants had to his mind the conso- what the French used to call the lofty conceptions lation of showing the world that Napoleon the Great of the Emperor,' but which seem to us less charac was all in all, and that without him La belle France, teristic of le plus grand Captaine, than of le plus and all her skilful marshals and her valiant armies, grand charlatan that even France has produced. King Joseph's cabinet had, it seems, proposed to order one of its armies to occupy a position called Milagro-no, says the Emperor,

were-NOTHING.

As the most important of these documents have been already applied to their historical uses, it is chiefly as illustrative of Buonaparte's personal character and his mode of dealing with his Generals and Marshals, that we shall now examine them.

"You should occupy Tudela, because it is an honourable position, and Milagro is an obscure one.'

The first of the Notes is of 13th July, 1808, with- P. 331. out date of place, but it must have been from Bayon- And again, he desires another army to take up a ne, and is addressed to Savary, chief of Joseph's position at Burgos rather than Trevino, which had staff, at Madrid. It takes a general, but, as affairs been proposed, because

turned out, not a very correct view of the operations

6

in Spain. The chief solicitude at that moment was ourable, whilst that of Trevino would be blind and Burgos is a position threatening, offensive, honas to the movements of Marshal Bessières, prior to

the battle of Medina del Rio-Seco. On a victory shameful (honteux et borgne).'-p. 334.

there Buonaparte rested the whole cause of Spain- This anxiety about the moral character of a miliwhile the authorities at Madrid were more alarmed tary position would seem extravagant in any other about Dupont in Andalusia-and Buonaparte is very man; but the truth is, that Bonaparte was well aware angry that some reinforcements had been sent to the how much his reputation, and, consequently, his latter which might have reached the former.

If General Dupont were to suffer a check, it would be of little consequence, and could have no other effect than obliging him to recross the mountains; whereas a blow directed against Bessieres would strike the heart of the army, and be felt like a tetanus to all its extremities.

power, were dependent on prestige, delusion and stage-effect, and he was anxious that despatches dated from important places, such as Burgos and Tudela, should keep up in France and throughout Europe, the idea that his position in Spain was firm and commanding.

a

Another paragraph of these notes is important to a The true way to reinforce General Dupont [in the just appreciation of the share which the British army had in the subsequent successes. After recapitulasouth] is not to send him troops, but to send troops to Marshal Bessieres [in the north]. General Du-ting all the events, the numbers and positions of the pont and Verdier have troops enough to maintain French and Spanish armies, he concludes by saying, themselves in their entrenched positions; and if Bes- • What I have thus stated proves that the Spaniards sieres were reinforced, and the Spaniards routed in Gal- are not to be feared; all the Spanish forces united licia, Dupont would find himself in the best possible would not be capable of defeating 25,000 French in position, both by the reinforcements which might then tolerable position.'-p. 338. be sent to him, and still more by the moral situation At last, however, in November, 1808, the great of affairs. There is not a city of Medina-not a peasant of the valleys, that does not feel that the man came to Spain himself, to purge the Peninsula whole fate of Spain is to-day in the operations of of the hideous presence of the leopards-je les chas Marshal Bessieres. How unfortunate it is that in serai,' said he, de la Peninsule! but he soon abandoned that chasse to his lieutenants, and returned sudthis great concern you should have gratuitously giv-denly to Paris to conduct his third Austrian war. Of his own proceedings in Spain these volumes conWe will here observe that Bonaparte was in the tain only two documents, both dated from the ob habit of estimating the total chances of any object-scure position' of Chamartin, near Madrid, the 8th say, at one hundred, and of proportioning off the of December, one to Marshal Ney, and the other to chances of success or failure at so much per cent., in Mortier, in which he criticises rather severely the a style that seems to us somewhat pedantic, and, in conduct of both, and particularly that of Ney, with

en twenty chances against us !'—vol. i. p. 320.

whom, says M. Belmas, he was 'fort mecontent.' Intioned to oppose us, whether in line or in columns, this letter he tells Ney, that are still lying there in the same order. Every man, the English are flying as fast as they can (a toutes officer and soldier, was killed! I at first stated their jambes); but we have been for a moment in a seri-loss at from 10.000 to 12,000 killed: I now believe it was more. ous position.'-p. 348. All my staff have seen it as well as myself. But you must not suppose that this was a massacre of prisoners: no, they defended themselves sight of the field of battle is really frightful.'-p. 372. to the last extremity, exclaiming No quarter. The

This serious position' must have been the situa. tion of the French prior to the passage of the Somo Sierra, when Ney had made a movement, with which Bonaparte now reproached him as a blunder which compromised for a moment the safety of the whole Such steady bravery is admirable: but much more army. M. Belmas throws no light on a question astonishing is the alleged fact, that the death of these which has always interested us, namely, why, just 12,000 heroes, the capture and utter dispersion of the as Bonaparte had enveloped, as it were, Sir John rest of the Spanish army, cost the French but 340 Moore with three armies, each considerably greater men killed and wounded! than ours, and all capable of being united with an But though the Spaniards were thus powerless in overwhelming superiority, and with every prospect the field, their defences of their towns exhibit the of a brilliant success against the English-why he highest degree, not merely of courage and enthusiasm, should at that moment (1st January, 1809,) have but of skill and ability. The details given by M. suddenly given over the command to Soult, and has- Belmas of the well-known sieges of Saragossa and tened away to Paris. It is everywhere stated that Girona are exceedingly interesting, and raise, if posthis was in consequence of intelligence received at sible, the reputation of these wonderful defences; that date of the preparations of Austria; but press- and particularly that of Don Mariano Alvarez, the ing as that danger might be, it does not appear to governor of Girona, whose resistance, though less have been so extremely urgent as not to have allowed romantic, and therefore less celebrated, was even more him a week or ten days for an object of such impor- obstinate, and, in the loss incurred by the French, tance to his cause, and such eclat to his personal more important, than that of Saragossa. It lasted nine glory, as a victory over the English army would have months, during which the French fired 11,910 bombbeen, particularly as we find that he did not leave shells, 7984 howitzer-shells, and 80,000 cannon balls. Paris for the Austrian campaign before the 18th of Of a garrison of 10,000, and a population of 20,000, February. Our conjecture is, that he foresaw that one-half perished by famine, sickness, and the sword. he could not force the British to a battle before they The siege cost the French at least as dear. reached Corunna, and that there he could be by no Belmas admits their loss to have been 15,000; but means sure of a victory, and was therefore not un- this must be far short of the mark, for we have the willing to escape, de sa personne, from a doubtful evidence of General Verdier, commanding the beoperation, in which he could not count upon having seiging army himself, that on the 21st of September, ninety-nine chances' for himself. Yet if he had three months before the capture of the place, his own persevered and succeeded, it might have had a more division of the army, which was specially employed lasting influence on his fortunes than even the won- in the siege, had already lost 12,000 men (vol. ii. p. derful triumphs of that Austrian campaign-England 769); and this is subsequently repeated by Augewould probably have abandoned the Peninsula, and reau :WELLINGTON not have marched from Lisbon to Paris!

M.

This division has suffered greatly, as well by the enemy's fire as by sickness, to such a degree, that, of 17,000 men, with which it began the siege, it has to-day (28th September) but 5000 left.'-Augereau, to the Minister of War, vol. ii. p. 810.

In a letter, dated Paris, 31st August, 1809, Buonaparte criticises pretty severely the conduct of Soult, Victor, Jourdan, and in short, of everybody in the campaign of Talavera, and disapproves, of course, not only the mode in which that battle was fought, but its being But we notice this siege more particularly as exfought at all, when there were only 50,000 French hibiting some instances of that incredible insubordito 30,000 English, who have thus been allowed to nation which Buonaparte seems to have tolerated brave the whole French army. A battle never should (and toleration with him was encouragement) amongst be fought unless you have three fourths of the chances his generals. The fact is so curious, that every fresh in your favour.'-p. 405. example which emerges is worth notice.

In a letter of the 31st January, 1810, in tracing a plan for the ensuing campaign, he says,

The Emperor considers that there is nothing in Spain dangerous but the English; that all the rest is canaille, that can never keep the field,'-p. 423.

The general of division, Count Gouvion St. Cyr, commanded in chief the army, under whose protection the first corps, headed by the general of divi sion, Count Verdier, was charged with the immediate operations against the town. Verdier, however, began by declaring (28th March) that he could not We find, however, in these volumes one instance, undertake the siege with so small an amount of force at least, of a pitched battle, in which the Spaniards, as Gouvion had assigned to him, and he appealed to though miserably beaten, deserve more honourable Buonaparte direct against the decision of the commention. Marshal Victor, two or three days after mander-in-chief. Buonparte directed that Verdier's his victory at Medellin (28th of March, 1809) writes demands should be complied with, and the siege proto King Joseph :ceeded; but this appeal of Verdier's produced furThe loss of the Spaniards was so great that it ther differences, which, Verdier alleged, went so far, must be seen to be believed. I myself have gone that Gouvion wished to prevent the capture of the place; over the field of battle to ascertain the facts. All the but this charge was. we suppose, unfounded. At Spanish battalions which General Cuesta had sta-length on the 19th September, after six months of