an acute shortage of doctors or scientists or engineers that will show up a few years hence. Now, during World War II I think that both Russia and Great Britain were very careful to see that sufficient numbers of men in their countries were deferred in order that they might be educated to meet the demands which perhaps arise today. Perhaps they did as good or a better job than we did in that respect. I wonder you care to comment on that.

if

I agree with the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Durham, that you can't very accurately or wisely evaluate the talents or capacities of any 17-year-old boy.

General HERSHEY. Well, Mr. Short, as you well know, knowing me as well as you do, I will not be able to have the answer to as difficult a question as this because there are several questions involved. The first part of the question is

Mr. SHORT. That is right.

General HERSHEY. What have we done? In a country where it is almost common behavior for everybody to go to college, when compared on the deferment business with a nation that you seldom ever go to college, it is a little hard for the person who sends everybody to college to have quite the deferment problems of a country where people do not go to college.

Mr. SHORT. That is right.

General HERSHEY. Now, I want to be perfectly objective about this. I am the Administrator and I do not have the luxury of opinions on the law. I administer it as I have thought it was written, and part of the issue that has gone and I have lost some weight and my hair is turning some gray-by the groups that have said that I have not carried out the thing according to the law. And if that is true, I think the Congress ought to be sure that the law is clear enough that even I could understand it.

Now, in the first place, I am not sure about what Russia is doing. I have heard a great deal about it.

Mr. SHORT. That is the reason I wanted your comment, for the benefit

General HERSHEY. Well, I am ignorant of that. The next thing I am up against, I don't happen to have the knowledge of exactly how many people we ought to have of these different scientists, and I appointed a committee in 1948 to find out, and the result-and I do not criticize them was to come up with saying that we ought to educate wise people because we are going to need wise people, but we don't know how many we are going to need. That is what my committee has told me. And I have been trying vainly since to have somebody define to me what an engineer was, let alone a chemist or a nuclear physicist or a lot of other people, so someone else could identify them. The identification problem is a very difficult one. It bothers me no end. I have never worried-if someone came inprobably this shouldn't be on the record, but I am not going to worry about it. I have said many times that if a person will identify the rare person, the rare bird, as we call him, if he could tell me what they are, I would prefer to postpone him, as some people would think, illegally, rather than to have a rule that would make his postponement possible, because if you make his postponement possible

Mr. SHORT. That is right.

General HERSHEY. There will be many, many others.

Now, there has been a committee working all summer on the rare bird, and I find their conclusion, and I hope I am not distorting, is that it is a difficult problem. [Laughter.]

General HERSHEY. Well, I say this with a great deal of humility. Mr. SHORT. You are very frank and honest and forthright. That is the reason I wanted your comment.

General HERSHEY. And so, I am in favor of anything that will give some things that will make this old country of ours survive.

Mr. SHORT. That is right.

General HERSHEY. But it has to be all of us surviving, not a few groups that are going to merely save part of us.

Mr. SHORT. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Thank you very much, General. Now, members of the committee, we will take a recess until 2 o'clock, at which time some witnesses from the Department desire to be heard. At 2 o'clock all members will please be back here. (Whereupon, at 11:50 a. m., the committee adjourned until 2 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let the committee come to order.

The first witness this afternoon is the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Forces, the Honorable Hugh M. Milton. Come around, Mr. Milton, please, sir. Now, sit right down, Mr. Milton. The committee will be glad for you to make any statement you desire to submit in regard to H. R. 3005, the extension of the Selective Service Act for an additional 4 years.

Secretary MILTON. Mr. Chairman, I do have a prepared statement, but so much of it is repetitive of what has already been said, if you have no objection, I would like to file that prepared statement with you and launch upon some objective charts which I have here to show the need.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know how much I appreciate that statement. That was exactly what I was going to suggest to you, not only to you but to the other witnesses.

Now, go right ahead.

Mr. RIVERS. You have learned early how to get along with this chairman.

Secretary MILTON. Thank you, sir.

(The statement is as follows:)

STATEMENT BY HON. HUGH M. MILTON II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANFOWER AND RESERVE FORCES)

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I appreciate this opportunity of appearing before your committee on behalf of the Department of Defense.

I would like to state first of all that Secretary of the Army Stevens and I are fully in accord with the legislation now being considered. Extension of authority to induct men for military training and service is absolutely necessary at this time. This Nation's vast international commitments impose extensive mission on the Army both at home and abroad. About 40 percent of our Active Army is today deployed in Europe, the Far East, Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, and other overseas areas. It is vital to the security of this Nation that these overseas forces be maintained at the required strength. It is equally vital that our strategic reserve in the United States and our training and logistic establishment be kept in a high state of preparedness. To meet these requirements the Army needs an assured steady supply of personnel.

It is true that a reduction in the strength of the Army is scheduled in the remainder of this and the next succeeding fiscal year. Yet the planned strength of the active Army will be a million men, even when this reduction in force has been accomplished. Only through selective service can we be assured of obtaining the numbers of men we need. To illustrate this need, I have here charts showing projected Army enlisted strengths, gains and losses for fiscal years 1954 through 1959.

In this chart (chart No. 1) we present a picture of the enlisted composition of the Active Army as it actually existed in fiscal year 1954, and projected through fiscal year 1959. The top horizontal black lines show our authorized enlisted strength by years. You will notice the strength is reduced from 1,274,800 at the end of 1954 to 979,800 for fiscal year 1955 and down to 911,600 in 1956, where it levels off.

I invite your attention to fiscal year 1955: The lower part of the vertical bar represents those enlisted men whose terms of service extend through the year. In other words, those who will be on hand and not be discharged.

When we add the 252,500 gains expected from voluntary enlistments and reenlistments we will still require 216,800 more personnel from selective service in order to meet our authorized strength of 979,800.

Following across the chart you can see that our projected requirements from selective service are 144,000 in fiscal vear 1956, 176,000 in fiscal year 1957, 170,000 in fiscal year 1958, and 184,000 in fiscal year 1959. This represents a total requirement for the next 4 fiscal years of 674,000 men for the Active Army.

Unless we receive personnel from another source, and here I mean selective ser ice, we cannot maintain the minimum adequate forces essential to the accomplishment of our many missions and to the security of this Nation.

In this chart (chart No. 2) you see the results of our enlisted procurement efforts last year and what we expect for this year. In 1954 we procured through recruiting 120,100 and through reenlistments and other sources outside selective service 91,100. In addition, 16,300 volunteers from the National Guard and the Army Reser e were accepted for active duty. These gains totaled only 227,500, or 264,800 short of our requirements. This fiscal year we expect to recruit 143,700 from ci il life, secure 98,600 from reenlistments and miscellaneous gains, and obtain 10,200 volunteers from the Reserve and National Guard. With this total of 252,500 we will still be 216,800 short of requirements.

If we lower our physical and mental standards for enlistment, some small gains in numbers could be registered. However, we would then be confronted with many aditional problems equally as serious. Men who are not physically fit, or men who are mentally weak, are noneffective and actually become a burden to the Army. As we reduce our strength, that which remains becomes more important, not only to take the initial shock of any future conflict, but this group of sol iers must also be capable of functioning in higher positions as the leaders or nucleus around which we would build an expanding Army. We have done much since World War II to improve this quality, both morally, physically, and mentally; however, to date, the Regular Army is still composed of approximately 30 percent of mental group IV personnel. This grouping represents indivi uals who cannot absorb training rapidly, and therefore cannot normally be given any of our advance technical training or school training. This restriction imposes a terrific problem area for mobilization.

My co nments on this subject of quality are intended to be informative in nature, by pointing out this serious area. Many of the men in this area eventually make fine so iers and can be used in a large Army; however, as our strength is reduced we fin this group, percentagewise, quite large. To consider lowering our mental stan ar s would be a grave mistake, especially at a time when our strength authorization is reduced to an essential minimum.

Over the past several months the Army, in cooperation with the other services an the Department of Defense, has exerted extensive effort to increase the attrati eness of military service, in order to gain and retain in the service the ma imu number of volunteers. In this I am confident we enjoy the utmost support from the Congress. Thus far we have registered some encouraging improvements in service attractiveness and have hope for turther impro e ent. We have made every effort to increase the effectiveness of our recruiting force and at the present time we have a very fine organization. However, it is a fact that im lementation of the draft is a stimulus to voluntary enlistments. On two occasions since late 1946 we have operated without the draft, and on each occasion vol inteers procured through the recruiting service dropped off drastically. In analyzing enlisted procurement for the Army and the Air Corps (Air Force)

between late 1946 and July 1950, I find that enlistments averaged approximately 45,000 per month when the draft was in operation. When we did not have authority to draft, or when we were not implementing the drafting authority, the number of volunteers was reduced about one-half during this period or to approximately 24,000 per month. In 1947 and 1948 we were unable to maintain the authorized strength of the Army on a volunteer basis when draft legislation was not in existence. By June 1948, when the draft law was reinstituted, the volunteer enlisted strength of the Active Army totaled 446,000 against an authorized Army strength of 590,000. This situation forced the Defense Establishment to request the Congress to reinstitute selective-service legislation. We can expect the same situation to obtain in the event this selective-service law is not extended. However, in this instance our authorized strength is considerably above that permitted in 1947 and 1948 and there is keener competition for personnel in the manpower pool who can be induced to volunteer. I am convinced that if we are to maintain authorized strengths and procure the number of volunteers required by the Army to insure a "hard core" of experienced personnel, we must not only have the selective-service law but we must have the draft in being. I am heartily in accord with the 24-month term of service for inductees. Two years of service represents the absolute minimum for the proper training and effective utilization of personnel. We can train 2-year men as specialists and develop the leadership potential in many of them. The noneffective time required for each trainee cannot be reduced. It includes processing, training, leave, and travel. Shorter terms of service must then cut into the advanced training time and the time which the soldier spends in his unit. To reduce this time will seriously reduce the combat effectiveness of our Army. Under present world conditions, this is a serious matter which cannot be taken lightly. We would pay dearly for a shortened tour both in dollars and in combat effectiveness.

Any reduction of the 24-month service period will necessitate an increase in Army training, transportation, material, facilities, supplies, equipment, and maintenance. As you see, such increases all point to an increase in administrative overhead with a resultant increase in the ratio of administrative to combat personnel. As we increase this administrative ratio we reduce combat effectiveness, oversea deployments, and the General Reserve including the 30-day ready forces and the Antiaircraft Artillery Command.

As an example, here are some results we could expect should we reduce the tour to 18 months:

1. The manning level of the operating forces would be reduced by approximately 10 percent, with a still greater reduction in combat forces.

2. Transportation or rotation costs alone would be increased approximately $2,220,400 in fiscal year 1957.

3. To maintain the same operating forces as the present 24-month tour would provide, it would necessitate an increased strength of 97,000 military personnel, which, due to great numbers, would have to be phased into the Army during fiscal years 1956 and 1957.

We

With the onslaught of another major conflict time will be of the essence. will need men already trained and readily available in our Reserve forces, both in units and as individual reinforcements. We cannot hope to build our Reserve units to strength unless we have a source from which to draw. The new Department of Defense national Reserve plan will provide limited numbers of non-priorservice men who will receive 6 months of active training under Army control prior to assignment in the Reserve forces. Regardless of the extent of the program for procuring non-prior-service men for the Reserves, however, we will always need a hard core of prior-service men, men who have had at least 2 years in the active establishment. These prior-service men are a vital source of military manpower which can be utilized in case of a general mobilization. So once again we find that the inductee is necessary if we are to provide a reservoir of trained personnel essential to a sound defense organization.

My previous remarks pointed up the need for the Selective Service legislation as a means of assuring an ample supply of enlisted personnel in keeping with the authorized strength of the Army. However, I feel it is most appropriate to bring to your attention that we are heavily dependent upon the Selective Service Act as a means of procuring officers for the active establishment. Section 6 of the act permits the deferment from induction of students enrolled in the Reserve Officer Training Corps program provided they agree in writing to accept a commission, if tendered, and subject to call by the Secretary of the Army, to serve on active duty for not less than 2 years after commissioning. The ROTC graduates are the primary source of officers for the active Army and for the past

several years have represented approximately 75 percent of the yearly accessions, or some 15,000 annually. It is my considered opinion that without the act we will be unable to procure quality officer personnel in the numbers needed as we will no longer have the authority to order ROTC graduates to active duty for a period of 2 years except on an individual and volunteer basis. In addition, the Selective Service Act has a direct bearing upon the quantity and quality of personnel produced at our officer candidate schools, as selectees represent some 90 percent of all those attending the two officer candidate schools at Fort Sill and Fort Benning We now have these men for 2 years after commissioning.

Under existing economic conditions, we cannot maintain our minimum essential strength without Selective Service. The draft is the only means at our disposal to maintain that strength.

In addition to the requested extension of authority to induct men for military training and service, I would like to cover one other provision contained in this legislation; that is the extension of the provisions of the Dependents Assistance Act. This law is designed to alleviate financial hardship for families of enlisted men who are now serving in the Armed Forces and those who will be required to serve in the future.

The extension of the provisions of the Dependents Assistance Act is a necessity during this period when we must depend upon the Selective Service process to provide a major portion of our enlisted manpower.

Each member of the Army with dependents will experience, at some time or other, problems in one or all of the following areas: dependent housing, dependent schooling, or medical care for his dependents. The provisions of the Dependents Assistance Act has greatly alleviated many financial hardships among our present members.

The same acute need for relief for the military dependents which prompted the enactment of the Dependents Assistance Act in 1950 will continue.

Secretary MILTON. Mr. Chairman, at the very outset I would like. to say that the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Stevens, and I join in the support of the extension as proposed in the act.

We feel that we just simply cannot have the Army of the size that we need on a voluntary system.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will find the whole committee in agreement and the country in agreement with that. We all recognize that. Secretary MILTON. Let me have the charts, please, then.

I would like to show you, if I may, sir, the enlisted strength for the Army for the next 4 years. And I point specifically to the year 1955 as the beginning year. The dark blue, at the bottom of that chart, shows the number of people which we will carry over into fiscal year 1955, and will serve in the Army throughout that year. They have a continuing obligation. They are either enlistees or inductees who still have at least a year left.

Our authorized enlisted strength for the year 1955 is 979,000. Hence, when we deduct the 510,000, it still leaves us short some 469,000 men that we have to procure from one source or another.

Now, they will come to us from two sources: Those who are enlisted or those who do enlist for the first time, and based upon our experience, we expect to have 252,500 who will come to us by reenlistment or by initial enlistment. That leaves us short of our goal 216,800 men. The CHAIRMAN. 216,000?

Secretary MILTON. 800; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. 800.

Secretary MILTON. And we must have that through induction. Without going through the same details on all of the remaining charts, I may say that in the 4 years from 1956 to 1959 it totals up that we will be short 640,000 men unless we have forced induction, sir. I would like to show one other chart, sir, if I may—————

The CHAIRMAN. Wait one minute.