Grazer Philosophische Studien: INTERNATIONALE ZEITSJohannes L. Brandl Rodopi, 2004 - 268 pages |
Contents
| 1 | |
| 21 | |
| 37 | |
Echte ontologische Alternativen | 59 |
Is Davidsons Epistemology | 101 |
A Defence of Creationism in Fiction | 131 |
Gesetze und vollständige Erklärungen | 157 |
Diskussion Discussion | 181 |
Russell and Ramsey on Distinguishing | 195 |
Besprechungen Review Articles | 209 |
This | 237 |
Common terms and phrases
allgemeine analytisch andere argues argument Axiom Bedingungen Begriff Beispiel beliefs besteht bezeichnen Brentanian Brentano Cambridge Charakter Chrudzimski Churchland claim complement conceptual schemes Davidson deontic logic deren Dinge dogma of empiricism drüben Einstellungen entities epistemic epistemology Erklärung Erklärungen existence Existenz Explanandum Explanans fact fictional individuals Form foundationalism Frage geht Gesetz gibt Grazer Philosophische Studien handelt Handlung Handlungserklärungen Hochberg Holmes Husserl impossible object intentionalen interpretation Inwagen's James Tiberius Kirk Kaninchen können L₂ liegt literary criticism logically independent Logik logisch MacBride Mally Mally's Meinong müssen negation nichtabgetrennte Kaninchenteile nomologischen object Ontologie ontologische Parsons particulars and universals Philosophy Plato predicate propositions Psychologie Quine Ramsey Ramsey's Realism Recht Rechtsethik relational judgements Relativität Rorty Russell Russell's Satz Sätze sein semantic sentences sind Sprache Sprecher Study in Scarlet theorems theory of truth tion true Twardowski Übersetzung unsere viel wahr Wahrheit Weise weiter weniger würde Yagisawa zusam zusammenhängt zwei
Popular passages
Page 113 - language, but that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false. (Davidson
Page 110 - posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience. (Quine 1951: 44)
Page 105 - senses one by one, or perhaps confronting the totality of his beliefs with the tribunal of experience. No such confrontation makes sense, for of course we can't get outside our skins to find out what is causing the internal happenings of which we are aware. (Davidson
Page 123 - the totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs ... is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges
Page 110 - given to the mind, then knowledge must be contentless and arbitrary; there would be nothing which it must be true to. And if there be no interpretation or construction which the mind itself imposes, then thought is rendered superfluous, the possibility of error becomes inexplicable, and the distinction of true and false is in danger of becoming meaningless. (Lewis 1929:
Page 109 - experience: As for the entities that get organized, or which the scheme must fit, I think again we may detect two main ideas: either it is reality (the universe, the world, nature), or it is experience (the passing show, surface irritations, sensory promptings, sense-data, the given). (Davidson
Page 117 - cause some beliefs and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified. (Davidson
Page 114 - rid of representations, and with them the correspondence theory of truth, for it is thinking there are representations that engenders thoughts of relativism. Representations are relative to a scheme; a map represents Mexico, say—but only relative to a mercator, or some other, projection
Page 110 - totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs ... is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges
Page 117 - The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is