products from the market. Could you give us your view on the appropriateness and the efficacy of this kind of effort by farmers to increase their prices?

THE PRESIDENT. One of the very serious problems we have in this country— all of the consumers—is trying to insure that the farmers who produce the food we eat and the fibers we wear get a fair price for their products. I do not think they have gotten a fair price over the years-in line with the earnings of the workers in industry.

I talked with some of the farm leaders before the Des Moines meeting. The Secretary of Agriculture brought in some of those leaders.

This Government should give very serious consideration to evolving some kind of a program that will give the farmer an equity of fairness, on the same basis for bargaining for the prices of his product as we have for the workers who bargain for the wages they receive for their labors. The particulars of that have not been worked out. I just don't know how we can obtain it.

But I do think the farmers are on the short end of the stick. I do know people are leaving the farms by the thousands and going into the cities. It is creating a very serious problem for us.

Today the farmer gets a smaller percentage of the dollar for the food that he produces for us than in any other period. I would very much hope that the administration, at some date in the reasonably near future, could find some legislation that would give to the farmer a means of bargaining reasonably and collectively, as we permit our workers to do.

Mrs. McClendon?

THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

Q. Mr. President, sir, the Constitution does not give you the right to carry on this war without permission from Congress. I am sure that you realize that more than anybody. In view of this misunderstanding that has occurred about the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, why don't you clear up this matter with your critics by quickly calling for a new vote in Congress on this matter?

THE PRESIDENT. Sarah, you don't always clear up your critics that easily. They will be with you before the vote. They will be with you after the vote. That is the way it is in a democratic society.

I have given a lot of concern and attention to attempting to get the agreement of the Congress on the course that the Government followed in is commitments abroad.

As a young Senator, I recall very vividly hearing Senator Taft speak on several occasions about President Truman's intervention in Korea. He frequently said, in substance, that while he thought what the President did was right, he did it the wrong way; that he should have consulted the Congress and he should have asked for their opinion.

Under the Constitution, the Congress has the right to declare to declarewar. It was never intended that the Congress would fight the war, direct the war, take the bombers off the ground, put them back on it, ground them. But it has the responsibility to declare the war.

Senator Taft thought that President Truman, before he committed our troops In Korea, should have asked the Congress not necessarily for a declaration but for an opinion-for a resolution.

President Eisenhower followed that policy in several instances, asking the Congress for an opinion. He discussed it with the leaders before he submitted the resolution.

Back in May and June 1964, before the Tonkin Gulf, we considered what we should do in order to keep the Congress informed, to keep them in place, and to keep them in agreement with what our action should be there in case of contingencies. There was very active debate in the Government, as I remember it, back as far as May and June of that year. Then we had the Tonkin Gulf.

After the Tonkin Gulf we responded to the action with appropriate measures. But after that, we felt that we should point out that there was likelihood there would be other instances. We could see the problem developing in that area. So we asked the leadership of the Congress to come to the White House.

We reviewed with them Senator Taft's statements about Korea, and the actions that President Eisenhower had taken, and asked their judgment about the resolution that would give us the opinion of the Congress..

We were informed that a resolution was thought desirable. So the members of the executive and legislative branches talked about the content of that resolution.

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A resolution was drafted. That was reviewed with the leaders on, I believe, August 4, 1964.

I sent a message up to the Congress shortly afterwards and asked for consideration of a resolution. Some of the Members of the Congress felt that they should amend the resolution, even after amendments had already been put into it by Members, to provide that if at any time the Congress felt that the authority delegated in the resolution should be withdrawn, the Congress, without waiting for a recommendation from the President--he might differ with themcould withdraw that authority by just passing a resolution which did not require the President's veto. They could do it by themselves.

That suggestion was made to me by a prominent Senator. I readily accepted. So the machinery is there any time the Congress desires to withdraw its views on the matter.

We stated then, and we repeat now, we did not think the resolution was necessary to do what we did and what we are doing. But we thought it was desirable. We thought if we were going to ask them to stay the whole route, and if we expected them to be there on the landing we ought to ask them to be there on the take off.

So Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara went before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee. Then they went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. They testified before all four of those committees.

As I said, they accepted some suggestions by the Congressmen and Senators, and amended the resolution. The committees reported the resolution. I believe the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House reported unanimously. The Armed Services Committee went along with it.

On the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, I think there was only one vote against it-Senator Morse. Then it went out to both Chambers for debate. We had stated our views in the message and in the measure. The leadership, too, expressed our views in some of their statements.

On August 5th, 6th, and 7th, during that period, there was debate, 2 days in the Senate-I believe on the 6th and 7th. I don't recall the dates exactly in the House. But that resolution was sent to us by a vote of over 500 to 2.

I believe that every Congressman and most of the Senators knew what that resolution said. That resolution authorized the President-and expressed the Congress's willingness to go along with the President-to do whatever was neces sary to deter aggression.

We are, as I say, trying to provide a maximum deterrent with a minimum loss. We think we are well within the grounds of our constitutional responsibility. We think we are well within the rights of what the Congress said in its resolution. The remedy is there if we have acted unwisely or improperly.

It is going to be tougher as it gets along. The longer the fighting lasts, the more sacrifice is required in men and materiel, the more dissent and the more difficult it is going to be.

But I don't believe we are acting beyond our Constitutional responsibility.

OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Q. Mr. President, what are your ideas on the need for early processing of the billions of gallons of oil from oil shale in Colorado in the Rocky Mountains in view of the Middle East stoppage of oil shipments?

THE PRESIDENT. The Secretary of Interior, since the Middle East crisis, has had a special group in his department dealing with imports and production matters. His various advisory committees give him counsel as to emergency measures that can be taken—and some that have been taken—to adequately protect our petroleum requirements.

They are reasonably well in hand. There is a great future in the oil shale development. I would doubt that in this immediate crisis that you could expect any great acceleration.

But if at any time our petroleum supply should be threatened more than it is now, the need should become greater. In any event just as the processes develop, you can expect further action in that field. But I don't think it is imminent now.

METHODS OF REDUCING THE DEFICIT

Q. Sir, earlier this week Budget Director Schultze said the administration hopes to squeeze out between $12 billion and $2 billion from the administrative budget. Could you share with us your thinking as to where some of these cuts might come?

The PRESIDENT. Yes, from the 15 appropriations bills sent to the Congress-two of which have been passed. We are examining them now. There is little indication that much in the way of savings can come from them.

We have talked to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House, where they originated, last week. Mr. Mahon was here earlier in the morning. We have pointed out the problem we have. We have urged the leadership to set a target date for getting those appropriation bills to us so they can be examined. There are about $61 billion worth of nondefense expenditures in the budget. We would expect to have to get the Congress to reduce many hundreds of millions—perhaps several billions-in those appropriations. If the Congress fails to do it, we will have to see where it fails-what bills contain the money we think can be reduced and that have the lowest priority-and then act.

Each department has been instructed to immediately contact the chairmen of its subcommittees and urge them to take action on the bill. When those reductions are made by the Congress, if they are not sufficient, then the Executive is pledged to make further reductions.

We believe we should try to keep our borrowing within 50 percent of the anticipated deficit. We hope that we can get a tax bill that will raise about $7 billion-plus. That will amount to about 25 percent of the anticipated deficit. Then we believe by refusing to pass certain measures that have been proposedand are pending-by taking action on other measures that the House has reduced, by reducing several billion ourselves, the Congress and the Executive can reduce the anticipated deficit by some 20 or 25 percent in withholdings, deferments, impoundings, and actual cuts.

Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President.

NOTE.-President Johnson's one hundred and eighth news conference was held in the East Room at the White House at 3:02 p.m. on Friday, August 18, 1967. The news conference was broadcast live on radio and television. As printed above, this item follows the text released by the White House.

The CHAIRMAN. This would clearly mean, it seems to me, that without a resolution he could do what he is doing now and what he did then, and, therefore, to repeal it is no sanction at all. It would be an idle gesture.

It is true the other alternative of having no armed forces at all would be a remedy. That also is just as unworkable and unrealistic as impeachment. Obviously, the country is not going to disarm completely in order to change a policy.

PERSUASION IS THE REAL REMEDY

I also discussed the real remedy in this situation is one of persuasion, that is, of reasoning like the discussion that has been going on, on and off the floor, by Members of the Senate seeking to enlighten the Administration and the country as to where our national interest truly lies. That is the real effect of the discussion going on and its real objective is to persuade a different course of action in Vietnam.

I think that is typical of the democratic system. Those who wish to stifle all difference of opinion, it seems to me, are acting in an undemocratic way. It is an authoritarian way, to object to anyone raising a different point of view from that of the Administration, and is, in my opinion, not in the democratic tradition. I think that we will have some questions later about bipartisanship.

I am under the impression that many people have been restricted from discussing these matters because they have been persuaded that there should be no partisanship in matters of foreign policy, and it probably contributed to the erosion of the influence of the Congress.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am glad that the Chairman has explained that he did not on his own will initiate the statement about impeaching

the President, but that he innocently answered the question when he was asked what powers were available to achieve the end.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry the Senator didn't see the program. It might have been very helpful to him.

Senator MCCARTHY. We shouldn't let that stand as an innocent answer, either.

Senator GORE. I was aware of the program and I don't think he needs to make any statement. He answered the question in a correct way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was the suggestion made here a minute. ago, Mr. Chairman, that we were getting a little far afield?

The CHAIRMAN. I think so. The Senator is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I didn't know about that. I wanted to clarify that.

The CHAIRMAN. You are quite right.

Senator Cooper, do you have any questions?

Really, I thought that the Senator from Illinois wanted to make a very brief statement. He doesn't purport to come here as a constitutional lawyer, but as a Senator. I don't wish to try to muzzle anybody, but he only made a very brief point. Does the Senator have any questions?

Senator COOPER. I do not. I will reserve most of my questions for Mr. Katzenbach. As I understand your proposal, it is simply that the President should annually tell the Congress what he considers our commitments to be. You are not attempting to deal with the constitutional part of it.

Senator PERCY. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington, do you have any questions? Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Percy, one part of your statement is not clear to me, but I notice the Under Secretary of State in the audience, and know he is a very busy man, so will speak to you later about it.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Thank you very much, Senator Percy. I am sorry we kept you so long.

Mr. Katzenbach, will you please come forward, sir. Mr. Katzenbach, I am sorry we got delayed, but I hope you will excuse us. You were here and you understand the reasons why.

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACH, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE-Resumed

Mr. KATZENBACH. I certainly do, Mr. Chairman.

AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM IN ABSENCE OF TONKIN BAY

RESOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I wrote you a letter, in order to give you some opportunity to consider the question. I will read it for the record:

"In your testimony last Thursday you stated that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution is, and I quote, ‘an authorization for the President, and in

my judgment it is as broad an authorization for the use of armed forces for a purpose as any declaration of war-so-called- could be in terms of our internal constitutional processes.' You made other statements of similar import."

"What would be the situation today regarding American involvement in Vietnam if the Tonkin resolution had not been passed?” (The text of the letter referred to follows:)

Hon. NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH,

Under Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

AUGUST 18, 1967.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There is one question I expect to ask on Monday the 21st which I hope you will give most serious study because I believe it deserves a considered reply.

In your testimony last Thursday you stated that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution is, and I quote, "an authorization for the President, and in my judgment it is as broad an authorization for the use of armed forces for a purpose as any declaration of war-so-called-could be in terms of our internal constitutional processes." You made other statements of similar import.

What would be the situation today regarding American involvement in Vietnam if the Tonkin Resolution had not been passed? Would the President then be with, or without, constitutional authority to send U.S. soldiers to South Vietnam in the numbers that are there today; would he have had authority to bomb in the north? In short, did the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution give the President authority which otherwise he constitutionally would not have had, and, if so, what?

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,*

Chairman.

Mr. KATZENBACH. I appreciate your sending that letter, Mr. Chairman. Let me see if I can answer that as honestly and as objectively as I can. I said at the outset in my prepared statement that we were working with one of the most difficult fields of constitutional law that could exist, and that by and large very little was specified, as Senator Hickenlooper has correctly stated, in the Constitution itself on this, and that in my judgment much of this is left to the working out of relationships between the Congress of the United States and the President of the United States.

This is particularly true since we cannot, in this area, generally defer it to the Supreme Court of the United States or to some other uninvolved or more objective process. So there is a good deal of disagreement and there has been in fact since 1789 as to what these powers are. What has been recognized by both the Congress and the President, and indeed by the Court in certain cases where they have commented on it, is that it was extremely important in speaking for the United States as a whole to speak with as single a voice as was possible to speak; and that the President exercising his own powers alone would not speak as strongly as he would speak if he was using his own powers and whatever powers the Congress had authorized or delegated, whatever they might be.

MEANING OF WORDS "AUTHORIZING" AND "AUTHORITY"

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we could get a clarification of the words Mr. Katzenbach has been using here today and used in his previous testimony-the words "authorizing" and "authority." What do you mean when you use the word "authority"? You used it just now by saying he can do it on his own authority, but he