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Senator SYMINGTON. I hope we can do it more in the regular order. The CHAIRMAN. I don't see anything wrong with Senators helping the Chairman. He has a great difficulty in pursuing these questions. Senator SYMINGTON. The Chairman seems to have a rare capacity to take care of himself.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator wishes to have the exact language of that passage, I am perfectly willing to read, but if not-does the Senator want me to put that in or not?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would appreciate hearing it; yes. It has been brought up by the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. I will read it. He has brought it up and I will read it. I happen to have it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't know what it is.

TIME DEVOTED TO TONKIN BAY RESOLUTION IN 1964

The CHAIRMAN. I have already made my position clear about my own activities in this period, so I won't reiterate that. I think maybe it might be helpful as background, before I do that, because many people have forgotten it, to put into the record what happened in the way this was handled. On August 5, 1964, the resolution was sent up here and introduced. I have the message of the President of the United States, a very brief one, which I will ask the reporter to put into the record. I don't think it is necessary to read all of it. (The document referred to follows:)

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, AUGUST 5, 19641

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954.

I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions :

1. America keeps her word. Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. Our purpose is peace. We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity. Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 261-263.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations-all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Con gress in the past-to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward-and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved. The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

The CHAIRMAN. The resolution was introduced on August 5. There was approximately a 30-minute discussion of it at that time. On August 6 the Committee on Foreign Relations met from 9:05 a.m. to 10:45 a.m., with the Armed Services Committee. There was, in other words, a 1 hour 40-minute consideration by the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services on August 6.

The resolution was reported to the Senate at about 12:30 p.m., and the discussion that day, on August 6, consumed approximately 4 hours. This is taken by the staff from the Congressional Record which I have before me.

On August 7 the Senate met at 10 o'clock, and under a unanimous consent agreement, there were three hours of debate, and the vote was set at 1 o'clock. Of that three hours of debate, two hours were allowed

to the Senator from Oregon, Mr. Morse, leaving one hour of debate under the control of the chairman for the utilization by other Members of the Senate.

At 1 p.m., approximately, the vote took place and the staff estimates there were approximately 2 hours 30 minutes actually used in debate because much of the time, as often happens, was in quorum calls and in discussions not directly on the question. So the staff calculates that there were 8 hours 40 minutes actually consumed in the overall debate of the resolution. That gives you some perspective as to how thorough the discussion was. You will find in looking at the record there was a feeling of great urgency, that there was a great emergency.

SENATE DEBATE ON TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

Coming now to the passage referred to by the Secretary on page S 18403 on August 6, 1964, Mr. Brewster, the Senator from Maryland: I had the opportunity to see warfare not so very far from this area, and it was very mean. I would look with great dismay on a situation involving the landing of large land armies on the continent of Asia. So my question is whether there is anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is nothing in the resolution as I read it that contemplates it. I agree with the Senator that that is the last thing we would want to do. However, the language of the resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Commander in Chief feels is necessary. It does not restrain the Executive from doing it. Whether or not that should ever be done is a matter of wisdom under the circumstances that exist at the particular time it is contemplated. This kind of question should more properly be addressed to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Speaking for my own committee, everyone I have heard has said that the last thing we want to do is to become involved in a land war in Asia; that our power is sea and air and that this is what we hope will deter the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese from spreading the war. That is what is contemplated. The resolution does not prohibit that or any other kind of activity.

Mr. Brewster said, "I thank the distinguished Chairman."
That is the passage the Secretary had reference to; is it not?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, there are some other passages along the same way. I think this entirely supports the point made by the Senator from Tennessee, that these passages must be read in the light of the circumstances that existed at that time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the Chairman yield?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I yield.

7

Senator SYMINGTON. What was the purpose of your bringing this passage up, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I brought up that particular passage, and there would be others in addition to it, only to show that the debate on the resolution was not limited to merely the incident in the Tonkin Gulf, and that the rather broad language was understood to give rather broad power and to authorize whatever the commander in chief regarded as necessary. I mean as far as the mood of not wanting to do this is concerned, certainly that was completely shared by the President and by the Administration. Nobody desired to get land forces in Vietnam, nobody desired any increase of them or any spread of the war in any respect. I do not believe the resolution authorized that. It authorized what was necessary; and what was made necessary was

made necessary by events which came afterward, which I do not think were predicted, which it was hoped would be avoided, but which were contemplated as possibilities. That is the only reason.

WHAT DID THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION DO?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you used the words "granting authority" or "authorizing." You remind me of a comment made by Professor Bartlett the other day in his discussion of this particular resolution. If I recall correctly, the record will show how accurate it is, he said that this resolution does not grant authority. He called attention to this language and I quote. This is the resolve by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

There is more to it of course, but I understood his point. He said this is not a declaration of war. We were approving the response to an attack upon our armed services, and the prevention of further ag gression, which would well be read in the context of the time as meaning further attacks upon our armed forces. And that being true, it is agreed by Bartlett and others that the President has an inherent power as commander in chief to repel an attack upon our armed forces or upon our own territory. There is a great question whether he has authority as commander in chief to repel an attack upon another country in the absence of specific authority. But there is that difference that Professor Bartlett called our attention to.

The Senator from Tennessee has called my attention to a further statement, elaborating on the answer that you called attention to. Senator GORE. Which bears upon intent.

The CHAIRMAN. It bears upon intent. This is on page 18459 of the Congressional Record, which is a statement by the chairman, as follows. This is in answer to a question by Senator Nelson. He was suggesting an amendment. I read it. My answer reads as follows:

It states fairly accurately what the President has said would be our policy, and what I stated my understanding was as to our policy; also what other Senators have stated. In other words, it states that our response should be appropriate and limited to the provocation, which the Senator states as 'respond to provocation in the manner that is limited and fitting.'

It goes on. I don't want to burden the record with all of that. But this relates directly to the point the Senator from Tennessee made. With that background, I will try to move along a little rapidly. Senator MUNDT. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I yield.

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

Senator MUNDT. Just to complete the record-and my memory is not clear on it-I think you should put in exactly what was done committeewise. You mentioned that they had met as a joint committee which I recall. Did the Foreign Relations Committee act separately, did we act as a joint committee? I think it would be well for historic purposes

to have the whole procedure, because it seems to me it was a pretty casual and rather urgent procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. We met jointly with the Armed Services Committee. The resolution was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services.

We operated under a 5-minute rule during that period which as I say consumed and hour and 40 minutes. There was a feeling, I believe I am accurate in saying, of great urgency. We were told this attack had taken place. The record, I may say the committee report and the hearings-is very brief. I have a copy here. There are some interesting passages, but there was the feeling that this attack had taken place. It was, we are told, a wholly unprovoked and very serious attack upon our armed forces in the high seas. Therefore there was a great sense of urgency, and we were asked to pass this quickly. The House had passed it at the time of the debate on the second day, August 7, 1964. I was told that it would be most unfortunate if there were any amendments allowed or any delay, because this would evidence a lack of confidence and unity within the Congress with our President. So we were requested not to accept amendments. Several of my responses to Senator Nelson and others were to the effect that yes, our policy was clearly understood, although the authority, the approval of the language was very broad. So I believe the intent, in the way the Senator from Tennessee correctly raises the question, was centered upon repelling the attack upon our armed forces.

Senator LAUSCHE, Mr. Chairman

The CHAIRMAN. Is that what the Senator had in mind?
Senator LAUSCHE. Will the Chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think in fairness it should be pointed out that if the record is read, it will disclose that opinions were expressed to the effect that the authority granted was limited to a repelling of any armed attack and to the repelling of aggression. So there was a combination of discussion in the hearings, on the Senate floor, one discussion to the effect that it gave plenary power, the other that it was limited.

The CHAIRMAN. I again would call attention-
Mr. KATZENBACH. It still is limited.

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The CHAIRMAN. I think these words are very difficult to keep straight. We find a great problem in the precision that Professor Bartlett referred to. He said he considered, if I recall correctly, this resolution not a grant of authority but a statement of policy. He said that it does not grant authority. I reiterate the words "The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President as Commander in Chief." I think this implicitly says that the Commander in Chief has this authority. We approve of your using it in this manner. As a matter of fact, he had already responded as commander in chief to the attack; so I think that is a point that is well to bear in mind when we are trying to delineate the extent of any grant of authority. Whether or not it is a grant of authority is a great question.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes.

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