STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL G. FINDLEY, A MEMBER OF CONGRESS FROM THE 20TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Mr. FINDLEY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a written statement?

Mr. FINDLEY. I do. I won't read the text of it, but I will summarize it, and hope that there may be some dialog about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. We will put the entire statement in the record. Mr. FINDLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

UNEASINESS ABOUT VIETNAM COMMITMENTS

I think it is quite apparent from the discussion that has ensued here this morning that there is wide disagreement, there is wide uneasiness about the Vietnam war. This is not true just on this side of the Capitol, it is true on the House side too. There is great uneasiness on the part of Senators and Representatives who voted for the resolution back in 1964, and I was one of them, and I feel it is an uneasiness born of unanswered questions-how did we get there, why are we fighting there, what will be the ultimate cost, when will we be able to get out, and what is the risk of engagement with China.

Some will say that our commitment in Vietnam really started with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution about which you talked at length this morning. It reads:

[T]he Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

But here the legal basis was the attack on American vessels on the high seas, as has been stated here earlier.

SEATO AS BASIS FOR COMMITMENT

Section 2 of the resolution presents an entirely different legal basis for further action. I won't read it all, but it relies exclusively on the phrase "in accordance with its obligations under the SEATO treaty.' So, therefore, the legal basis for the Tonkin resolution, as I would interpret it, was the SEATO treaty. Nothing in the way of authority that was in the Tonkin resolution or implied in it, could be derived any place but from the SEATO treaty. So it is important to examine the SEATO treaty as the basis for what has ensued in Southeast Asia. The first part of article IV of the SEATO treaty refers to aggression by means of armed attack. It also contains the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Now, the SEATO treaty, therefore, requires a determination of armed attack before any country may act. The Tonkin resolution related, therefore, only to an armed attack upon a U.S. ship, because there was no determination in the Tonkin resolution that armed attack had occurred against South Vietnam. No similar determination of armed attack on South Vietnam was made in the resolution nor in any form by the Executive or by the Congress until 6 months later in February of 1965 when the State Department issued a report entitled "Aggression From the North." That was 6 months after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

Since there was no determination of armed attack against South Vietnam for the basis of section 2 of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the SEATO treaty at that point had not been properly implemented in respect to South Vietnam and, therefore, could not serve as the basis for military action there. Moreover, since the Tonkin Bay resolution was based entirely upon the SEATO treaty it cannot justify our actions either.

Now, the hearings on the SEATO treaty in 1954 made it perfectly clear that some form of congressional action was required, and Secretary of State Dulles, in response to a question before this very committee, stated that the President "would act through the Congress if it were in session, and if not in session [he would] call Congress."

As far as I can learn, the provisions of the treaty have been fullfilled only in respect to the attack upon American ships. They have not been fullfilled in respect to the attack upon South Vietnam.

Is this a trivial, paperwork omission? Is it really of small importance, just a technicality hardly worth correcting? I think not.

CONSTITUTIONAL STEPS NOT COMPLIED WITH UNDER SEATO

Quite the contrary. In my view, this failure to take the required constitutional steps has led to this great feeling of uneasiness throughout the country about Vietnam. Because of this failure, the great issue in Vietnam and all of its vexing complexity has never really been placed on the anvil of democracy here on Capitol Hill where major policy decisions have traditionally been hammered out. Consequently, the unanswered questions, such as those raised here this morning, continue to torment both the Congress and the people of this country.

Had the issue been placed squarely on this anvil, the people of the United States, through their elected representatives in both Houses of Congress, could have brought these divergent views together in synthesizing debate and brought the matter to clear resolution.

After debate and the amendment process, a final vote on this question would have been had, and undoubtedly it would be a record vote, just as was the case with the Tonkin resolution, and from that date forward the Senators and Representatives who voted would have defended their votes. They would not have argued that they did not deal with this issue, for they would have known that they dealt with it and had cast their vote one way or the other. The die would have been cast and, in effect, the people of the United States would have spoken. In all probability subsequent criticism and dissent would have been relatively isolated and restrained, as it has been in past wars. Implementing this decision made here on Capitol Hill, the President would have had no trouble in establishing priorities in rallying public support.

Unfortunately, this had not occurred. The lack of compliance with constitutional procedures had the effect of denying our Nation a powerful, unifying influence.

This has undermined our position at home, and that, of course, has not gone unnoticed by the outside world, where it has tended to weaken our position by making us vulnerable to unnecessary criticism.

TAKING PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL STEPS NOW

Is it too late to fulfill constitutional procedure, to correct this paperwork omission that occurred back in 1964? I say it is not, and I say the sooner it is done the better for the country, the better for the President, the better for our long-range national welfare.

It is my feeling that a resolution should be placed before the Congress, one which will be debated and amended in order to forge a policy acceptable to the American people, one which will answer the grave fundamental questions that are now being asked.

In my view, this is the logical, the proper, the sensible way to remove this feeling of uneasiness so prevalent today.

The suggestion has been made that we repeal the Tonkin resolution. I believe a member of this body has suggested that course of action. That, in effect, would be a vote of confidence or a vote or no confidence for the President.

I question whether very many of us, no matter what we might say to the press, or privately, would vote to rescind the Tonkin resolution, because it would be interpreted worldwide as a repudiation, a personal rebuke, against the President.

But the procedure that I suggest could not reasonably be interpreted as criticism of the President or the conduct of the war. Indeed, it would be a form of self-criticism, a recognition on our part that the Congress really has not, up to now, fulfilled its constitutional responsibility.

NEW RESOLUTION SUGGESTED

Therefore, for two important reasons, first, because the SEATO treaty, as the law of the land, demands it and, secondly, because the American people deserve and desire to have this issue resolved in the only appropriate and capable forum, I have invited my colleagues on the other side of the Capitol to join me in introducing the following resolution:

Resolved, by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), that upon the adoption of this resolution, the appropriate committees of each House of Congress shall immediately consider and report to their respective bodies their determination as to whether further Congressional action is desirable in respect to polices in Southeast Asia.

It may well be that the Congress would decide that further legislative action is not desirable, but at least they would have come on to a decision upon that very important, fundamental question, and I feel that even in that event it would have served a great unifying influence upon our country.

This action would certainly be in keeping with the great constitutional procedures upon which this country is built. It would settle the national will and purpose, and because it would help to unify the Nation it would enable the President-and he is the President of all of us to provide more effective leadership in this troubled and troublesome period.

It will not seem inappropriate, I trust, Mr. Chairman, to express the hope that some consideration may be given to a similar resolution by the Senate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The prepared statement of Congressman Findley referred to follows:)

STATEMENT BY HON. PAUL G. FINDLEY, MEMBER OF CONGRESS, AT THE HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. SENATE, AUGUST 23, 1967, ON SENATE RESOLUTION 151

CONGRESS MUST ACT TO UNIFY NATIONAL WILL AND PURPOSE ON VIETNAM Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it is indeed an honor for me to be before this distinguished body of the Senate today to discuss this most important issue of "what constitutes a national commitment." It is a subject on which I have spoken on the Floor of the House several times, and one which I feel deserves a thorough public airing so that the people of this country may understand better the governmental processes which can lead us to peace or to war. I have followed your hearings up to this point with great interest, and I think we all will agree, as Senator Fulbright stated in his opening remarks, that "a national 'commitment' [must be defined] as an undertaking carrying in one form or another, the endorsement of Congress."

The form such an endorsement should take is an important question to which the Committee will undoubtedly give much attention. In August of 1964, the Administration and the Congress decided that the form of such an endorsement should be that of a Joint Resolution, known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Passed in response to a reported attack by North Vietnam upon two American ships in international waters, it declared Congressional support for measures already taken, and to be taken, by the President. The hearings on the resolution dealt almost exclusively with the facts of the attack and did not consider the war then raging in South Vietnam.

Today there is a great uneasiness among Senators and Representatives who voted for that resolution-an uneasiness that pervades the entire country. It is an uneasiness born of unanswered questions-how did we get there, why are we fighting there, what will be the ultimate cost, when will we be able to get out. what is the risk of China entering the war?

Despite the fact that with the latest increase in troops committed to the war. we will have over half a million men in Vietnam, the largest number since World War II; and

Despite the fact that a projection shows that more American men will be killed this year, and twice as many wounded, as were killed or wounded in all the previous years of the war combined; and

Despite the fact that we are spending over $20 billion per year on this great war effort, we are still uneasy about why we are fighting in Vietnam.

Thus, I am not being critical of the war or its conduct by pointing to this uneasiness. Aggression by means of subversion, terror instilled by guerillas, and entire units of North Vietnamese troops which can disappear into the jungles with scarcely a trace present a kind of military threat we have never before faced and one which is extremely difficult to meet. Yet, it is no wonder that those who have so many unanswered questions, and those who view the statistics of this war are uneasy; it is no wonder that they cannot understand the high cost to America. America values freedom today as much as in the past, and I am confident America will never shirk its responsibility to protect that freedom. America has the determination to fulfill that responsibility. Still, there is the uncertainty which we all feel. Americans are uncertain as to how and why this war began and how it will end. The previous instances which ushered us into war presented much sharper answers to these same questions.

On February 3, 1917, at a time when most of Europe was already at war, Germany began an unrestricted submarine war against American ships. Shortly thereafter the Congress declared war. There was no doubt in the mind of the nation what we wanted to do. Similarly, and more strikingly, Congress reacted after Japan attacked a sleeping Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, by declaring war the next day. Again, the American people did not falter.

Even our participation in the Korean War, though authorized by the United Nations and never formally declared a war by the Congress, was precipitated by an easily recognizable event-namely, the invasion on June 25, 1950, of South Korea by over 60,000 North Korean troops spear-headed by over 100 Russian built tanks.

The Vietnam war has no such easily definable origin or national consensus. Its beginning was small and its growth, until recently, was slow. Very few people remember how it all started, if they ever knew. Yet, it is a war that has been going on since the end of World War II. American aid was first given on June 27, 1950, when President Truman sent a 35-man Military Assistance Advisory Group in to advise the troops of other nations there in the use of American weapons. From this small beginning American participation has snowballed. The commitment of American troops began slowly. The first American injuries did not occur until October 22, 1957, and the first death on July 8, 1959. On May 5, 1960, the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam was doubled from 327 to 685. By 1962, it had again been upped to approximately 4,000 men; to 15,000 men in 1963; and to 23,000 men by the end of 1964.

Can anyone say when America began to "fight" the Vietnam war? With such a gradual and undefined beginning, is it any wonder that the American people are confused, that they do not understand the war and that they seek and deserve a clarification of how we got there and what we are doing there?

Yet our security can be imperiled not only by overt aggression but also by transformations which are made to appear, insofar as is possible, as not aggression at all. These "concealed wars" or "wars of national liberation" may appear as internal revolution or civil war. They may be instigated by outside forces or merely exploited by them. Many believe that these represent significant threats to the security of the free world.

Gradual Communist infiltration and domination of vital areas through steps each of which is small and seemingly insignificant may not appear to justify overt intervention. These non-overt aggressions present issues which are deliberately and intrinsically unclear. They stand in contrast to the armed invasion across the frontier of another country, the sinking of passenger ships with innocent civilians aboard and the unmerciful pre-dawn attack on a major military-civil target.

To ask for certainty in these situations may be a prescription for inaction. It may not be possible in advance to determine the nature of the conflict or every U.S. response.

These considerations make especially important clarification and resolution of national will through constitutional procedure.

Some will say the American commitment actually began when the Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 10, 1964. But there are striking differences between the events which preceded that resolution and the form of our response, and those of the three other wars of this century. In each of the two world wars, a massive attack upon American lives, ships, and territory was followed close on the heels by a formal Declaration of War by the Congress of the United States. After the invasion of the North Koreans, the United Nations Security Council asked the United States and other members to enforce the U.N. order for a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of troops. However, in the words of Secretary of State Rusk, testifying before this Committee meeting jointly with the Armed Services Committee on August 6, 1964:

"The immediate occasion for this Resolution is of course the North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels, operating in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, on August 2nd and August 4th. However, it is obvious that these attacks were not an isolated event but are related directly to the aggressive posture of North Vietnam. . .'

The Congress might have responded with a declaration of war, though I am not now suggesting that it should have or that the form of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution should have been different. What must be realized, and what has lead to immeasurable confusion, is that the legal basis for one section of the resolution is not the same as the legal basis for the other section, and the President cannot use the legal basis for one section to justify action under the other section. Section I of the operative part of the Resolution reads:

"[T]he Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

Here, the legal basis cited was that of the Commander in Chief to repel the attack upon the two American naval vessels operating in international waters. As the President stated at his news conference last Friday, he did not need Congressional authority for these purely defensive actions. It is always the right of American military personnel to respond when attacked. Therefore, once again, the legal basis for the response to the attack upon the American ships in 1964 was in the President's Constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.