The CHAIRMAN. No; I do not know that there is reason to say he is better qualified. It is a reason to say he has a great advantage in getting his way. That is quite different from saying he is better qualified, don't you think?

Mr. HOLT. Yes; I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what my point is. I do not know the answer to it.

Thank you very much.

Mr. HOLT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been very patient.

I want to insert, Mr. Reporter, in the record, certain material that former Senator Arthur Watkins has made available to the committee: a letter to President Eisenhower dated March 12, 1954; a discussion in the Senate on February 19, 1952; the extension of remarks by the Honorable Robert A. Taft on January 29, 1952; and certain excerpts of General Eisenhower which were brought to my attention by Senator Arthur Watkins from General Eisenhower's book, "The Mandate of Change." These have some historical interest, I think, and bear upon the question which is before the committee.

(The above referred to documents follow :)

Hon. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
President of the United States,

White House,

Washington, D.C.

MARCH 12, 1954.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I read with genuine interest your statement at the news conference on March 9 that, "There is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is the result of the Constitutional process that is placed on Congress to declare it. Now let us have that clear; that is the answer.”

It is refreshing to have a President again who honors the Constitution, and I extend to you my sincere congratulations upon the stand you have taken. I never had any doubt that this would be your position should the matter be presented squarely to you. But it does give me satisfaction, and I'm sure millions of other Americans to have you reiterate again your adherence to the Constitution. Your statement is especially reassuring at this time because of the statement made by Secretary Dulles in a speech in which he was quoted as saying in substance: "The President and his highest policy-making body, the National Security Council, had made a 'basic decision' ". This he said was "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing". This statement seemed to imply that an aggressive move on the part of our enemies would bring "instant retaliation". Instant retaliation has been interpreted to mean that the United States would strike first and then proceed to seek a declaration of war from Congress following the retaliation. Mr. President, from my youth I have been taught to believe that the Constitution was drafted under Divine inspiration; that it protected, or made possible through future amendments, the protection of all liberties and rights of the people of this great country. One of the greatest of these rights, in my opinion, is the right of the people themselves to make the decision as to war or peace through their own representatives in both houses of Congress. The act of putting this nation into war is of such grave consequence, affecting as it does the lives of its citizens who must do the fighting and dying, that it should be, and is, a matter for the people themselves to decide. In saying this. I am not overlooking the fact that it should be the duty of the Chief Executive in cases of attack upon the United States to repel instantly such an attack. Under such circumstance, the act of war is created by a hostile power. But in cases not involving an attack upon the United States, the people themselves, through their representatives in Congress, should make the decision whether or not we go to war.

In the same New York Times story which carried your press conference statement, I note an editorial comment on the North Atlantic Pact (and carried in the news story itself) to the effect that "moreover the United States commitments imply the possibility of similar action. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, for example, states: "The parties (including the United States) agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all ***". The Times consistently has interpreted this to mean that the President would be justified in acting without a vote of Congress immediately upon an attack upon any of our allies of the North Atlantic Treaty. Fairly interpreted, the Treaty does not contain any such authorization.

I am enclosing with this letter, Mr. President, a copy of a speech I made on this subject to the Senate a number of years ago when the protocol for bringing Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty was under consideration in the Senate. That speech is self-explanatory, and I think it clearly reveals that the legislative history shows that Article II of the self-same Treaty provides that only the Congress can implement its terms and carry out the obligations to which we are committed in that Treaty. That was the clearcut understanding given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as my speech reveals in detail.

With respect to the Korean involvement, I took the stand the day. President Truman announced that he had ordered the United States to intervene in the North and South Korean conflict that he was violating the Constitution and that it was his plain duty to present the matter, with all the surrounding facts and circumstances, to the Congress for whatever action Congress should decide should be taken in the matter. Many lives were lost and untold consequences came as a result of what I believe was the illegal action of President Truman. The country was divided, and the Korean war became the most unpopular war in the American history. Congress was in session at the time, and it would have been just as easy to bring the matter to the attention of the Congress as it was to discuss the matter with the United Nations Security Council.

With reference to the Indo-China war, let me say that I have been misquoted in the statements that said that I criticized your action in sending Air Force technicians to help service the planes which we had given to the French forces. What I actually did was to point out that your action was a borderline case which could possibly result in involvement.

On the floor of the Senate, in a colloquy with Senator Stennis, when discussing the matter, I called attention to Mr. Dulles' statement on "instant retaliation". I pointed out in that colloquy that if the international situation deteriorates to the point where it is apparent that an attack upon us, or any of our allies, is imminent, then the President should advise the Congress of the situation and ask for general authority for instant retaliation in the event an attack finally occurs at a location, or locations, which would immediately endanger our life as a nation or gravely affect our power to wage a war in the defense of our liberties and life as a nation.

This matter has been rather hurriedly put together, Mr. President, but I think I have raised questions about "instant retaliation" and have pointed out the relationship between the President and the Congress in such matters which deserve your serious consideration.

May I say in conclusion that I have written this letter very reluctantly, because I do not want to embarrass you or to put myself in a position of trying to meddle in the duties or responsibilities of the President of the United States. In other words, I should like to be helpful if possible, without becoming obnoxious.

Very respectfully,

ARTHUR V. WATKINS.

P.S.-You will note the date of this letter is March 12. Since writing it, the press conference of Mr. Dulles yesterday and your press conference of today have, in my opinion, raised serious questions which I am sure you and your staff will give immediate consideration to. I am sending the letter with enclosed copies of the speech I referred to, which I hope will be helpful in sustaining what I believe to be your position; that is, that Congress, except in direct attack upon the United States, must give the President the authority before war can be waged in the defense of our allies or other nations.

[Congressional Record]

PRESIDENT VIOLATES TREATY-SPEECH OF HON. ARTHUR V. WATKINS OF UTAH, IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1952 Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, a great deal is being said now about lack of morality in Government and about officials in Government who violate the law. Investigations are being held which have revealed a great deal of downright dishonesty and violation of the criminal statutes by many officials in various departments of the Government. The taking of bribes, the peddling of influence, the embezzling of public funds are grave matters, but they only have to do with enrichment of the offenders at the expense of the public.

In view of the legislative record which was made on the 6th and 7th of this month in the final consideration of the resolution ratifying the protocol of the North Atlantic Treaty which admitted Greece and Turkey to that pact, it now appears beyond all doubt and argument that the President of the United States is violating the express terms of that treaty in sending our Armed Forces to Europe as a part of the international army to garrison and defend Europe.

That is a grave charge to make, but there seems to be no escape from that conclusion in view of what happened in the Senate.

The President has, without any reference to the Congress, ordered divisions of troops to be stationed in Europe prior to an aggression. Prior to the great debate of last year on the "troops to Europe" resolution, he announced we would be sending 10 divisions to Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty.

But when an executive of this great country deliberately violates a treaty which, under the Constitution, becomes the law of the land, we have a matter of far greater and graver concern than any of the so-called exposures of official corruption that have been revealed in lower levels of government.

MAKES GRAVE CHARGE

Mr. President, I realize that I have made a grave charge against the Executive of the United States. I intend in this speech to make clear the reasons for making that charge and the grounds on which it is based, and in doing so, I want it understood that I am in nowise discussing the merits of whether it is wise or unwise to send our Armed Forces to Europe prior to an aggression. As a matter of fact I voted for the purely advisory Senate resolution which approved the sending of four divisions of troops to Europe. But this was not the act of Congress as I shall demonstrate the North Atlantic Treaty provides. I am directing my remarks directly at what I consider to be a grave and unprecedented violation of the supreme law of the land by the Secretary of State and President of the United States. In order to do that I shall have to review some of the background and legislative history of the North Atlantic Treaty at such times as it has been before the Senate of the United States for official consideration.

There seems to have been a failure on the part of most of the working press as well as certain Members of the Congress to realize the real significance of what was developed in the debate of the protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Pact. That debate, which largely centered around the interpretative language which I offered for inclusion in the resolution of ratification, had added an important chapter to the legislative history of the North Atlantic Treaty.

CONGRESS MUST APPROVE

A simple reading of the closing remarks of the debate will show that it is now a matter of record, available to all the world, that the constitutional processes of the United States require congressional approval insofar as the making of war or the employment of our troops in any foreign nation under the provi sions of the North Atlantic Pact is concerned.

The fact that the interpretative language which I offered was eventually withdrawn has been construed in some quarters as a personal defeat for the senior Senator from Utah and the senior Senator from Ohio (Mr. Taft). Nothing could be further from the truth. The official interpretation of the treaty is much stronger than the interpretative reservation I offered.

When the North Atlantic Pact was before the Senate in 1949, I offered a reservation as follows:

"The United States understands and construes article V of the treaty as follows:

""That the United States assumes no obligation to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area or to assist any other party or parties in said area, by armed force, or to employ the military, air, or naval forces of the United States under article V or any article of the treaty, for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military, air, or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.'"

POWERS NOT SURRENDERED

I have not been alone in the apprehension that the rejection of the reservations which were offered to the North Atlantic Pact in 1949 would be interpreted and construed by our North Atlantic friends and allies as evidence that the President of the United States in fulfilling the obligations of the United States under the North Atlantic Pact had the power to use the Armed Forces of the United States in any way he should see fit, even to the extent of taking the United States into war. It was my fear that, as a result of rejection of the reservation, our friends and allies might conclude that the Congress had now delegated to the President the power to make war and to employ the Armed Forces of the United States at will anywhere in the world without the consent or approval of Congress. When my reservation was defeated, I voted against the treaty, as I did in 1949, because it was being interpreted at that time by the press and the foreign offices of several of the countries which are parties to the pact as an automatic commitment to war on our part, without action on the part of Congress, in the event of an attack on any of our allies. This interpretation was based on article V of the treaty.

We were assured at that time, however, that the right of the people of this country to have the final “say," through their representatives in Congress, on the questions of war or peace was amply protected in article 11 of the treaty, which provided:

"The treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

It now appears that this provision went further than more people realized at the time, because it said that not only must the treaty be ratified by the parties to the pact in accordance with their constitutional processes, but its provisions must be carried out in the same manner. This was a departure from the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which left out the language "carried out."

NO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In the debate in 1949 on the treaty, no member of the Foreign Relations Committee, which was responsible for the treaty, at least in its presentation to the Senate, went so far as to give the legislative history of and define for the record the full meaning and significance of the words "constitutional processes."

In that debate I pointed out that it probably would be contended that the President could implement the treaty in the full meaning of that language because he had such power under the Constitution, or at least he would claim that power. My reservation was offered at that time in good faith, to make certain that our obligations under the treaty would mean the same thing in Europe as in our own country.

On the one hand I was assured by proponents of the pact that the power of Congress to have the last say on peace or war was fully protected; but on the other hand, when I urged that we should say so in the explicit language of my interpretative reservation or one similar to it, I was told that to do that would cut the heart out of the treaty. Obviously such a position was completely contradictory.

VOTED AGAINST TREATY

Under the circumstances I announced that if my interpretative reservation were adopted, I would vote for the treaty. But the reservation was rejected, and my vote was cast against ratification.

With the treaty in effect, and under our Constitution the law of the land, its implementation began. Congress was asked to provide armament for our allies which it did.

But when the President decided to send our Armed Forces to Europe, prior to an aggression, to become part of an international army, he ignored the Congress

and proceeded on his own, under the claim that he had the power under the Constitution to send our Armed Forces anywhere he felt necessary.

Then came the great debate.

The Senate, acting alone, finally adopted as advisory resolution, which does not have the force of law, advising the President in substance that in the interest of sound constitutional processes, Congress should be consulted before he sent any more troops to Europe, other than four divisions which he already had announced were to be a contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty defense forces. In addition, the action of the President in sending four divisions of troops to Europe was approved. I voted for that resolution.

It should be noted also that the President was acting on his own responsibility in establishing and manning air bases in Atlantic Pact countries in Europe and Africa.

The action of the Senate was in a substantial part the adoption of my interpretative resolution offered in 1949. The President and his spokesmen have continued to insist that the President has full power to implement the treaty without approval of the Congress, at least with reference to the disposition of our Armed Forces.

With this background, we then come to the action of the Senate in ratifying the protocol on the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty.

TREATY INTERPRETED

During the debate, the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. George], ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, made this significant statement on February 7:

"Let me say to the Senator from Ohio that the only trouble which has arisen in this case has developed because of the President's interpretation of a power which the Senate never gave to him or intended to give to him with respect to the employment of troops in foreign countries under the treaty.

"Whatever may be the President's power generally under the Constitution is an altogether different question. When we were writing the North Atlantic Treaty, it was upon my insistence, as a member of the Committee, that article 11 was inserted:

""The treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.'

"The Secretary of State then interpreted that language to mean all of its provisions, which of course, was correct.

"The Secretary of State, who was the spokesman for the administration, then interpreted the words 'constitutional processes' to mean congressional approval insofar as a declaration of war or the employment of our troops in any foreign country was concerned, and that language was designedly inserted into the treaty. "The only difficulty has arisen because of the failure of the Executive to follow a straightforward course and to act in accordance with the power delegated to him by the Congress. or, in this case, by the Senate.

"However, with all respect, I think the reservation offered by the distinguished Senator from Utah, and which the distinguished Senator from Ohio now is defending, really weakens the position of the Congress heretofore taken. For that reason, I could not and would not support it."

Mr. President, I fully agree that the interpretative reservation offered by me to be a part of the resolution of ratification of the protocol upon the acceptance of Greece and Turkey would weaken the position of the Congress, in the light of the interpretation placed upon article 11 of the pact by the distinguished Senator from Georgia, and now made crystal clear by his recital of the legislative history of article 11. The interpretation of the treaty by the Senator from Georgia was fully as strong as my interpretative reservation offered in 1949. which I quoted at the beginning of this speech. Let us consider the situation related by the Senator from Georgia.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MADE

First, it appears that the Foreign Relations Committee assisted, in a conference with the Secretary of State-Mr. Acheson-in the writing of the North Atlantic Treaty before it was signed by the various parties to the pact.

Second, that the Senator from Georgia insisted, as a member of the committee. that the following language be inserted in article 11 of the treaty:

"The treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."