Letter from Robert C. Hill, former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico and Assistant Secretary of State, to Senator Fulbright, September 13, 1967__ 318 Summary index__ 323 U.S. COMMITMENTS TO FOREIGN POWERS WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1967 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221 New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Fulbright, Gore, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper. OPENING STATEMENT The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We meet today to begin a series of hearings on the state of Congress' constitutional role on the making of American foreign policy. The occasion is Senate Resolution 151 which purports to define a national commitment as an undertaking carrying in one form or another the endorsement of Congress. Our purpose which goes beyond the present resolution is to evaluate the responsibilities and current roles of Congress and of the Executive in the making of foreign policy, the changes which have taken place in the respective roles of the two branches in recent decades, the reasons for these changes, and their effects upon our constitutional system. For purposes of this evaluation, we have requested the assistance of interested Senators, our representatives of the Executive branch, and of distinguished academic persons such as today's witness. On the basis of what is learned in these hearings, it is possible that the committee will wish to confirm Senate Resolution 151 in its present form or that it will wish to amend it, abandon it, or replace it with some other legislative instrument. In this respect I believe I can speak for my colleagues in saying that the committee approaches the present inquiry with an open mind. For myself I think it well to make clear at the outset that I have certain predilections. I will, of course, be pleased if even indirectly these hearings encourage the Administration to reconsider its war policies. I am deeply concerned, however, with the constitutional question to be considered in these hearings. The fact that the war in Vietnam is related to the constitutional problem does not mean that the latter is merely a facade for pressing opposition to the war. It means only that this war, which I oppose so deeply, and events connected with it, such as the adoption of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 and other events such as the Dominican intervention of 1965, have aroused in me an awareness of institutional problems that I probably should have had before, but in fact did not. 1 EVALUATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF CONGRESS I wish therefore to make it clear that although these hearings have been precipitated partly by the concern which some of the members of this committee feel about the Administration's war policy, their purpose is to evaluate the constitutional role of the Congress in the making of foreign policy. This problem, as statements on the Senate floor in support of Senate Resolution 151 have made clear, is of concern to all Senators regardless of party and regardless of their positions on the war in Vietnam. The witnesses have been invited solely on the basis of their special knowledge of the constitutional question. Whether and in what way any witness may refer to current issues is a matter of which the committee has no advance knowledge. I have another predilection which I wish to make clear at the outset. I believe that a marked constitutional imbalance between the Executive and the Congress in matters of foreign policy has developed in the last 25 years as a result of which the Executive has acquired virtually unrestricted power to commit the United States abroad politically and militarily. I further believe that this imbalance should be redressed, that it is important for the Congress to reassert a measure of authority in foreign relations, including the war power, the general advise and consent function of the Senate and the power to pass upon proposed foreign commitments by treaty or other legislative means. I have attempted in the past, most recently in my statement of July 19 before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, to spell out these contentions by reference to specific events, and I hope to return to the subject in the future, drawing upon what will be learned in the inquiry which we begin today. PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW At present, however, I wish only to state the personal point of view on which I enter these hearings. During the decade of the 1950's I was impressed by the relative immobility of American foreign policy, and on several occasions expressed the view that the presidential power to conduct our foreign policy had been unduly circumscribed by Congressional interference. It may be recalled that under the impact of the activities of the late Senator McCarthy and the exploits of his agents Cohn and Schine, our foreign service in the State Department was virtually paralyzed. These unfortunate circumstances together with the tension of the cold war of that period led me to advocate greater freedom for the Executive in the conduct of the foreign policy. These views are reflected in speeches that I gave in 1961. We are all susceptible to the human tendency to give undue weight to concerns of the moment. As a result of the experience of the 1950's there was reason to be concerned with immobility in American foreign policy. Having now experienced the frenetic mobility of the 1960's, the overheated activism and the ubiquitous developments in the mounting sense of a global mission often referred to as the responsibilities of power, I now see merit that I formerly did not see in occasional delay or inaction. I now see how great the Executive's foreign policies powers are and how limited the Congress' restraining powers are and I see great merit in the checks and balances of our 18th century Constitution. One learns or tries to learn from experience. Events of recent years tend to support certain premises that are implicit in the Constitution, that hasty action is often unrewarding, that precipitous decisions tend to be unwise decisions resulting in unwanted commitments from which it is difficult to extricate ourselves. In the last six years the United States has taken four major military actions on the basis of executive decisions made either secretly or under such alleged conditions or urgency as to preclude meaningful consultation with the Congress. In only one of these instances, that is, the missile crisis of 1962, was the urgency genuine, and on that occasion at least the leadership of the Congress could have been brought into the Administration's decisionmaking without loss of time or secrecy. In the other three instances, that is, the Bay of Pigs, the passive intervention in Vietnam, and the intervention in the Dominican Republic, it would have been very much better if action had been delayed to permit careful consultation between the Executive and the Congress. None of these three instances was as great an emergency as it was made out to be at the time. We could as well have intervened in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam a few weeks later than we did and be as well off for having done so as we are now; and had there been a few weeks delay for thinking things over perhaps we would not have intervened at all, in which case we would be better off than we are now. Experience, I believe, points at least as much to the dangers of precipitous and excessive action as it does to the dangers of inaction. Perhaps out of these hearings there may arise suggestions for reducing both dangers. For my own part I feel sure that whatever safeguards are devised, they must be institutional rather than personal, rooted in established constitutional procedures rather than personal estimates, and promises concerning the exercise of power. Most important of all, whatever safeguards we devise we must be prepared to respect them as much when they obstruct our personal wishes as when they advance them. Out witness today is Mr. Ruhl Bartlett, professor of diplomatic history at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Professor Bartlett has taught at Tufts and the Fletcher School since 1927. He is the author of several books of which the most recent is "Policy and Power, Two Centuries of American Foreign Relations" published in 1963. Professor Bartlett is also the editor of the "Record of American Diplomacy," a standard book of documents and meetings in the history of American foreign relations. Professor Bartlett, we are very pleased indeed to have you today. We do appreciate your taking the time to come here and discuss these matters with the committee. I want to announce it will be about 15 minutes before the copies of Professor Bartlett's statement will be available due to technical difficulties. I wish to insert at this point the resolution and several editorials discussing the matter which is before the committee this morning. (The material referred to follows:) [S. Res. 151, 90th Cong., first sess.] Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in recent years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government through means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment. [From the Philadelphia (Pa.) Evening Bulletin, Aug. 3, 1967] In constitutional theory, the duty and the right of the U.S. Senate to advise and consent on foreign policy initiated by the President is quite simple and clear. But in practice it is not either clear or simple, and this is what gives interest to the resolution submitted by Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) calling for joint congressional-presidential statements where any foreign commitment is involved. At first glance, this would seem an attempt on the part of the legislative branch to intrude upon the executive. But it can also be argued as merely an attempt to restore the historic balance, by letting the Congress know what we're in for before we have become so involved that national pride and self-preservation make it impossible to pull out. This would apply not only currently, but to the past and future. Were the commitments made at Yalta and Potsdam what the Senate, as elected representatives of the people, really wanted? Are we so deep in Vietnam because of commitments on which there was executive decision only? There are extreme difficulties in such questions, because Congress has often shown itself to be indecisive to a hopeless degree. The Executive has to be able to move, and swiftly, under some circumstances. Yet if-as Senator Fulbright insists-this is not meant to apply to one President, nor to any one situation, but only to clarify our future course, then the resolution is well worth careful debate. An impressive array of senators of both parties agree with him on this. [From the Boston (Mass.) Globe, Aug. 2, 1967] THE FULBRIGHT RESOLUTION The resolution introduced in the U.S. Senate on Monday by Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has been long overdue. It is intended to prevent the Executive Branch from making foreign policy commitments to other nations without the Senate's approval. Several supporters of the war in Vietnam have endorsed it, and Sen. Fulbright has made it clear that the resolution is aimed at practices during not only the current administration, but the preceding three. Yet its relevance to the "commitments" cited in justification of our Vietnamese policy is clear. For example, a 1954 letter from President Eisenhower to the then premier of South Vietnam has since been cited as a "commitment," when all it pledged was assistance. And Vice President Humphrey in April 1966 spoke of "great commitments" made at the Honolulu Conference the preceding February. In neither case was the Senate consulted. All too often it was willing to let the administration go ahead on its own. Passage of the Fulbright Resolution, after hearings in September, would be an encouraging sign that the upper chamber of Congress is moving to regain its full power of advice and consent supposedly guaranteed by the Constitution. [From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times, Aug. 2, 1967] Concern is growing, in Congress and the nation, that the United States has allowed itself to become saddled with a whole collection of vague and ill |