in which our large scale operations have developed there on constitutional grounds. It is perfectly obvious that if the executive branch were confident that the legislative branch would consent to its actions, it would seek such consent. If, on the other hand, the chief executive-particularly a politically astute President, who feared dissent from within his own party-had reason to doubt that such consent would be forthcoming, he would not ask Congress' opinion of his policies. Although there is ample evidence that the President has not sought the advise and consent of the Senate, as often as he should have, it is also clear that on many occasions Congress has surrendered its prerogatives to the executive branch. If the President can be attacked for usurping legislative power, Congress can also be criticized for willfully and deliberately abdicating its constitutional responsibilities. Has Congress fully discharged its duty to review independently policies before they are embarked upon, or to carefully study later the actual results obtained by following various policies? How seriously does the Senate study the qualifications of men nominated by the President for ambassadorial, military and other appointive posts? Are all the gentlemen confirmed truly the best possible choices for the positions they receive? There is nothing unique or magical about the conduct of military or foreign relations; why then are there so few Congressional initiatives in this field, and why does the executive branch tend to disregard those policy recommendations it does receive from Congress? At present, there appears to be an encrustation of negativism in Congress, particularly in the Senate. The constant nay-saying leaves the Administration free to act without providing positive thoughts, new ideas or direction. The purpose of the separation of powers is to make the government as democratic and as representative as possible. If Congress continues to abdicate its rightful role in foreign affairs, we run the risk of following policies which do not represent the will of the people. If it were so inclined, Congress could reassert itself in many ways, perhaps most dramatically by exercising its power over appropriations. To take an extreme example, let us speculate what would happen if the President were of one party and the Congress of another, and they disagreed on whether or not to fight a war. If Congress voted to restrict military expenditures, can anyone doubt that the President would be unable to wage war? The Congress does indeed have the ability to reassert itself, and by less unpalatable means, if it so desires. However, based upon pragmatic evidence available, the trend in Congress seems to be toward closer cooperation with the executive, rather than toward a reassertion of constructive legislative initiative. There seems to be a considerable tendency for people who aspire to Congress to identify strongly with the President's programs. They no longer see themselves as arbiters of policy guidelines, nor in the light of the intended checks and balances, but rather as the implementing arm of Presidential policies. This brings us to the third, purely political point. If Congress as a whole is not going to exert its prerogatives in the foreign affairs field, is it not incumbent upon the representatives of the party out of power to revert to their traditional opposition role? Why should the loyal opposition not as scrupulously inspect and question the activities of our government abroad as they do its actions at home? Foreign policy lends itself as easily to thorough and logical examination as does domestic policy. The whole bipartisan concept, which is particular and unique in its extensive application to foreign affairs, is in need of reappraisal. Why should investigation, review and the origination of alternative proposals stop at the water's edge when so much of the taxpayer's money, and ofttimes our citizens' lives, are expended in the international arena? While the concept that irresponsible opposition to established policies in time of national emergency is helpful to the enemy may have some validity, the magnitude of the threat to the United States would need to be most extreme for this concern to take precedence over the essential requirement for discussion and the airing of divergent views as an integral part of the democratic process. In order to exert its influence, Congress should be more adequately staffed by technicians capable of conducting independent reviews of executive branch policies, both in the foreign affairs and defense fields. The Administration will quite naturally weight its testimony in favor of its predetermined policies, and information which might prove embarrassing or contradictory to established policies is normally classified and will not be produced unless specifically asked for. While Congress as a whole should independently review and investigate governmental operations, the opposition in particular has a responsibility to the public to be active in this work. Yet the so-called bipartisan staffing pattern of both the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committees greatly reduces the opposition's ability to function effectively. At present I believe there are some 29 people working on foreign affairs for the Senate, none of which is listed as minority staff members. On the House side there are 19 staff poistions, only two of which are designated as minority employees. As a result, members must rely almost exclusively on their own staffs to do the type of research which the opposition has a special obligation to do. I do not mean to imply by all of this that I do not recognize the requirements for good security in highly sensitive matters; however, the representatives of the people, if not the entire public, have a right to know what is going on and a responsibility to keep themselves well informed. With this in mind, a change in the staffing patterns and a reexamination of the value to the nation of the entire concept of bipartisan foreign policy would seem to be in order. In closing, I should like to note that we live in a time of recurrent crisis and we will, I am afraid, need to learn to live with unsettled conditions unless our Communist opponents care to redefine their objectives in the world. Actually, most of these crises do not constitute immediate or direct threats to the vital interests of the United States. In plotting moves on the atomic chess board, both sides are restrained from moving too quickly or dynamically for fear of panicking the other side into a massive retaliation posture. Thus, although it is true that tensions are often high, we find that, as was most recently the case in the Middle East, the superpowers are seeking to avoid direct confrontation with each other. The actual world situation, then, belies the often repeated claim that the world is so much smaller now than when the Constitution was written that there is no onger time to deliberate before acting. Yet, the President normally consults lirectly with scores of people and indirectly through the chain of command in he executive departments with hundreds of others, before he acts on any international problem. The world is much too complex today for one man to have sufficient knowledge about its many problems for decision-making purposes. In fact, the same modern technology which has shrunk the world, and thus made t necessary for more rapid responses than in the past, has also made it much simpler for the President to consult with advisors before taking action. At the time the Constitution was written, people needed to be called together by messengers on horseback, and to write everything out in longhand, were obliged to wait weeks for replies to communications, and so forth. Today it is easier to consult with advisors. There is the opinion that time exists to do so unless the United States is in imminent danger of military attack. Thus, the President can, and does, seek advise before acting, but often he does not turn to the Congress for that advise as the Constitution requires. Mr. Chairman, one hopes that public hearings such as those being held on Senate Resolution 151 will alert not only the President, but also Senators and Congressmen to concentrate on their respective responsibilities for the establishment and conduct of policies so vital in the international field. I request that this letter be made a part of the hearings on Senate Resolution 51. Respectfully submitted. ROBERT C. HILL, Former Ambassador to Mexico and The CHAIRMAN. The committee is adjourned. SUMMARY INDEX (List of witnesses appears alphabetically in contents) Administration statements at NATO, SEATO, and Tonkin Gulf resolu- Advisory function of Senate, use of Aiken, Senator George D.: Examination of witnesses: Katzenbach, Hon. Nicholas deB_ Amending the Constitution--- Page 172, 173 American involvement in Vietnam in absence of Tonkin Bay resolu- "Authorizing" and "authority," meaning of.. Bombing policy of United States.. Broad delegations of power to the President in resolutions_ 94-95 258, 288, 289 128, 141, 143 170 12 212 306 33, 98 307 11 14 218, 297 129 186 40 Katzenbach, Hon. Nicholas deB______ 131–132, 157–163, 168, 183, 187 Comparison between Pearl Harbor and Gulf of Tonkin attacks.. Conflict over shared powers to make treaties__ Congo situation: Question of Presidential authority in.. U.S. involvement in recent__ Congressional approval for defense of Republic of China......- Congressional authority: Evaluation of role of Page 96 95 225 308 223 95, 119 225 24 86 237 41 33 17 22 2 Congressional resolution on President's use of Armed Forces. 12 210 47 Congress power to declare war, and the Tonkin Gulf resolution_ Constitutional Convention, thrust of the_ Constitutional division of powers. Constitutional prerogatives of Congress, reasserting-. Constitutional roles of legislative and executive, reversal of _ |