on NIKE X had reached a point where we felt that the NIKE X was ready for deployment.

SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF ABM SYSTEM

Now the situation that we are facing is that in the last year the intelligence community has noted that the Soviets are deploying an ABM system around Moscow [deleted].

I would like to emphasize to the committee that there is no divergency of view within the intelligence community as to the purpose of the Moscow deployment. Unanimously, they agree that this is an antiballistic missile system.

[Deleted.]

The intelligence community also believes that [deleted] the Soviets will probably extend and improve their ABM defenses over the coming years. This is the defensive aspect.

The offensive aspect is this. As pointed out in the Secretary's posture statement, the Soviets have accelerated the deployment of hardened ICBM's. [Deleted.]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff don't know whether the Soviet overall objective is strategic nuclear parity or superiority. In either case, we believe that their probable aims are one or more of the following.

First, to reduce the United States assured destruction capability— that is, our ability to destroy their industry and their people.

Second, to complicate the targeting problem which we have in directing our strategic forces against the Soviet Union.

Third, to reduce our confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses, thereby reducing the possibility that the United States would undertake a peremptory first strike against the Soviet Union, even under extreme provocation.

Fourth, to achieve an exploitable capability, permitting them freedom to pursue their national aims at conflict levels less than general nuclear war.

ASSUMED SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT

As pointed out in the Secretary's posture statement, his recommendation at the end against deploying NIKE X at this time is based fundamentally on the following, and I am quoting:

The Soviet Union would be forced to react to U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear forces, with the result that, first, the risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States would not be further decreased, and second, the damage to the United States from a nuclear attack in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense.

We feel that this judgment assumes that Soviet reaction to NIKE X deployment will be equal, opposite, feasible, and possible. We don't think that it gives sufficient weight to important interactions associated with deploying NIKE X, and importantly, consideration of the interaction of not deploying the NIKE X appears not to be weighed sufficiently.

COSTS TO OVERCOME DEPLOYMENT

We do not pretend to be able to predict with certainty just how the Soviets will react. We do know from experience the high price they

must pay to overcome a deployed U.S. ABM system, and some of the costs to them are the following:

First, the economic and the technological expenditures necessary to counter the NIKE X.

Second, the diversion of resources from other high-priority programs.

Third, [deleted] the point which Senator Symington was talking to a moment ago [deleted].

INCREASED NUCLEAR WAR RISK BY SOVIET ABM DEPLOYMENT

Again, we feel that they would also be faced with the grave uncertainties associated with targeting against an ABM defended nation. We believe that the Soviet offensive and defensive buildup does increase the risk of nuclear war because, in the first place, deterrence is a combination of forces in being and state of mind.

Should the Soviets come to believe that their ballistic missile defense, coupled with a nuclear attack on the United States, would limit damage to the Soviet Union to a level acceptable to them, whatever that level is, our forces would no longer deter, and the first principle of our security policy is gone.

I should say here that while I certainly agree-and so do the Joint Chiefs that the basis of deterrence is the ability to destroy an attacker as a viable nation, as a part of this, there is also the ability of the nation to survive as a nation--in other words, the converse of the first point.

Second, lack of a deployed U.S. ABM increases the possibilities of a nuclear war by accident and by the Nth country triggering.

Third, failure to deploy a U.S. ABM creates a strategic imbalance both within our forces and between the United States and the Soviet forces. It could lead to Soviet and allied belief that we are interested only in the offensive, that is, a first strike, or that our technology is deficient, or that we will not pay to maintain strategic superiority.

EFFECTS OF ANTIMISSILE DEPLOYMENT

We also believe that damage to the United States from a nuclear strike can be reduced by an ABM system in a meaningful way. Now, of course, Mr. Chairman, nobody can say at what point of nuclear destruction a nation is no longer a viable society. We do know, or at least we have estimates, that the Soviets lost something like 25 million people in World War II. Now these losses are not exactly comparable, of course, to what would happen in a nuclear war, because they lost 25 million people perhaps over a period of 4 or 5 years. We are talking here of the loss of 25 or more million people in a matter of hours, and the psychological shock and other effects would be considerably different.

Nevertheless, one nation will probably survive best in a nuclear exchange, and the 30, 40, or 50 million American lives that could be saved by NIKE X are, therefore, meaningful, we believe, in every

sense.

Now the basis of our recommendation-this is a sort of recap, Mr. Chairman-the basis of the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs that we initiate new deployment of NIKE X with an initial operating

capability in [deleted] is based fundamentally on the requirement to maintain the total strategic nuclear capability or balance clearly in favor of the United States.

Specifically, we believe that deployed NIKE X would do one or more of the following: First, provide a damage limitation capability by attrition of a Soviet attack.

Second, introduce uncertainties which would inhibit Soviet leaders from concluding that the United States could not survive a Soviet first strike or that the United States would not preempt under any circumstances.

Third, stabilize the nuclear balance.

Fourth, demonstrate to the Soviets and our allies that the United States is not first-strike minded; in other words, that we don't put all of our eggs in the offensive basket.

Fifth, continue to deny to the Soviets an exploitable capability. And by this I mean to continue the Cuba power environment in the world.

I think that in regard to this last point, and to explain it a bit, I should point out that by this we mean that at the time of Cuba, the strategic nuclear balance was such that the Soviets did not have an exploitable capability, because of our vastly superior nuclear strength. And to bring this forward into the present context, it's also the view of the Joint Chiefs that regardless of anyone's feelings about the situation in Vietnam, we think it quite clear that we would have had even more hesitation in deploying our forces there, had the strategic nuclear balance not been in our favor.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

ESCALATION OF ARMS RACE

Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, you used the words "Soviet reactions" several times. What do you mean by that?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The Soviets, I think all of us would agree, Mr. Chairman, would react if we put up a defense that substantially reduces their to detonate offensive weapons on or over our soil. I don't believe there is any disagreement in the Pentagon on this.

power

Chairman RUSSELL. You would define it as an increase in the arms race rather than an armed attack on this country?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, it would definitely reduce the value of our defense, if they reacted, and that is the point I make in the statement. I have not alluded in the statement to the arms race, although it would definitely escalate, in my opinion, at great cost and no real gain to either side. We are already reacting to their ABM. [Deleted.]

SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

Chairman RUSSELL. It seems to me that there would have been a more marked reaction on their part to the development of the POLARIS submarine than there would be to a purely defensive weapon. The POSEIDON and the POLARIS are purely offensive and have tremendous striking power, and the weapon we are talking about is a defensive weapon. It would seem to me that an offensive weapon would be more apt to disturb them and bring about a reaction.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think both do, Mr. Chairman. I think we are seeing a reaction to our offensive capability today.

[Deleted.] I don't think there is any question but that this is what happened. So they did react to POLARIS and they did react to MINUTEMAN.

REQUESTS BY CITIES FOR ABM SYSTEM

Chairman RUSSELL. After a fashion. I wasn't impressed by yourargument that if we deployed an ABM system, we would have a demand from cities [deleted]. We built the NIKE-HERCULES and the AJAX, and we thought when we built them we were getting a weapon against a nuclear attack from aircraft. I don't recall any great clamor from cities for batteries of NIKE-HERCULES and AJAXES.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, one of the reasons was they wouldn't have been very effective deployed at those sites when the bomber attack was expected from the North. In this particular case

Chairman RUSSELL. You don't have confidence in the effectiveness of this one.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do in this sense, Mr. Chairman. That if you put these around [deleted] cities, the Soviet planners are going to retarget their weapons to all the other cities, because there is no sensewasting weapons on [deleted] if you have got all the rest unprotected. [Deleted.] And the danger to the other cities that aren't protected is increased by the fact that we protect [deleted] and make them less vulnerable and therefore less desirable targets. And that new factor is in addition to the fact that they just have no protection to begin with. The danger is increased because of the incentive of the Soviets to retarget. I anticipate there will be a tremendous clamor in this country, if we ever go ahead and protect only [deleted] and leave the others. There are [deleted] other cities of over 100,000 population that wouldn't be protected by the SPRINT missiles in that light sys

tem.

Chairman RUSSELL. I have a question here on the question that Senator Symintgon touched on.__[Deleted.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.]

General WHEELER. [Deleted.]

Chairman RUSSELL. [Deleted.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. [Deleted.]

[Colloquy deleted.]

MINUTEMAN I AND II MISSILE LOCATION AND RELIABILITY

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Young.

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. Secretary, I note in table 2 that at the end of fiscal year 1967, the MINUTÉMAN II force would total [deleted] missiles. Just where are these located?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can't tell you exactly where the IIs are. The MINUTEMAN Is and IIs are all over the Northwest. I will be happy to get the location of IIs versus Is. I have forgotten which specific wings we converted to IIs and which wings are still Is.

(The information is classified and was furnished separately to the committee.)

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. In your view, how reliable are they?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think quite reliable, Senator Young.

We have over the past 2 or 3 years engaged in so many missile firings that I have no hesitancy in saying that both the POLARIS system and the MINUTEMAN are highly reliable. It has exceeded the estimates that I gave the Congress whenever we had the controversy over reliability, which would have been in 1964.

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. All right. I have been fussing with the Air Force about this for quite some time. [Deleted.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. I just looked at a report on this a short time ago, Senator Young. Let me get the data and either give it to you or insert it in the record here, because I don't think there is any question about the basic reliability of our missile systems.

Periodically we have mechanical problems in missiles as we do in tanks or rifles or aircraft, so that as these come up, they are corrected. There is one now, I can't even think which system it is in. It has to do with a safety device [deleted]. In any case, it is one of the typical mechanical problems that we encounter all the time.

General WHEFLER. May I speak to this point of the MINUTEMAN II?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Surely.

General WHEELER. We have been running a series of tests out at Vandenberg, Senator, on the MINUTEMAN II. They had a retrofit of an improvement device; they had some trouble; and if I recall correctly, the first [deleted] out of [deleted] shots were failures. However, as of yesterday, out of [deleted] shots, they have had [deleted] successes. In other words, after the initial [deleted] failures, they have fired [deleted] more missiles and have had only, I believe, one failure, so that the success figure is going back up to what we would anticipate it to be.

MISSILE MODIFICATION PROCEDURE

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think, Senator Young, as we go through the kind of improvement modifications we are going through on all of these missile systems, [deleted] every time we make a change of that kind, we are going to have some failures at the beginning. And it is for that reason that we have this very extensive and expensive test program.

But I think it is also fair to say, and I would like to ask Bus his view on this, that we have no hesitancy whatsoever in targeting based on our reliability figures.

General WHEELER. As a matter of fact, in the targeting program, based upon the results of these tests, we have reliability figures which are cranked into the targeting process [deleted].

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. [Deleted.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will be happy to give you a public explanation of it, or material you can use publicly, Senator Young. Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. Will you give me something? Secretary MCNAMARA. Surely.

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. The Air Force won't give me anything that is meaningful.