8. Europe and the NATO Area Western Europe remains the most important single grouping of nations with which the United States is intimately and inevitably associated. Everyone, including the Soviets, understands clearly that for any hostile power to attempt to dominate or control Western Europe's 350 million people, immense material resources, and strategic positions would be to strike directly at the vital interests of the United States. It is equally clear that their intimate association and alliance with the United States best enables the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty to protect themselves, their security, and their freedom from pressure and coercion. These fundamental considerations far surpass in importance any matter of formal treaty arrangements or the kinds of current issues which occupy our day to day attention. I can report that in many respects NATO has made much progress in the past year. Despite repeated assertions that the Alliance is in crisis, the fact is that it has been adjusting in a very effective way to changing times and circumstances, adapting its organization and procedures so as to preserve an effective collective security system. Before discussing NATO's activities during the year, it may be well to summarize the general trends of political events in Europe. There are clear signs of change in Europe. Currently, our NATO allies are reassessing their individual and collective military situations, the nature and extent of the threat which potential Soviet aggression now presents, whether the Alliance needs to be changed in order to take advantage of the emerging political fluidity throughout Europe, and the search for peace in Europe. I believe that their conclusions are not very different from our own. They believe, as we do, that the Alliance remains necessary, but that it should not be an obstacle to bridging the present dividing line through Europe. Clearly, the maintenance of a strong and effective Allied military posture is not in the least inconsistent with a vigorous search for new ways to shift from the passive concept of peaceful co-existence to what President Johnson has called "the broader vision of peaceful engagement". Rather, NATO's strength is in large measure the reason why these new possibilities are beginning to open before us. The United States will work with its European allies in searching for opportunities for peaceful engagement with the eastern half of Europe. One of the strongest reasons for the continuation of the Alliance is Germany. It is the Alliance that has kept the Federal Republic of Germany free, and it is in large degree through the Alliance that the Federal Republic has resumed a peaceful and harmonious relationship with her neighbors in Europe. And it is the Alliance that has made possible a German contribution to the defense of the West in a degree appropriate to her resources. It is the Alliance that permits, through the presence of Allied forces in Germany, both the collective defense of Western Europe and the manifestation of the continuing obligation of the Allies for an ultimate peace settlement in Central Europe and for the reunification of Germany itself. NATO thus can play a vital role in the political evolution that is beginning in Europe. It provides the framework of defense which makes possible the search for new political solutions without endangering the security of the member nations. It can continue to contribute both militarily and politically to the strengthening of the bonds which hold the Atlantic Community together. The events of last year give reason for encouragement concerning the vitality and cohesion of NATO. France has withdrawn its forces from NATO command and has requested that NATO forces be removed from France. At the same time, the French Foreign Minister has reaffirmed France's intention to remain a party to the North Atlantic Treaty beyond 1969; and France is continuing to participate in some Alliance activities. The other fourteen members are determined to maintain NATO institutions and are managing the adjustments within NATO so as to make possible coordination with France, including military liaison arrangements. the invitation of the Belgian government, the North Atlantic Council and the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) are moving to that country, as is the Military Committee, which has been here in Washington. The Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) is moving to the Netherlands. The NATO Defense College has moved to Rome and has resumed operations after only a few months interruption. At The relocation of U.S. facilities from France has proceeded with equal smoothness. The headquarters of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) will shortly be established in Stuttgart, Germany. Our Air Force units have been or are being relocated either to the United Kingdom or to the continental United States, from where they will continue to be available in support of our NATO commitments. In the main, our stocks and depots are being relocated elsewhere in Europe, principally to Germany and the U.K. 74-454 O-67-3 The Alliance has taken this opportunity to undertake some needed streamlining, reforms and economies. Several echelons in the higher NATO military structure have been eliminated by the abolition of the Standing Group and of two subordinate headquarters Allied Land Forces Central Europe and Allied Air Forces Central Europe. The staff support for the Military Committee has been strengthened and its direction streamlined. A substantial reduction in personnel strength is being made in SHAPE. I should add a word about our relations with the Government of France. We would, of course, have preferred a different attitude on her part, but there is nothing to be gained for us or our Allies in debating the position of the French Government. We continue to welcome France's participation in those Alliance activities in which she has an interest and to which she is willing to contribute. There is much constructive work to be done in the Alliance, and it is to this positive aspect of the situation that we should address ourselves. There are two main areas in which constructive actions can be taken; one is primarily military and the other primarily political, but with the most far-reaching security implications. - With regard to the first, a major change in attitude and substance has begun to occur in the management of the Alliance's defense forces. The Alliance has begun the process of effective force planning, under which the member countries project their long range plans for defense expenditures, jointly relate these plans to the military contingencies they may face collectively, and attempt to design the most effective forces that can be purchased and supported with the resources expected to be available. Some important imbalances remain between our country and the others, between one Service's capabilities and those of another, and between plans and resources but we are making progress. In particular, NATO made substantial progress in the past year in developing an Alliance-wide five-year program for planning the size and composition of our forces as well as their equipment. And, last July, the NATO Defense Ministers approved guidance under which the NATO military authorities are to develop their force proposals for the period beyond 1970. - A crucial factor in this effort, it seems to me, is the increasing willingness of the politically responsible defense officials of the various nations to take an active role in Alliance military matters. Too often in the past, these officials have not played a sufficiently direct role in Alliance military planning, and have left the primary responsibility to military authorities who did not have the political or financial responsibility or authority. I am, therefore greatly encouraged by the growing direct participation of my colleagues in the defense affairs of the Alliance, and I am hopeful that this participation will increase further in the future. As you know, last autumn, President Johnson, Prime Minister Wilson, and former Chancellor Erhard agreed on the need for a searching reappraisal of the threat to our common security, of the forces required for deterrence and defense in central Europe, and of the question of equitable sharing of the defense burdens. The importance of this study was underscored by the difficulties encountered by the United Kingdom in meeting foreign exchange costs of its forces in various overseas theaters, including Germany, and by our own balance of payments difficulties. A good deal of agreement has already been reached in these talks, particularly with regard to the nature of the threat and the general principles which should govern the size and composition of the nuclear and conventional forces of the Alliance in the Central Region. Some differences still remain, however, and fuller consideration needs to be given to equitable sharing of the financial burdens and to the implications of new technology, especially that related to our rapidly growing strategic mobility. These issues are now being systematically addressed and proposals resulting from the trilateral review will later be the subject of full consultation with NATO as a whole. The real significance of all these activities is that the Allied Governments are making a systematic effort to relate strategy, forces, and financial factors on a multilateral basis in order to develop a rational, coherent, and realistic force posture for the Alliance as a whole. The second major aspect of the management of the Alliance is the much discussed matter of nuclear strategy. Here, too, I am strongly encouraged by recent events. For some years we in the Alliance had been engaged in a somewhat abstract debate, conducting our strategic discussion too much in terms of generalities. Now we have entered a period of far more mature consideration of these matters. In November 1965 the North Atlantic Council formed a Special Committee composed of the Defense Ministers of 10 NATO nations to examine means of increasing Allied participation in various aspects of nuclear planning and consultation. We have examined and discussed the strategic nuclear resources and the tactical nuclear weapons of the Alliance, the potential circumstances and consequences of their use, and the way in which the Alliance should organize to carry on future discussion of these subjects. In February of last year the Nuclear Planning Working Group of this Special Committee, consisting of five NATO Defense Ministers, discussed the existing strategic nuclear forces and agreed that these are adequate to deter a large-scale attack by the Soviet Union. In April last year the same Ministers discussed questions related to tactical nuclear weapons. They agreed that the number of such weapons is sufficient in quantity under present conditions, although the optimum mix could benefit from a more detailed study. These preliminary substantive discussions were followed by recommendations for a permanent organization to carry on the work. This organization was formally established in Paris last December. It consists of (1) a Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee open to any NATO nation willing to participate in its work; and (2) a Nuclear Planning Group composed of seven Defense Ministers drawn from the full Committee. The Nuclear Planning Group will perform detailed studies and prepare policy proposals for consideration by the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee. 9. United Nations Although the restoration of peace in Vietnam has continued to occupy a major share of our attention, we are also vitally concerned with the broader problems of peace throughout the world. To this end, we have continued our support of the United Nations, which was created in 1945 to maintain international peace and security. United Nations peacekeeping forces are helping to preserve peace and security in the Gaza Strip and in Cyprus. United Nations observers are performing similar functions in policing and supervising the cease-fire line in the Kashmir area and in helping to maintain the effectiveness of the Armistice Agreements along the eastern borders of Israel. Undoubtedly, greater use of United Nations peacekeeping abilities would be made if it were possible to secure agreement among the major powers on the methods of initiating and financing peacekeeping operations. Extensive discussions took place on both of these issues in the |