We have been hedging against this possibility for some time, and last year we took a number of actions of which the following are the most important:

Now, in the FY 1968 program we propose to take a number of additional actions to enhance the future capabilities of our Assured Destruction forces, of which the following are the more important:

(1) Produce and deploy the POSEIDON missile.

(2) Produce and deploy improved missile penetration aids.

(3) Increase the proportion of MINUTEMAN III in the planned
force and provide it with an improved third stage.

(4) Initiate the development of new reentry vehicles, specifi-
cally designed for use against targets heavily defended
with ABMs.

I will discuss each of these actions in greater detail later in connection with our other proposals for the strategic forces. But for now, let me point out that the net effect of these actions would be to increase greatly the overall effectiveness of our Assured Destruction force against the Soviet Union by mid-1972. Even if the Moscow-type ABM defense were deployed at other cities as well, the proposed U.S. missile force alone could inflict about 35 percent (86 million) fatalities on the Soviet Union in 1972 after absorbing a surprise attack.

As I noted earlier, a relatively small number of warheads detonated over fifty cities would destroy half of Red China's urban population and more than one-half of her industry.

Thus the strategic missile forces proposed for the FY 1968-72 period would, by themselves, give us an Assured Destruction capability against both the Soviet Union and Red China, simultaneously.

2.

Capability Against "Higher-Than-Expected Threats"

As I indicated last year, our Assured Destruction capability is of such crucial importance to our security that we must be prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats which are greater than those projected in the latest intelligence estimates.

The most severe threat we must consider in planning our Assured Destruction forces is an extensive, effective Soviet ABM deployment combined with a deployment of a substantial ICBM force with a hardtarget kill capability. Such a Soviet offensive force might pose a threat to our MINUTEMAN missiles. An extensive, effective Soviet ABM system might then be able to intercept and destroy a significant portion of our residual missile warheads, including those carried by submarine-launched missiles. (The Soviet offensive and defensive

threats assumed here are both substantially higher than expected.)

To hedge against the possibility of such a threat to our landbased missile forces, we have authorized the development and production of the POSEIDON. Should still additional offensive power be required, and such a requirement is not now clear, we are considering the development and deployment of a new Advanced ICBM, designed to reduce vulnerability to such a Soviet threat. The deployment of the NIKE-X as a defense for our MINUTEMAN force would offer a partial substitute for the possible further expansion of our offensive forces.

But again I want to emphasize that we don't know whether the Soviet Union will develop and deploy the kind of forces assumed here. Even against this higher-than-expected threat, and even without a NIKE-X defense of MINUTEMAN, our proposed strategic missile and bomber forces could still inflict 40 percent or more fatalities on the Soviet population throughout the time period involved.

More extreme threats are highly unlikely. In any event, the changes we are now proposing in our strategic offensive forces would make it dangerous and expensive for the Soviet Union to move in the direction of more extreme threats to our Assured Destruction capability. If we assume, as I believe we should, that the Soviets would want to reduce the vulnerability of their own offensive forces against the possibility of a first strike by our very accurate forces in the FY 1972-73 period, they must further disperse and harden their strategic missiles, which is exactly what they appear to be doing now. To do so is expensive and for the same budget outlay results in reduced missile payloads. Not to do so would leave the Soviet force highly vulnerable. Thus, we can, in planning our forces, foreclose any seemingly "easy" and "cheap" paths to their achievement of a satisfactory Assured Destruction capability and a satisfactory Damage Limiting capability at the same time.

We, of course, cannot preclude the possibility that the Soviet Union may increase its strategic forces budget at some time in the future. That is why we are now undertaking a very comprehensive study of a new strategic missile system. And that is why we are not precluding the possible future construction of new POSEIDON submarines or the defense of our presently deployed MINUTEMAN silos with NIKE-X. While I believe

we should place ourselves in a position to move forward promptly on all of these options if later that should become necessary, we need not commit ourselves to them now.

D.

CAPABILITIES OF THE PROPOSED FORCES FOR DAMAGE LIMITATION

The principal issue in this area of the Strategic Forces Program concerns the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system, i.e., NIKE-X. There are three somewhat overlapping but distinct major purposes for which we might want to deploy such a system at this time:

2.

3.

To protect our cities (and their population and industry) against a Soviet missile attack.

To protect our cities against a Red Chinese missile attack in the mid-1970s.

To help protect our land-based strategic offensive forces
(i.e., MINUTEMAN) against a Soviet missile attack.

After studying the subject exhaustively, and after hearing the

views of our principal military and civilian advisors, we have concluded that we should not initiate an ABM deployment at this time for any of these purposes. We believe that:

1.

The Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U.S. ABM deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force still further with the result that:

a.

The risk of a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. would not be further decreased.

The damage to the U.S. from a Soviet nuclear attack, in
the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any
meaningful sense.

As I noted earlier, the foundation of our security is the deter-
rence of a Soviet nuclear attack. We believe such an attack can
be prevented if it is understood by the Soviets that we possess
strategic nuclear forces so powerful as to be capable of absorb-
ing a Soviet first strike and surviving with sufficient strength
to impose unacceptable damage on them. We have such power to-
day. We must maintain it in the future, adjusting our forces
to offset actual or potential changes in theirs.

2.

3.

-

There is nothing we have seen in either our own or the Soviet
Union's technology which would lead us to believe we cannot
do this. From the beginning of the NIKE-ZEUS project in 1955
through the end of this current fiscal year, we will have in-
vested a total of about $4 billion on ballistic missile defense
research including NIKE-ZEUS, NIKE-X and Project DEFENDER.
And, during the last five or six years, we have spent about
$1.2 billion on the development of penetration aids to help
ensure that our missiles could penetrate the enemy's defenses.
As a result of these efforts, we have the technology already
in hand to counter any offensive or defensive force changes
the Soviet Union might undertake in the foreseeable future.

We believe the Soviet Union has essentially the same requirement for a deterrent or "Assured Destruction" force as the U.S. Therefore, deployment by the U.S. of an ABM defense which would degrade the destruction capability of the Soviet's offensive force to an unacceptable level would lead to expansion of that force. This would leave us no better off than we were before.

With respect to protection of the U.S. against a possible Red
Chinese nuclear attack, the lead time required for China
to develop a significant ICBM force is greater than that re-
quired for deployment of our defense therefore the Chinese
threat in itself would not dictate the production of an ABM
system at this time.

-

Similarly, although the protection of our land-based strategic
offensive forces against the kind of heavy, sophisticated
missile attack the Soviets may be able to mount in the mid-
or late 1970s might later prove to be worthwhile, it is not
yet necessary to produce and deploy the NIKE-X for that purpose.

I have already discussed, in connection with my review of the capabilities of our strategic forces for Assured Destruction, the third major purpose for which we may want to deploy an ABM defense (i.e., the protection of MINUTEMAN). Now, I would like to discuss the other two purposes.

1.

Deployment of NIKE-X for Defense of Our Cities Against a Soviet

Attack.

What is involved here is an analysis of the contribution the NIKE-X system might make to the defense of our cities under two assumptions:

(1) That the Soviets do not react to such a deployment.

(2) That the Soviets do react in an attempt to preserve their
"Assured Destruction" capability.

As you know, the major elements of the NIKE-X system are being developed in such a way as to permit a variety of deployments; two have been selected for the purposes of this analysis. The first, which I will call "Posture A", represents a light U.S. defense against a Soviet missile attack on our cities. It consists of an area defense of the entire continental United States, providing redundant (overlapping) coverage of key target areas; and, in addition, a relatively low-density SPRINT defense of a number of the largest cities to provide some protection against those warheads which get through the area defense. The second deployment, which I call "Posture B", is a heavier defense against a Soviet attack. With the same area coverage, it provides a higher-density SPRINT defense for twice the number of cities.

Shown on the following table are the components and the costs (which, if past experience is any guide, may be understated by 50 to 100 percent for the systems as a wholea/) of Posture A and Posture B.

a Even before the systems became operational, pressures would mount for their expansion at a cost of still additional billions. The unprotected, or relatively unprotected, areas of the U.S. would claim that their tax dollars were being diverted to protect New York and Washington while they were left naked. And, critics would point out that our strategic offensive force is premised on a much larger Soviet threat (the "possible", not the "probable" threat); they would conclude that the same principles should be applied to our strategic defensive forces. For these and other reasons, I believe that, once started, an ABM system deployed with the objective of protecting the United States against the Soviet Union would require an expenditure on the order of $40 billion over a ten year period.

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